# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JANVARY

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## JANUARY 1967


The End of Either/Or . . . . . *McGeorge Bundy* 189
Policy-Making in a World Turned Upside Down . . . . . *Thomas L. Hughes* 202
Our Dialogue with Japan . . . . . *Edwin O. Reischauer* 215
China in Context . . . . . *Lucian W. Pye* 229
China Convulsed . . . . . *Mark Gayn* 246
Cuba, Castro and the United States . . . . . *Philip W. Bonsal* 260
Planning Our Military Forces . . . . . *Harold Brown* 277
New Horizons in Foreign Trade . . . . . *William Diebold, Jr.* 291
The Rights of Primitive Peoples . . . . . *Margaret Mead* 304
Economic Revolution in the Soviet Union . *Marshall I. Goldman* 319
The Shackled Historian . . . . . *Herbert Feis* 332
Asian Revolution and American Ideology . . *Raul S. Manglapus* 344
Non-Crisis in Italy . . . . . *E. A. Bayne* 353
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *Henry L. Roberts* 363
Source Material . . . . . *Donald Wasson* 382



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## *CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE*

*McGEORGE BUNDY,* President, the Ford Foundation; formerly Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; former Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University * * * *THOMAS L. HUGHES,* Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; former Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State * * * *EDWIN O. REISCHAUER,* Professor of Far Eastern Languages, Harvard University; Ambassador to Japan, 1961–66; former Special Assistant in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; author of "The United States and Japan," "Wanted: An Asian Policy" and other works * * **LUCIAN W. PYE,* Professor of Political Science and staff member of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Director of the China Studies Project of the Council on Foreign Relations; author of several books in the field * * * *MARK GAYN,* Asia Bureau Chief for *The Toronto Star;* author of "The Fight for the Pacific," "Japan Diary" and other books on Asia * * * *PHILIP W. BONSAL,* Ambassador to Cuba, 1959–60; formerly Ambassador to Colombia and Bolivia * * * *HAROLD BROWN,* Secretary of the Air Force; formerly Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; formerly Director, Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California * * * *WILLIAM DIEBOLD, Jr.,* Senior Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; author of "The Schuman Plan" and "Trade and Payments in Western Europe" * * * *MARGARET MEAD,* Curator of Ethnology, American Museum of Natural History; frequently engaged since 1928 in anthropological studies in the South Pacific; author of many works in the general field, including "Growing Up in New Guinea" and "Coming of Age in Samoa" * * * *MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN,* Associate Professor of Economics, Wellesley College; Associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University; author of "Soviet Foreign Aid and Trade with Developing Countries," "Soviet Marketing: Distribution in a Controlled Economy" and other works * * * *HERBERT FEIS,* former Economic Adviser, Department of State; member of American delegations at many international conferences; author of "The Road to Pearl Harbor," "Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin," "1933: Characters in Crisis" and other works * * * *RAUL S. MANGLAPUS,* member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Philippine Senate; former Undersecretary, Department of Foreign Affairs; candidate of the Party for Philippine Progress in the 1965 presidential elections * * * *E. A. BAYNE,* Associate, American Universities Field Staff; formerly on the staff of the Economic Coöperation Administration; author of "Four Ways of Politics: State and Nation in Italy, Somalia, Israel, Iran."

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# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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## THE END OF EITHER/OR

*By McGeorge Bundy*

THE end of 1966 finds the United States with more hard business before it than at any time since 1962. We are embattled in Viet Nam; we are in the middle of a true social revolution at home; and we have undiminished involvement with continents and countries that still refuse to match our simpler pictures of them. It is not surprising that one can almost hear the nation asking where it is trying to go. It is Viet Nam that gives the question a special edge, and probably it will be in Viet Nam that the most important early answers will be given. But Viet Nam is not the place to begin. It is better to begin with ourselves, and to ask ourselves again what we want—and should want—in the world.

With all his international preoccupations, the American remains a man of private purposes. His hopes and fears for these purposes still decide most elections. Foreign travel and investment multiply (to the despair of those who think the dollar an end, and not a means, and to the great advantage of a nation that must not live alone any more), but they multiply mainly for private reasons. Americans can be touched by hunger and sentiment, so that food goes to India and help of all sorts to Israel, but the American dream remains domestic. However great their nation's interests overseas, the boys always want to come home. Such inwardness of national feeling can be dangerous, but it has the enormously important consequence for others that the American democracy has no enduring taste for imperialism.

What the American people still want of the world, then, is that it should allow what George Washington called "the security of their union and the advancement of their happiness." The enormous difference between Washington's foreign affairs and our own—a difference nine-tenths of which has developed in the last

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twenty-five years—is in the number, variety and size of the American actions which are generated by this desire. It is not a change of national purpose. Behind every sustained and serious engagement of the United States there lies an express or implied decision that this action is important to the safety and welfare of the United States itself. Policies which cannot persuasively claim this justification do not last, however attractive they may be for a time or with a part of our public. The American commitment anywhere is only as deep as the continued conviction of Americans that their own interest requires it.

In a world of accelerating change, with both sciences and societies in continuing revolution, it is not only natural but necessary that the specific policies which are right in one decade should be questioned in the next. No spokesman for American foreign policy should ever be afraid to question his own premises, and none should shirk the continuous task of relating what this country does and says to its own safety and welfare. One of the great contributions of our last two Presidents has been their insistent habit, inside the government, of reviewing established policies to test their continuing validity. Presidents are properly cautious about sweeping changes, and both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Johnson have questioned more policies than they have changed. But as political leaders both of them have continuously understood what both professors and bureaucrats too easily forget—that the most admired plans and policies, whether freshly minted in the imagination or sanctified by long establishment, are no better than their demonstrable relation to the American interest.

There is another almost opposite justification for regular reexamination of our policies: it is that by and large they can stand it. Back in 1950, when Mr. Acheson denounced the species he called "re-Examinist," there was good reason to fear the revival of isolationism, and it could well seem the part of wisdom to avert debates which might call the whole course of U. S. policy into question. But sixteen years later that reaction is out of date. The years of Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson have confirmed a general policy of engagement which is as far from isolationism, in spirit as well as practice, as it is from the merely moralistic globalism which in earlier generations sometimes seemed the only alternative. The debate between Woodrow Wilson and Hiram Johnson is over, and simple solutions to hard problems are less

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seductive than they used to be. There are wild men in the wings, but on the main stage even the argument on Viet Nam turns on tactics, not fundamentals. This was the meaning of the overwhelming defeat of Senator Goldwater. He may not have been as wild as he sounded, but the country would not take the chance. Candidates of all persuasions, in 1966, showed that they had learned that lesson.

II

It has not been easy for us to accept the complexity of the world. The revolution in our foreign affairs which dates from the Fall of France made demands that were met only at the price of great oversimplification. For twenty years from 1940 to 1960 the standard pattern of discussion on foreign policy was that of *either/or:* Isolation or Intervention, Europe or Asia, Wallace or Byrnes, Marshall Plan or Bust, SEATO or Neutralism, the U.N. or Power Politics, and always, insistently, anti-Communism or accommodation with Communists. The drama of these debates, the sweeping generalities which were used repeatedly by political leaders from Roosevelt through Eisenhower, and the excess of certainty which infected every Secretary of State from Hull through Dulles—all these forces served to push into the background the fact that the world is not simple.

Moreover, in the 1940s there were quite special reasons for strong and simple attitudes. Let us admit that Americans too easily choose up sides. The cardboard heroes and villains of the movies, and now of television, respond to a deeply ingrained national habit of dividing the world into good guys and bad guys. (No snobbery is called for; it is a habit to which some of our most distinguished intellectuals are also addicted.) But the first years after 1940 did have their full quota of authentic villains and heroes: Hitler and Churchill, Stalin and Marshall, Mao Tse-tung and Magsaysay. These genuinely polar choices gave reinforcement to natural habits of thought, and justification to the hardening of arguments.

We need not be self-righteous in criticizing the simplifications that were popular in the generation that joined the world. If we are old enough, the odds are overwhelming that we shared in them. Time after time, simplification was the prerequisite of decision and action, and what is most important about this twenty years is that most of the great decisions were right. If the

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acceptance of complexity was somewhat delayed, and if the political cost of the first great encounters with failure (in China), and stalemate (in Korea) was high, still there is no major nation whose record in that period is half as good.

But in the 1950s the balance of advantage shifted against black-and-white thinking. It was the tragedy of the Eisenhower Administration that the President, who understood in his bones the need for generosity and accommodation, was served by a Secretary of State who combined great subtlety—even deviousness—of tactics with a deep internal need for arbitrary moral certainty. Where there really were still clear-cut issues (as in Berlin or the Formosa Straits) the Eisenhower Administration was capable of a careful firmness that many of us underrated at the time. But where it was not simple—which was most of the time in most countries—the record was disappointing.

The day of *either/or* may have ended with the death of John Foster Dulles, for black-and-white was never the instinctive mode of General Eisenhower. But with John F. Kennedy we enter a new age. Obviously there had been much recognition of complexity in the years before 1961, but Kennedy was the first American President to make a habit of it. Over and over he insisted on the double assertion of policies which stood in surface contradiction with each other: resistance to tyranny and relentless pursuit of accommodation; reinforcement of defense and new leadership for disarmament; counter-insurgency and the Peace Corps; openings to the left but no closed doors to the reasonable right; an Alliance for Progress and unremitting opposition to Castro; in sum, the olive branch and the arrows. He argued that the surface contradictions were unreal, and by the 1960s the country was ready to agree. In the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson this view has persisted. Like Theodore Roosevelt, and for similar reasons, Mr. Johnson often prefers the poster to the etching, but those upset by language too vivid for their own tastes have too often overlooked the equally vivid language that asserts with equal conviction the countervailing and complementary doctrine. Under the last two Presidents at least, the recognition of complexity has been the first law of policy.

A closely related lesson has been the demonstration that what happens in the world is not determined by Americans alone. (Others with an exaggerated sense of their own importance have had to learn this lesson still more painfully than we—Moscow and

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Peking are consoling instances—but this essay is about our troubles, not theirs.) Already in the last years of the Truman Administration the painful experiences with China and Korea were turning the minds of perceptive men to the problem of the limits of American influence, and the message was preached in a series of sensible books by men who left office with Mr. Acheson. But in the 1950s Washington did not speak in the rhetoric of restraint, and later events have had to teach us as a nation what a few learned earlier from harsh, direct experience.

Nations in all continents, in the last ten years, have shown a persistent tendency to have histories of their own which are only marginally related to the actions of the United States. It remains the comfortable habit of politicians elsewhere to excuse their own failures as the product of American folly or wickedness, while their successes are usually claimed as all their own. The claims are stronger than the excuses. The role of the United States is seldom central in the internal affairs of other states. Even when direct American power is as important as it has been for a generation in Germany and in Japan, it is still the local political forces which are decisive in the selection and support of governments. The United States did not create de Gaulle or destroy Goulart; it did not make or unmake Sukarno and Nkrumah; it has not been able to "deal with" Nasser, except by making small-scale deals with him; it was not the agent of the fall of Khrushchev or the rise of Lin Piao. It did not even determine the result of the recent elections in the Dominican Republic. Anyone who thinks that the lines of influence from Washington are like so many strings to so many puppets has never sat at the pulling end. We have had to recognize more and more that we live in the midst of troubles most of which we did not make, and among governments moved by problems and purposes of their own.

We have confirmed our acceptance of continuing engagement in the world's affairs, while no longer needing the somewhat artificial encouragement of a belief that we are both all-righteous and all-powerful. We no longer doubt that we should have extensive policies—and take extensive actions—in Europe, in South America, in Asia and in all the oceans. (We still have doubts about Africa, and they are reflected both in the too low priority which we tend to give to the problems of that continent and in the somewhat jerky quality of what we have done in places like the Congo.) We no longer expect these undertakings to produce

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final results by fixed dates. We have accepted involvement in the real world, and we see that world more nearly as it is.

Meanwhile our real and relative strength has continued to grow. The general performance of our economy has been excellent for nearly six years, and our achievements at the edges of science and technology are still more startling. We have put behind us the fear of stagnation that marked the first years after Sputnik, and worry among our friends about our possible weakness has given way to fear that our continuing technological revolution may have a mass and momentum that condemns all others to a sad second rank. These fears are probably exaggerated, but they testify to our present strength. So does the fact that more than four-fifths of all the foreign investing in the world is now done by Americans.

We also have two decades now of hard experience in the practice of international affairs, and the day has passed when any other nation could claim the advantage of experience and exposure in comparison with us. In particular areas and for particular purposes, others still have special skills that we cannot match. But taken as a whole, the stock of American experience, understanding, sympathy and simple knowledge is now much the most impressive in the world.

These assertions are comforting, however, only in a comparative sense. It does not follow at all that we have all the power and skill we need. Complexity increases; the threat of aggression persists; and so does the menace of nuclear weapons to the future of all mankind. The demands upon American strength and good sense do not decrease. We cannot ensure peace or progress anywhere alone. But there is no safety yet for free men anywhere without us, and it is the relation between this astonishing proposition and the complexities of each part of the world that makes the conduct of our foreign affairs such an overwhelming task.

## III

The great present case, of course, is Viet Nam. Nothing about it is simple. Indeed what has made debate so easy, and action so hard, in Viet Nam is that the debater can defend the propositions he likes from a great pile of evidence in which there is plenty to support every view. In our actions, however, we have to live with the whole. The truth in Viet Nam is that there is both aggression from the North and civil conflict in the South, both corruption

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and self-sacrifice, both strong anti-Communist feeling and a weary lack of affection for much of the present anti-Communist leadership. The political base for an effective non-Communist state is still weak—but it does exist. The Vietnamese do not think of the Americans as they thought of the French—but they do retain a stubborn insistence on doing things in their own way.

The internal complexities are matched internationally. Viet Nam is indeed a test of Communist revolutionary doctrine, and what happens there will affect what happens elsewhere; but victory for Ho would not mean automatic communization of all Asia, and the defeat of aggression would not mean an end to the pervasive—if sometimes exaggerated—threat of China. The lines of influence and concern stretch out in all directions, but almost never in simple and straightforward terms. There is no simple unity among either Communists or non-Communists on Viet Nam. Those who support our view do so for reasons that vary, and many of those who are critical would be more critical still if we were now to back out. On the international scene, as inside Viet Nam, the only general proposition that seems valid is that sweeping and simple views are useful only for those who do not have responsibility.

This is not the place for a study of the long line of decisions that has brought us where we are in Viet Nam. The continuing conviction, through twelve years, has been that we should be ready to do our full share to help prevent the Communists from taking South Viet Nam by force and terror. This conviction has led to decisions that few foresaw in the early 1950s. Those decisions have enlarged the costs and raised the stakes of both success and failure. The most conspicuous increase in our effort has been military, and more than once decisions have been made just in time. It seems almost certain that without the military commitments made by President Kennedy and President Johnson in late 1961 and early 1965—in each case after the most prayerful consideration of the consequences of both action and inaction—South Viet Nam would have been delivered to the tender care of Hanoi and the chances for peaceful progress in many Pacific nations would have been heavily reduced. My own belief is that these great decisions, with all their costs, have been right, and that it is right to persevere—in the interest of the Vietnamese, in our own interest and in the wider interest of peace and progress in the Pacific.

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The political requirements, less dramatic but equally essential, have also grown with time, and at the end of 1966 performance in this field has still not matched the encouraging successes of the armed forces. In part, of course, the difficulty here is simply that without general and sustained military superiority in a given area it is hard even to begin on political action. Beyond that, the job is much more unfamiliar to us all. Finally, unlike the direct campaign against major Communist military units, the political effort, in all its forms, can take effect only as it engages the energies and convictions of the Vietnamese people themselves. So we must not be surprised that real pacification is hard to get in the Vietnamese countryside. It is, after all, the one thing above all others that the Communists are determined to block by whatever means they can. That this work remains slow and hard, less than two years after the days of highest Communist hope, is not astonishing. But it is also no ground for complacency, and it remains right for both Saigon and Washington to give the highest possible priority to this part of their work.

Viet Nam is thus both military and political. It is also an example of another kind of double imperative: the requirement for *both* action *and* restraint. It is necessary to act, but it is also necessary to keep that action within limits. What makes this rule a matter of life and death in military matters is of course the ghastly spectre of nuclear exchanges—anywhere with anyone. But there are other reasons for restraint. Even without the ultimate weapons, we would want no war with China. Even without China we would go badly wrong to commit ourselves, by word or by act, to the destruction of the régime in Hanoi. We simply are not in the business of destroying Communist states by force (a proposition confirmed in a most painful way at the Bay of Pigs).

The most debated of our military actions in Viet Nam is of course the bombing of the North. In a measure this debate is less an argument between the Government and its critics than a conflict between two schools of thought, both of which the Government opposes. Given their quite opposite politics and military prejudgments, it is natural that there should be a sharp divergence between single-minded advocates of air power and equally single-minded believers that all forms of bombing are both immoral and ineffective. Those who choose to believe that Hanoi is the aggrieved party in Viet Nam will have still stronger feelings. So debaters here and abroad have naturally made the bombing a

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central topic, and the tactical advantage of this emphasis for Communists is obvious.

But the truth is that the bombing of the North has never been more than one military instrument among many—an instrument made legitimate by previous hostile actions, made necessary by the critical dangers of 1965, and justified still by its value in hampering the work of infiltration and supply. All bombing carries risks of error and of civilian damage. The bombing of the North has been the most accurate and the most restrained in modern warfare. Those who have watched the President and his Secretary of Defense in action on this subject can testify that it is wholly wrong to charge them with recklessness, or with abdication of their responsibility. What they deserve instead is the understanding support of those who want restraint, as they continue to resist pressures from the few who do believe in greatly widening the war as a means to ending it.

Here, indeed, is the precise and persisting difference on which the country ruled by its vote in 1964. The real choice is not between "doves" and "hawks." It is between those who would keep close and careful civilian control over a difficult and demanding contest, and those who would use whatever force is thought necessary by any military leader in any service.

There is also a decisive difference between raising the cost of aggression and trying to "win" by "defeating" Hanoi. To attempt such a "victory" would be terribly wrong on three counts: (1) it would carry great risk of war with China and the Soviet Union; (2) it would engage us in a new and terrible contest for which we have no taste or need—a contest for the future of North Viet Nam; (3) it would not settle the issue in the South. What three administrations have always understood is still true: the decisive area of our interest in Viet Nam is in the South. It is there that our military and political actions can and should be intensified. It is there that we can also give massive support for relief, for rehabilitation and for economic and social advances—always behind the shield of growing military and political strength and self-confidence.

The contest in Viet Nam is not likely to be short, though its major combat phase may end well before the long hard work of real pacification and rebuilding. Fortunately the American people have demonstrated that their staying power in this effort is much greater than either friend or foe expected. In the face of

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repeated disappointments and in spite of the confusion of angry debate and imperfect understanding on all sides, our people have shown great resilience of spirit. They have accepted the stress of this effort, and they have refused to give support to easy wrong answers at either extreme. Open opposition has flourished. There has been less jingoism than in any previous war in our history. The nation has endured the special demands of an uncensored war—one which has been freely reported from our side of the lines by a number of men who clearly doubt its value. This is also the first war with daily television from the field. I think it is good, on balance, that the war is brought into our living rooms, but it remains a striking fact that this time we get our dose of "The Naked and the Dead" not afterward, but instantly.

The ability of the people of the United States to keep their balance in this unprecedented situation is profoundly encouraging. Whatever criticism may be current abroad, it is just this sturdy temper that all our friends have needed before and may need again in future. The true value of the United States as an ally and friend rests not on the language of treaties which always have escape clauses, and not on mechanical notions of cause and consequence, but rather upon the fact that this is a nation which sees things through and tries to see them straight.

The prospect in Viet Nam, then, is for more struggle and sacrifice. Of course it is always possible that the Communists may give up their opposition to negotiations, and certainly it is essential that we ourselves should be ready and eager for such a change in their position. There is every reason for the openness and responsiveness that the President and the Secretary of State have repeatedly shown, not only in their words but in public and private diplomacy. The passionate sincerity of this commitment will be proven to all doubters on the day that their offer is accepted. But it would be wrong to count on any early Communist response. Communists, like other men, negotiate when they think it helps them to achieve an objective, and up to now the clear Communist objective has been to take over South Viet Nam. The Communists are quite right in supposing that our own firm purpose in any negotiation will be very different from theirs. Moreover, the struggle will necessarily continue during any negotiations until acceptable terms for an armistice are worked out, and in these circumstances a prolonged negotiation could easily undermine the confidence of Communists in the South. For these

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reasons it is unlikely that the men in Hanoi will agree to negotiations until our purpose or theirs has changed. Even then the prospect for a negotiated settlement may be weak, for if the Communists do decide that their present purposes exceed their capacity, may they not prefer a private decision to a public admission? This is what happened in Greece, and it is as likely an ending in Viet Nam as a peace by formal agreement. Actions leading to reciprocal actions may be the eventual path away from open warfare—and it was right for the United States to make it plain again in September, through Ambassador Goldberg, that the United States is ready to take this road too.

It is not pleasant to have to write of the prospects for accommodation with Vietnamese Communists in these stark terms. A number of talented and honorable writers have pinned their faith to very different notions of what may be practicable. But they have produced little evidence to back their faith. It would be agreeable if there were a real prospect of a peaceful coalition with Communist participation and non-Communist control; but this picture, drawn from the unusual experience of France and Italy in the 1940s, seems irrelevant to the realities of Viet Nam. It would be good also if there were a serious prospect of inducing the Communists as an organized force to accept a political contest divorced from force and terror, in a securely neutralized and guaranteed state; but the evidence of past Communist behavior in Viet Nam does not support this hope. My own unhappy conclusion is that many of those who write about this kind of solution are really engaged in concealing—perhaps even from themselves—their willingness to let South Viet Nam go to the Communists rather than face the trials of a continued struggle. In this respect they simply do not speak for their country, and it is of great importance that Communists everywhere should come to understand that fact.

## IV

Viet Nam is our most immediate foreign business, but even Viet Nam should not let us forget the strength which permits and the interest which requires our active effort elsewhere. As in South Viet Nam itself, so in relating Viet Nam to other concerns, the right choice is not either/or; it is both/and.

First, we need *both* military *and* economic action. Our stake in Viet Nam, and our larger stake in Asia, will not end as aggression

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subsides. We have an abiding national interest in the progress of the people across the Pacific. This interest has been magisterially reaffirmed in the President's trip to Asia. It is part and parcel of the still wider American interest in enlightened help to those who are helping themselves. The level of our economic aid is too low today to serve our own interests, and the fight for a strong and responsive program next year may be the most urgent single cause in foreign affairs for men of good will to back.

Second, we are *both* an Atlantic *and* a Pacific partner. Our interest in the future of Europe has not weakened merely because the most active danger today is in Asia. Since the missile crisis of 1962 Europe has known four years of continental quiet that are unmatched in the last half-century. Not all Europeans have taken full advantage of this quiet to work for harmony beyond their present borders, and we ourselves have been a little slow, until recently, in moving out from successful defense toward wider settlement. We face a serious test now in working both against nuclear spread and for Atlantic partnership, but it is a test we can meet. Certainly it is wrong to suppose that our effort in Viet Nam changes or weakens our interest in Europe. We must put troops where they are most needed, but we can and will sustain the great Atlantic commitment we have honored steadily for twenty-five years.

Finally, we have a still more sweeping double duty: to carry on *both* these wide foreign activities *and* an active program of social progress at home. Those who resist such a domestic program can be expected to use the costs of Viet Nam as an excuse for a domestic penny-pinching which would be as shortsighted as it is unnecessary. The recent election has probably strengthened the position of those who feel this way. They are wrong. Even if the Vietnamese war were twice as expensive as it is, and even if it were likely to end entirely in a few months, it would be a mistake to use it as an argument for delay in doing what needs to be done within the United States. Since the costs of Viet Nam are in fact quite manageable, and since they are likely to continue for years, the notion of using Viet Nam as a reason for delay at home becomes absurd. It makes no sense for the real interests of any American, since the work at home that we do not do now will simply have to be done later at much higher cost.

It is therefore an act of folly for any true liberal to argue that we must choose between Viet Nam and social progress. The

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truth is the opposite. Americans who believe in the further development of the great new departures in education and health, in the battle for better cities, and most of all in the cause of really equal opportunity—those, in short, who care for social progress—should not strengthen the hands of their opponents by accepting the notion that we must choose between persistence in Viet Nam and full budgetary support for a strong domestic program of action. It is not so, in economic or even in political terms. Retreat in Viet Nam is not the road forward at home. The real consequence of a pullout in Southeast Asia, for our domestic affairs, would almost surely be heavy reaction.

So as we face the New Year we have no shortage of work to do. We have come a long way over the last generation, and we have a long way to go. But while there is some impatience and irritation among us, we can properly put the main emphasis elsewhere: on our steadiness of purpose, our capacity to do what needs doing and our ability to hold true to the ends of peace and human progress even in a time when the path to peace leads through jungle warfare and the path to progress through the worst tangles of our own selfishness and prejudice.

Almost twenty years ago, Henry Stimson wrote in these pages of "The Challenge to Americans." He was writing mainly about Russia and the needs of Europe, but he set his argument in a larger frame. I venture to pluck a few of his sentences from their context because I think he would not mind.

> It would be shriveling timidity for America to refuse to play to the full her present necessary part in the world. And the certain penalty for such timidity would be failure. The troubles of Europe and Asia are not "other people's troubles"; they are ours. . . . The world's affairs cannot be simplified by eager words. We cannot take refuge from reality in the folly of black-and-white solutions. . . . We need not suppose that the task we face is easy, or that all our undertakings will be quickly successful. The construction of a stable peace is a longer, more complex and greater task than the relatively simple work of war-making. . . . Surely there is here a fair and tempting challenge to Americans.

The challenge of 1967 is harder than that of 1947 only for those who are in battle, and for their families. For the rest of us it is easier now than it was then. We have twenty years of experience to help us, and we have the spur of knowing that our other necessary efforts, at home and abroad, are the best possible payment on the debt we owe to those who fight.

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# POLICY-MAKING IN A WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN

*By Thomas L. Hughes*

ACCORDING to legend, when Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown in 1781, he sent the British army marching out with colors cased and drums beating to the tune, "The World Turned Upside Down." Repeatedly over the intervening years, as in the preceding centuries, history has harbored those who have turned the world, or whose world has turned, upside down. Some were bent on radically uprooting, others on beneficially preserving, each according to his own lights. Revolutionaries and traditionalists alike frequently find the world behaving contrary to expectations.

On seven continents, change is proceeding in ways that defy the ideologists and soothsayers alike. Change—and anxiety. "We do not know what will be born," said Valéry at Zurich four years after the Armistice of 1918, "and we fear the future, not without reason. We hope vaguely, we dread precisely."

Yet articulation is preferable to brooding. The dire dilemmas of our day must for each of us become personal ones as events impinge upon our lives and responsibilities. Even the most casual among us has a duty to himself to try to pull together his scattered thoughts to see whether any practical insights have come to him from his training, his travel, his reading, his conversations and his work. All this encourages me to speculate, somewhat introspectively, about certain aspects of the foreign-policy world in which I now live.

The traditional professional way of looking at foreign policy is that of late nineteenth-century Europe, which assumed a world of vertically separated sovereign states presided over by good, bad or nondescript governments, internally compartmentalized for policy-making purposes. In those days, at least in theory, responsibilities were fixed. Each participant knew with whom he was "dealing." The experts and operators inside each government knew where their obligations and responsibilities lay. Their essential task was to sort out the problems confronting them from abroad, to line these problems up against any favorite goals of their own, and then to set about pursuing a course of action guided by the touchstone of the "national interest." Tensions

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were expected to arise as these organized units confronted and conflicted with one another, and it was considered prudent to keep up defenses just in case.

As we have moved from the age of sail to steam and from air to space, amendments to this basic concept have been made to allow for growing complexities and other recent irritations. But in many quarters these assumptions are still whimsically considered to be integral to the concept of foreign-policy responsibility, and even essential to the self-respect of its professional participants.

Turning this traditional foreign-policy world upside down, let us consider two phenomena which have intruded into the very center of foreign-policy-making in the '60s. The first could be called "the two cultures in foreign affairs," and the second, in some ways complementary to it, "the meeting of horizontal and vertical politics."

II

If each of us draws his own map of the world, we quickly discover that maps differ. Men and institutions and governments operate under their own laws of relativity about what is important in the world at any given moment. Like the Bostonian's and the New Yorker's map of the United States, Senator Fulbright's map of the world clearly differs from former Senator Goldwater's, even if the dates on them are the same. The Pentagon's map of the world contrasts with A.I.D.'s, the C.I.A.'s map is unlike U.S.I.A.'s, N.A.S.A.'s map may differ from the A.E.C.'s—all in terms of assets, vulnerabilities, commitments, past investments, future hopes and overall significance from separate institutional points of view. A map of the world which looks right side up in one part of Washington often looks upside down or left side up in another. In the very nature of things bureaucratic, policies run where preferences lead. In the institutional structure of the United States government, for example, certain nations achieve a built-in over-representation, a weighted voting constituency. The overlay of all the different perspectives—of all the different maps—produces in the real foreign-policy world a mosaic of varying colors, sizes, shapes, pins and flags, depending on a variety of interactions, priorities and interruptions, many of them by no means under American control.

Thus in a sense the facts of foreign policy are not facts, or if they are, they are highly slippery and manipulable. To state it

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broadly, foreign-policy facts are eminently less satisfying than defense facts or industrial facts. That is one reason why the Research and Analysis offices of the Department of State occasionally envy their Research and Engineering counterparts in the Department of Defense. The two groups are noncompetitive in more ways than one. The latter deal constantly in the higher forms of mathematics; the former deal constantly in the lower forms of non-mathematics, even anti-mathematics. Indeed, we in the State Department are just specialized enough in the variables of foreign affairs to know how fruitless it is to try to run Chinese Communist intentions through the computers, or to try to quantify what is going on in Buddhist pagodas or to extrapolate the psyche of Fidel Castro. We are paid to make educated guesses, but that is something different. It is not very systematic, as systems-analysis goes.

Another reason why it is difficult to find "the facts" is that there are so many just plain facts. There is simply no end of facts. Yet at the summit of the government, there are only one President, one Secretary of State and one Secretary of Defense, who, no matter how great their appetite for facts, cannot digest them all. Facts have to be gathered, reported, selected, arranged, varnished, packaged and presented. Facts have to be added together to make patterns of facts.

The policy-maker gets his facts where he finds them—at the end of this process, or anywhere along the way. So he may properly ask the questions: Which facts? Whose facts? Whose selection? Whose varnish? Who is selecting the selectors of facts? And the variables implicit in these questions are complemented by the consumer's own personal variables of time, context, toleration and receptivity for facts. The policy-maker's understandable preference for immediate versus long-term facts, for specific versus open-ended facts, for facts pointing toward minimal choices versus facts thrusting toward major changes in policy—all these affect the fate of facts in the realm of foreign policy.

Thus all foreign-policy facts are relative, but some are more relative than others. This is where the two cultures come in: the cultures through which the facts are filtered. On a far larger canvas C.P. Snow discovered and copyrighted the concept of the two cultures several years ago. But the pattern also closely fits the extrasensory perceptions of the foreign-policy world as I know it. Like Professor Snow, I have often felt that I was

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moving among two groups—comparable in intelligence, not grossly different in social origin, earning about the same incomes, who in intellectual, moral, and psychological climate had little in common. . . . Between the two is a gulf of mutual incomprehension—sometimes hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding. . . . The feelings of one pole become the anti-feelings of the other. . . . This polarization is sheer loss to us all.[1]

Snow divided the whole of Western society into two polar groups—the literary intellectuals at one pole and the physical scientists at the other. I cannot define the two foreign-affairs cultures with equal precision. I can nonetheless say that I am strongly aware of divergent polar pulls that tend to separate the community of hardware orientation from the community of human orientation. This divergence goes beyond atmospherics to fundamental ways of thinking.

The divergence is not necessarily deliberate or even conscious on the part of the participants. Nor does it have anything to do with alleged conspiracies which assorted critics from time to time charge up to various New York law firms, establishments, syndicates or secret societies. Nor am I trying to separate the men from the boys, or the hawks from the doves. I mean something more serious, and will risk further generalizing about it.

In the United States today there is on the one hand a grouping of those impulses and associations which increasingly link the scientifically creative forces, institutions and personalities of industry, defense and intelligence, of physics, electronics and nuclear energy, of statistics, management and computers—a grouping now being curiously augmented by cadres of "modernizers" rising up from obsolescent constitutionalism and prescribing military government for the "economic stabilization" of developing societies. All this can be contrasted with a grouping on the other hand of those impulses and associations which our hardware specialists now call "software," embracing the more traditionally humanistic tendencies both of skepticism and humane commitment—outlooks concerned with the intangibles of society like individual motivation, conviction, identification, participation, loyalty, persistence—disciplines devoted to the anthropological, historical, sociological, behavioristic bases for the politics of aspiration—perceptions relevant to the cohesiveness of groups, the breadth of the political base, the social cement, the viability

[1] C. P. Snow, "The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution." New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959, p. 2–12.

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of societies, the arts of democratic leadership, the ethical propulsions and dilemmas, and the eternal case for ballot-casting and for stimulating the political energy essential for closed societies to evolve into open ones.

These two basic divergences have something to do with William James's old distinctions between the "tough-minded and the tender-minded:"

> The tough think of the tender as sentimentalists and softheads. The tender feel the tough to be unrefined, callous, or brutal. Their mutual reaction is very much like that that takes place when Bostonian tourists mingle with a population like that of Cripple Creek. Each type believes the other to be inferior to itself; but disdain in the one case is mingled with amusement, in the other it has a dash of fear.[2]

The two cultures in foreign affairs likewise have something to do with the shades of difference between science and art, between deduction and induction, between assurance and reserved judgment, between determinants and indeterminants, between solid referents and nuances, between photography and impressionism, between statics and motion. They have something to do with the differences between quantity and quality; between specialists and generalists; between model builders and moralists; between coercion and consent; between kolkhoz and kibbutz; between force and subtlety; between the appeals of power and the power of appeals; between Bismarck at Sedan and Lincoln at Gettysburg; between Lenin at the Finland Station and Gandhi on the Salt March. These distinctions apply unevenly, but each contains a partial truth. In different ways the intellectual descendants of Marx, Freud and Einstein have complicated matters by enlisting in both cultures, alternately serving each with weapons to pierce the traditional armor of the other.

In their effects on the policy process, the polar pulls of the two cultures are destabilizing. No one would accuse the twentieth-century strategic engineers belonging to the first culture, laboring in what President Eisenhower has called our "military-industrial complex," of the lack of sophistication of the nineteenth-century pacifist merchant of death, Alfred Nobel. But Nobel's peculiar *Weltanschauung* is worthwhile resuscitating every now and then as an abrupt reminder of the dead end to which the unbridled passion of the engineer in politics can lead. "Well, you know," Nobel wrote to a friend, "it is rather fiendish things we are work-

[2] William James, "Pragmatism." New York: Longmans Green, 1928, p. 13.

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ing on, but they are so interesting as purely technical problems, and so completely technical as well as so clear of all financial and commercial considerations, that they are doubly fascinating."[8]

The polar tendency of the second culture can be equally destabilizing. Appalled or frustrated by one aspect or another of what they see going on about them, its adherents tend to tire. They may stay in the policy process, yet discard considerations of pertinence. Some are too pragmatic to be practical, others too relativistic to be relevant. Or their anti-scientific reaction can be so strong that they tend to forsake rigorous thought in favor of their predilections and let disciplined judgment slip into intuition. Or they may be so entirely repelled that they abdicate the marginal influence left to them and retreat to the sidelines of destructive criticism, cynicism or lazy Cassandraism.

Spokesmen for the two cultures sit together around policy tables bypassing with growing sophistication each other's direct line of fire. The more sophisticated the players, the less obvious are the distinctions between the two cultures in everyday foreign-affairs discourse. Thus it has become fashionable for some devotees of one culture to affect a certain interest in the other, to display varying personal packagings of soft hardwariness and hard softwariness. Occasionally a mediator with honest affiliations in both cultures does what he can as a go-between. But it is an uneven contest. The Philistines in each culture resent mixed loyalties, and the budgets and the numbers weigh heavily on the hardware side. The polar pulls of the two cultures remain—the hardware pole and the human pole.

Through these two cultures filter the facts that reach the policy-makers, with the first of these cultures increasingly moving, in America, into the center of political gravity. Many of the conscious adherents of each culture spend much of their time worrying about how those in the other culture are shaping their facts, and devising plans to counter the others' assumed tactics. Few of them devote much effort to depolarizing the contest. At worst they enjoy the fray, and at best they leave the mediating assignment to some overtaxed superior between themselves and the President in whom all such issues join.

Yet I think that those of us in responsible positions in American life, whether inside or outside the government, ought to ask ourselves: Who besides the President, who on the way to the Presi-

[8] Nicholas Halasz, "Nobel." New York: Orion Press, 1959, p. 178.

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dent, is bridging these gaps between the two cultures in foreign affairs?

To the extent that one of the cultures clearly preëmpts the field, and the central issues of policy are considered and decided largely within its terrain, to that extent we ultimately narrow our national options—precisely the thing which, according to the conventional wisdom, enlightened policy should seek to avoid.

Thinking people in the second culture long ago accustomed themselves to living with contradictions, to having faith in skepticism, to advancing toward the solution of a problem by admitting as a possibility something which few but the greatest among the scientists, soldiers, economists and game-theorists of the first culture admit—namely, that the problem may be insoluble. In terms of practical politics in a nuclear era, that is a viewpoint which we discard at our peril. For we live in an age which constantly presents us with impossible alternatives— none of which appears to lead us where we want to go.

If the first culture can begin to produce numbers of people with technical proficiency and the ability to rise above it, and if the second culture can begin to produce numbers of people with human understanding and the ability to relate it to the machinery of power, there will remain possibilities for accommodating the two cultures to the benefit, rather than the detriment, of foreign policy. However, only an optimist would say that this is already happening.

III

As the two cultures compete for the time, attention and focus of those who make foreign policy, there has developed another phenomenon equally unsettling to the traditional view of the foreign-policy world—the meeting of vertical and horizontal politics. By the latter I mean the political explosion of personal interest in and affection for foreign affairs which we Americans are now experiencing. Everyman's involvement in foreign affairs overruns all institutional restraints and threatens once more to turn upside down the world of the old-time foreign-affairs professional. For while he often fits easily, consciously or unconsciously, into one of the two cultures, it is hard for him to adjust to total competition.

Some proprieties used to be observed by the uninitiated.

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Foreign policy was thought to be an arcane pursuit, where fools would not be suffered gladly. The expert's role was protected by widely held notions of the damage to the national interest which would flow from private interventions in foreign affairs "out of channels." Well-meaning people, no matter how high-minded, were encouraged to desist from frolics on their own. "Departures from policy" were frowned upon, and there were vague murmurings about violating the Logan Act.

These barriers have proved hopelessly insufficient. Today foreign policy is a preoccupation of nearly everyone who is not officially assigned to it. All cabinet members, all governors, all congressmen, all university presidents, most mayors, all important business and labor leaders, many farmers, and all professors, ministers, journalists and students, as well as safari-goers and countless other participants in the Affluent Society, are volunteering to help. Neither the gold drain nor the beautification of America deters them from going abroad. As the Foreign Service officer issues them passports, he may occasionally think of Thoreau and the railroad, and conclude that it is all simply "wickedness going faster."

The professional wonders whether we are putting our best feet forward. He may develop strong convictions about the importance of convincing certain people to see America first. He may project the new political explosion of general interest in world affairs into a prospect of sheer pandemonium: the ultimate deprofessionalization of foreign policy. The growth of horizontal politics across national boundaries undermines the basis of his whole folklore, vested as it is in the vertical politics of professional diplomacy. The traditional shades and hues of countries on maps take on unpredictable colorations. In a hundred ways he sees us becoming horizontally involved in their politics, and they in ours. He sees the nineteenth-century dikes of nationalism—sovereign states governed by governments served by professionals—being washed away in a flood of universal politics. And after such a short lifespan, too! Unreconciled, he tries to swim in the new currents of internationalized personal politics swirling around him and to maintain his professionalism in the process.

There are bureaucrats who consider the bureaucracy's chief function to be one of guarding the Republic from its elected officials and educating the appointed ones as quickly as possible to their predecessors' old biases, thus preserving and sanctifying

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policies which otherwise would be in search of a rationale. For such a bureaucrat the new challenge of universal politics is especially tiresome. Not only does he have the American people's elected and appointed officials to deal with, but he has to deal with the American people themselves. He has read that it is un-American to try to restrict travel, and he is large-minded enough to admit that the travel may somehow benefit the traveler, if not the government. So the travel schedules multiply, and the vertical professional sees himself suicidally contributing more and more of his own working day to facilitating the horizontal politics of others. His efforts become part of the problem, not part of the solution.

As he watches this phenomenon, our bureaucrat is aware of certain patterns. He identifies clumps of association, informal horizontal collections of like-minded people. He tells himself that this is a natural unfolding for export of native-American pluralism.

Some Americans simply prefer the atmospherics of big industry, hard work, puffing smokestacks, cloudy weather, wage-stabilization, Rhein-Ruhr cigars, good bathrooms, cold climate, heavy food. They fly to the places in Europe where these can be found.

Other Americans prefer romanticism with sunshine, have a weakness for lost causes, admire sherry, genealogy and the land-based aristocracy, favor Hemingway and Berlioz, fancy a family-military tradition and affect an effortless superiority. They agree with William Dean Howells that "inequality is as dear to the American heart as liberty itself." And they go to those places in the Caribbean or Mediterranean where they can find foreigners as unequal as themselves.

Still other Americans feel most at home by going abroad in their shirtsleeves, determined to help others help themselves with village development, low-cost housing, birth control clinics, schistosomiasis-eradication and movable trench-latrines. Accompanied, perhaps, by recordings of Joan Baez and lyrics of Bob Dylan, they enlist for far-flung assignments in "the other war," ameliorating, where they can, the world's great North-South crises of economics and race.

These by no means exhaust the number of contrasting natural patterns of association between Americans and the world. In the process each American creates flavorful and often inconsistent

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foreign impressions of America, involvements with America, concerns about America and expectations from America. Mirror images of the societies and individuals he embraces or spurns reflect back into American public life, stirring up increased interest and attention here. Before long, international issues take on domestic constituencies of their own with internalized political overtones. Cyprus, Kashmir, Angola, Yemen, Rhodesia and the Oder-Neisse line become increasingly domesticated in American circles in terms of the interested constituencies which seek to play upon U.S. policy consideration.

Another consequence flows from these relationships—the exporting, and re-importing from abroad, of our internal governmental disagreements. The United States Government is always meeting the United States Government, like Plato, coming back. Inter-service rivalries come back through other people's Foreign Ministries after referral and umpiring by interested foreign parties who factor in their own various weights and measures. Minority assessments in Washington solemnly reappear from foreign Heads of State. Recommendations suggestive of pending American agency proposals double back through foreign embassies in Washington. Requests from foreign governments for military and economic aid often bear an expert's touch in their drafting, as though their receiver was not the first American through whose hands they had passed. Governments, shadow governments, former governments and public relations firms all play a part in this enveloping international political process.

However imprecise the terms, there is a kind of internationalization of the political right and of the political left—of conservative and radical countries. Moreover, in a sense there are Democratic and Republican countries, and Foreign Service and non-Foreign Service countries. Sectors of our government become predictable in their preferences and affiliations. Officially we are called upon to act more and more in the shadow of an elaborate series of promptings by Americans through foreigners back to Americans—an intricate web of political relationships, complex but real, that conditions and helps shape the total context in which issues are joined, positions staked and decisions made.

The aerospace age also contributes audience problems which complicate the politics of the foreign-policy world—in this case at the top, among the chief actors, not at the middle and lower levels among the supporting cast. Visual, instantaneous com-

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munications are reaching more and more of the world's people. Telstar is projecting local leaders onto a world screen, where they perform before a world audience, including their interested peers. The fusion into one big audience of multiple audiences which could previously be separately addressed now confounds the foreign-policy-maker as much as it previously confounded the domestic politician.

The television screen has smashed the carefully tailored appeal to separate groups. There are few insulated audiences any more, and private explanations become less credible. Foreign-policy leadership, at least in the Atlantic Community, is performed amidst a cloud of witnesses under klieg lights before a universal audience. The historic diplomatic temptation to pursue several inconsistent policies at once, simultaneously satisfying separate constituencies, is less and less often available. Our foreign-policy spokesmen now have to choose public inconsistency and awkward ambiguity or courageous consistency and costly concreteness. And the shades of the communications prison-house are closing in, not only in the form of pictures and policies bouncing off stars, but of airmail copies of *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* flown to the desks of most foreign ministers before the resident American ambassadors receive the instructions that are exposed in the newspaper columns.

Finally, the growth of horizontal international politics affects the relations of the men at the top of governments with one another. Each world leader has drawn his opposite numbers as if by lot, and for all he knows he must share his remaining time in power with them. Many no doubt regard this as unfair and may think of some of their counterparts' predecessors or current alternatives as infinitely preferable. But the foreign-policy stage has a given cast of characters, and they are sure to be moving much of the time in different phases, within different contexts, toward different objectives.

The very speed of travel and communications in the 1960s assures that all of the prominent actors on the world stage will see more of one another than any single one of them would choose. Each is thrust more and more into the other's political situation. Who, one may ask, feels at home with whom? The spectrum includes Franco and Nyerere, Kekkonen and Mobutu, Wilson and Souvanna, Fanfani and Suharto, Salazar and Mrs. Gandhi, Ky and Kenyatta, Tito and Frei, Sihanouk and the

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Shah, Nasser and Sato, Ian Smith and Mao, Brezhnev and Balaguer, Pearson and Vorster, Chiang Kai-shek and Mendez Montenegro, Ayub and Ongania, Gomulka and de Gaulle—a hundred flowers, all of whom want to bloom, and none of whom wants the rains to fall on the just and the unjust alike. Their personal appreciations of one another, bounding and rebounding through the two cultures and across the horizontal politics of the foreign-policy world, have a greater effect than ever before on any single government's abstract freedom to conduct foreign policy. The day when international tensions were a significant function of interpersonal tensions may again come into its own.

*IV*

It is clear that the stereotyped, traditional foreign-policy world has disappeared. But the two cultures and the meeting of horizontal and vertical politics envelop it more and more, hour by hour—preëminently so in America. For, as is true of so much else, these phenomena have arisen in America well in advance of other Western countries and markedly in advance of the fragile societies of the developing world and of the closed or quasi-closed societies of the Communist world.

"There is a part of the Atlantic," James Bryce wrote in his final (1914) revision of "The American Commonwealth,"

> where the westward-speeding steam-vessel always expects to encounter fogs. On the fourth or fifth day of the voyage while still in bright sunlight, one sees at a distance a long, low, dark gray line across the bows, and is told that this is the first of the fog banks that have to be traversed. Presently the vessel is upon the cloud, and rushes into its chilling embrace, not knowing what perils of icebergs may be shrouded within its encompassing gloom. . . . So America, in her swift onward progress, sees, looming on the horizon, and now no longer distant, a time of mists and shadows, wherein dangers may be concealed whose form and magnitude she can scarcely yet conjecture. . . . It may be the time of trial for democratic institutions.

To pretend that the themes I have been propounding already merit so portentous a prophecy would overstate the case. I have not been describing clear and present dangers, but rather clear and present tendencies, two of which happen to coincide in the current critical period of American foreign-policy life. The growing preëminence of the hardware culture in our foreign-policy *process* is occurring alongside a hitherto unexampled buffeting of our traditional vertical foreign policy *apparatus* by the winds

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of horizontal politics. Because of their simultaneity, these two tendencies could generate effects extending beyond those that either development might have produced alone.

For nearly two centuries, American history has demonstrated a uniquely beneficial interweaving of our technological and humanistic strands. In a possible future environment of growing mutual hostility, the two cultures I have been describing could polarize to the nation's net loss. Official America could become less and less significantly responsive to the thundering pluralism of her democratic base, precisely at a time when that base is reinfused with oppositionist horizontal politics from frustrated adherents of the second culture. At some point we could be faced with the anomaly that those cultural manifestations most distinctively American, technologically speaking, had become the trademark of American officialdom, while those cultural manifestations most distinctively American humanly speaking, and most clearly associated with American leadership roles in the past, had become the trademark of the anti-official opposition in the body politic. Such a development would indeed constitute a "time of trial for democratic institutions" worthy of Bryce's fateful warning.

But we have by no means yet reached that point, and it would be a disservice to the facts and the future to overread, overwrite or overspin the potentially dangerous consequences of the historical coincidence I have described. Hundreds and thousands of responsible men and women who inhabit the American foreign-policy world, inside and outside government, still have it within their power to determine how these forces will ultimately play themselves out—and to prove, once again, that nothing in history is inevitable until after it has happened.

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# OUR DIALOGUE WITH JAPAN

*By Edwin O. Reischauer*

> The rioting crowds that clamored at the gates of the Japanese Diet building in May and June and the throngs of Zengakuren students who snake-danced wildly down the streets of Tokyo and swarmed over Hagerty's car at Haneda Airport have given pause to many persons in both the United States and Japan. . . . Never since the end of the war has the gap in understanding between Americans and Japanese been wider than over this incident. . . .
>
> All this reveals a weakness of communication between the Western democracies and opposition elements in Japan. Though the latter include the most fervent supporters of peace and democracy, their thinking is so far removed from that of their counterparts in the West that sometimes no real dialogue is possible. On top of the ever-present language barrier stands an even higher barrier of unspoken assumptions that make true understanding difficult.

THESE quotations are from "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," an article which I wrote for the October 1960 issue of this review. There I pointed out that the disturbances might be seen by some as "a sign of the growing gap between the party in power and its opponents, of rising tension and violence that can only end in leftist revolution or a Fascistic suppression of the opposition." I also noted that "an unfriendly Japan or even a strictly neutralist Japan might well mean the inevitable withdrawal of the American defense line to the mid-Pacific." My own conclusions, however, were more optimistic. I did not foresee a break in the defense relationship between the two countries and predicted that "Japan's practical politics will probably continue on its remarkably level course." I am glad to say that this hopeful prognosis seems fully justified today. The present article will report on what has happened in our "dialogue" in the interval, during which time I served as Ambassador to Japan.

## II

Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, who succeeded Kishi in July 1960, was a statesman of rare wisdom. He realized that the Japanese people were still spiritually confused by the terrible war experiences they had been through and were divided by deep political fissures. They needed time to find their bearings and develop a national consensus on the problems they faced. He therefore adopted a go-slow policy, which he dubbed the "low

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posture." He did not push issues, as had some of his predecessors, but waited patiently for consensus to emerge from unhurried discussion and compromise.

At the same time, Ikeda drew attention away from the controversial areas of defense and international alignment toward the safer field of economic growth. He called for a "ten-year income doubling plan," which was not a plan so much as an estimate that Japan's economic productivity would double over a ten-year period. Under his leadership Japan continued on its breakneck rate of economic growth, averaging about 10 percent in real terms per year, thus getting well ahead of the announced "plan." The economy boomed, burgeoning visibly in every direction. Tokyo became a nightmare of new construction—multi-storied buildings, elevated highways and new subways. Workers became accustomed to seeing their pay checks increased by around 10 percent each year. There was a continuing consumers' revolution, as television sets, fine cameras, washing machines, refrigerators, room coolers, motorcycles and private cars spread ever more widely throughout the households of the nation. People spoke of the "leisure boom" and devoted themselves with enthusiasm to holiday activities.

Ikeda was aided by the international situation in his effort to calm political tensions and seek a broader consensus. For one thing, once the new Security Treaty had gone into effect, the interest of the opposition forces shifted from the immediate effort to block its ratification to the long-range objective of preparing for its cancellation in 1970, when, according to the terms of the Treaty, either side could denounce it. Another factor was the tremendous popularity in Japan of President Kennedy. His image of youthful hope and idealism made association with the United States seem less hazardous and more attractive even to many of the opposition elements. Despite recurring Cuban crises, there appeared to be a growing détente between the Soviet Union and the United States that gave promise of a more peaceful future.

At the same time, the widening split between the Chinese and Russians threw the leftists into confusion and began to undermine many Marxist premises. China's first nuclear explosion in October 1964 heightened the confusion. It split wide open the popular anti-nuclear bomb movement, which had been used previously as a means of stirring up anti-American sentiment.

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On the one side, the Communists were forced to distinguish henceforth between "good" and "bad" nuclear explosions, while the more idealistic supporters of the movement remained opposed to all.

Another important factor was the growing Japanese knowledge of the outside world. Most occidental observers had been shocked by the lack of information among Japanese, and particularly intellectuals, about what had actually been happening in the world since 1945. Japan's relative isolation from world affairs under the Occupation and its continuing absorption with its own problems explained this situation, but it left the political debate in Japan a matter of rarefied theories curiously divorced from world realities. By the early 1960s this situation was beginning to be corrected. The cumulative effect of programs of cultural and intellectual exchange and the widening flow of Japanese abroad in connection with Japan's rapidly expanding foreign trade were resulting in a slowly deepening knowledge of what was really going on in the outside world.

Under these conditions Japan moved a long way toward the consensus Ikeda desired. When he relinquished the helm on November 9, 1964, stricken by the cancer that was to take his life nine months later, he left behind a very different Japan from the one he had taken over a little more than four years earlier. Not only was it vastly more prosperous, but the Japanese people were fully aware of this. As a result they were much more relaxed and self-confident. Japan was clearly rushing ahead. Already it was pushing into sixth place in the world in terms of economic productivity. At the rate it was going it would within a few years pass the United Kingdom and France and might in time even pass West Germany, to become the third largest economic unit in the world, ranking next to the two great superstates—the United States and the Soviet Union.

General elections in November 1960 and November 1963 had shown the continuing stability of Japanese politics. There had been a slow rise in opposition votes, but the Liberal Democratic majority was still secure at close to 60 percent. Prosperity and a growing understanding of the realities in the world had brought many opposition groups closer to the center of the political spectrum, making eventual consensus with them seem more possible. An opposition take-over seemed more remote than before, because the split between the extremists and moderates in the

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Left was widening faster than their votes were increasing. There had also been a steady drop in the size and intensity of political demonstrations in the streets. The more radical leftist leaders still called regularly for mass actions of this sort, but the members of the labor unions and university students simply did not respond as before. Many of the unions showed a marked shift in emphasis from political action to more narrowly focused activities in behalf of their own economic welfare.

Most important, the great mass media—the newspapers, magazines, television and radio—had shown a growing tendency toward moderation and balance, both in reporting and in comment. The riots of 1960 had made them realize that they were not dealing with an all-powerful government, as had once been the case, but that it was the mass media themselves that exercised vast powers of influence over the Japanese public. The obvious conclusion was that the mass media must use their power with caution and responsibility.

The self-confident spirit of the new Japan was epitomized by the Tokyo Olympic Games held in October 1964 just before Ikeda's resignation. The Japanese people had thrown themselves into organizing the Olympics with their characteristic enthusiasm and efficiency, and the results were superb. Everyone agreed that the Tokyo Games were in every way the best ever held. A sense of euphoria swept the nation. Ikeda, who had assumed the Prime Ministership in the dark aftermath of the 1960 riots, left in the warm glow of the Olympics. During his period, the "low posture" tortoise had covered a lot of ground, outpacing the more erratic hare-like progress of some of his predecessors.

III

Ikeda's successor, Eisaku Sato, has faced a more difficult period. The helpful Kennedy image was already tragically gone, and President Johnson simply lacked the appeal that his eloquent young predecessor had had for Japanese young people, intellectuals and the more moderate elements in the opposition. Moreover, before Sato had fully found his political footing, the international situation worsened greatly—at least as seen from Japan. The escalation of the war in Viet Nam in February 1965, through the extension of American bombing to the North, threw the Japanese public into virtual panic. It seemed to them that United States policy was in the hands of blind military adven-

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turers, who, like those of Japan three decades earlier, were leading their country into a hopeless conflict with the forces of Asian nationalism. They feared that the United States would soon be involved in a war with Communist China, which would in turn engulf Japan because of the American bases in Japan and Okinawa. As themselves the victims of American bombing only two decades earlier, they naturally identified themselves with the North Vietnamese rather than with us or Saigon.

The result was a sharp rise in criticism of the United States and in fears of the defense relationship with us. Since the debate between neutralism and alignment with the United States was the most central and hottest issue in Japanese politics, this situation heightened old political tensions and widened the basic cleavage in Japanese politics. It also sharply reduced Japanese self-confidence. The outside world seemed more menacing again, and there seemed to be less hope that Japan could remain at peace and play a constructive international role.

Even the economy now gave reason for concern. The unbridled economic growth of the Ikeda period had left some undesirable legacies. Inflationary trends had been set in motion that were proving hard to curb. The rapid rise in consumer prices was threatening to eat up wage increases, and the average citizen as a result felt that his economic position might be worsening. Swift but uneven growth had also produced serious economic imbalances which made 1965 a year of difficult readjustments. Gross National Product grew in real terms only around 3 percent, which was so much lower than the accustomed rate that the Japanese felt they were going through a serious "recession."

Rapid growth had also produced difficult social problems. The concentration of labor in industry and the cities sharply reduced rural population—the percentage of the labor force in agriculture is now probably less than 25 percent—leaving villages without young people and many families without fathers. The sprawling cities were increasingly plagued by traffic congestion, air and water pollution, juvenile delinquency and a sense of alienation on the part of the individual lost in the complexities of city life.

The first year of Sato's Prime Ministership thus witnessed an apparent reversal of the current that had flowed slowly but steadily under Ikeda. But this proved only a temporary eddy in the stream. When the Viet Nam War did not escalate further into a Sino-American conflict, when the United States showed its

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ability to use its great military power with restraint, still more when the United States, by its bombing pause and diplomatic efforts in the early weeks of 1966, demonstrated its eagerness for a negotiated rather than a military settlement, the fears of the Japanese began to subside. They swung back to the hopeful currents of the Ikeda period, which now flowed more strongly than ever before. It became clear in 1966 that Japan had indeed come a long way since 1960.

If the Japanese had had serious fears about their economic future, these were dispelled by a rapid resurgence of the economy after the 1965 doldrums. The government has decided that a growth of 7½ percent in G.N.P. in real terms would be socially more healthy than the old 10 percent average. It is significant that the problem it faces is to hold growth down, rather than to push it up, to 7½ percent.

More significant has been the rebounding of Japanese self-confidence and optimism. Despite the increased political tensions of 1965, Sato pushed through the normalization of relations with South Korea, capping more than a decade of efforts to achieve this difficult but obviously desirable goal. He matched the American contribution to the new Asian Development Bank with an equal commitment of $200,000,000. And in 1966 the Japanese government boldly joined in efforts to develop a stronger sense of regional coöperation in East Asia, calling together a conference of Southeast Asian economic ministers in Tokyo and participating in other regional conferences. Japan this past summer also took the lead among the creditor nations in seeking ways to help Indonesia meet its current needs for aid and to reschedule its crushing debt burden.

Most remarkable has been the development in 1966 of a broad but calm and reasoned debate over the problems that Japan faces. Led by a group of outstanding younger scholars, the Japanese have for the first time since the war begun to look at the problems of defense and their relations with neighboring countries, not in terms of how Japan should react to American or Communist contentions, but in terms of Japan's own interests and goals. The mass media have redoubled their efforts to present a broad and balanced picture of world problems, and some of the major newspapers have organized special groups to study national defense and other controversial issues. The result has been a much more realistic and far less politically heated debate

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than before. No subjects have been automatically taboo—not even nuclear problems. Much attention has been given to what Japan itself can do to help lessen world tensions and contribute to the growth of stability in the less developed countries.

IV

It has been in this general context that we have tried since 1961 to deepen our dialogue with the Japanese and lessen the type of misunderstanding that lay behind the unhappy events of 1960. In this attempt I, for one, took a cue from Ikeda in adopting the "low posture," trying not so much to persuade the Japanese to agree to American points of view as to broaden the area of discourse in order to find points of common understanding and to seek out the differences in underlying assumptions that brought us to contrasting conclusions. I sought to shift the emphasis from the Japanese assumption that our relationship is one of leader-follower, in which Japan is only free to choose its degree of "alignment" with American policy, to a sense of "partnership," in which Japan and the United States, as the two great industrialized nations of the Pacific, face together the problems of that area on the basis of our respective but actually closely parallel interests and ideals.

Since the leaders of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, the higher bureaucrats and the top businessmen of Japan are persons who tend to share many of the same premises with us, there has been no particular difficulty in achieving mutual understanding with them, but even here we have made efforts to broaden the dialogue. Prime Minister Ikeda and President Kennedy in 1961 started an annual economic conference between members of the two cabinets and also created joint scientific and cultural committees. These have all met regularly since then with most useful results. Japanese businessmen have led in convening a number of excellent conferences with their counterparts in America, and official and unofficial organs of contact of this sort are continuing to proliferate. Meanwhile the exchange of information and opinion has become a routine operation at every level between the two governments.

The gap in understanding in 1960, however, was not with the government and its backers but with the opposition elements—the parties of the Left, organized labor, intellectuals and students. Many of the people in these groups accepted the Marxist con-

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cepts that "capitalism" was the reason for "imperialism," and "imperialism" the source of world tensions: therefore the United States, as the leading "capitalist" country, was the chief threat to peace, while the "socialist" countries, that is Communist China and the Soviet Union, were the "peace camp." Such thinking naturally led to a desire to break the defense relationship with us and achieve a strictly neutral position for Japan, if not one of outright alignment with the Communist nations.

In so far as the Japanese stuck to this outmoded nineteenth-century analysis of world problems, no very useful dialogue could be developed. In fact, there still is none with Communists or with those Socialists who, while rejecting the Communist label, accept the Communist view of the world situation. A large part of the opposition groups, however, never fully accepted this Marxist analysis, and their growing knowledge of the twentieth-century world has further diluted their Marxism. These more moderate elements have responded to our efforts to achieve a better understanding of each other.

Even before 1960 the United States government was engaged in a broad program of cultural and intellectual exchange with Japan through the Fulbright Program and other similar agencies. Professors, students, leaders in the mass media and in many other fields and, perhaps most significantly of all, leaders in the labor unions, went back and forth in large numbers. All these activities have, of course, been continued and, where possible, expanded. Cultural and intellectual exchanges under private auspices have increased even more rapidly. All this, as I have noted, has had a growing cumulative influence on Japanese understanding of us and of world problems and has contributed greatly to mutual understanding.

Exchange activities of this sort are not easy to summarize because each individual case is unique, depending on the person involved and the circumstances surrounding him. Instead of characterizing the effort as a whole, I might briefly describe my own activities as an example, since the Japanese public accepted me not only as the American Ambassador but also as a sort of permanent exchange professor.

The dialogue I engaged in with Japanese scholars, political leaders, writers and the general public, through private discussions, public lectures and numerous magazine articles, was largely dictated by their interests. Much of it naturally concerned

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Japanese-American relations—trade disputes, problems concerning American bases and their use, our future defense relationship, our respective attitudes toward the China problem and, most of all in recent years, the Viet Nam War.

At the same time my dialogue with the Japanese embraced certain more basic problems. We started with a consideration of recent Japanese history and the process of modernization in Japan. Many Japanese historians have tried to force the story into a Marxist historical pattern. "Modernization" is defined as progress toward a better society, which in turn is assumed to be complete "socialism." Since Japan is not a fully "socialist" society and modern Japan has experienced totalitarian tendencies and imperialistic ventures, these scholars assume that Japan has proved a miserable failure at "modernization." The inevitable conclusion is that it must now seek a new pattern for "modernization" in the Soviet Union or China. This interpretation entirely misses the main point in modern Japanese history, which is that Japan, despite some terrible mistakes, has modernized far more successfully than any other major Asian country.

The "modernization" debate naturally led to a discussion of just how important Japan was as a nation that had been reasonably successful in modernization, what it might have to offer in this regard to the less modernized countries of the world, and finally, what Japan's role in world affairs might be. Thus it paralleled the general trends of Japanese thinking and perhaps contributed in a small peripheral way to these trends. In any case, it did lead to some better understanding on both sides of the differences in our points of view, and definitely contributed to the habit of discussing these differences fully and frankly.

▼

In all these ways, a broader and deeper dialogue, both official and private, has been developed over the past several years between Japanese and Americans. It might be appropriate, therefore, to assess where we stand today in this dialogue and in our relations with Japan. The progress we have made in these respects is of course largely the product of broad developments in Japan and in Japanese attitudes toward the outside world, as described earlier in this article. At the same time, I believe it is safe to conclude that the deepening of the dialogue has had at least some small reciprocal influence on these more basic developments.

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Japan's great economic growth has been the main reason for a sharp decline in the number and intensity of our bilateral economic problems. In 1961 these still loomed large. The Japanese, apprehensive about their economic future and obsessed with the feeling of dependence on American markets, viewed with grave alarm every disagreement or fluctuation in our economic relationship.

Now with Japanese-American trade nearing $5 billion and the Japanese economy one of the strongest in the world, our bilateral trade problems seem to have shriveled in relative importance. They are seen to occupy only a small fringe of an otherwise vastly successful economic relationship. Some American industrialists worry about Japanese imports in certain specific fields—such as wool textiles—and their Japanese counterparts worry about American efforts to restrict Japanese exports in these fields. American businessmen remain dissatisfied with stiff Japanese restrictions on the import of certain American commodities and the sharp limitation placed on the inflow of American investment. Disputes over North Pacific fisheries—most notably over salmon in Bristol Bay in Alaska—are hot issues for the small groups directly involved on both sides. On the whole, however, bilateral economic problems today generate only a fraction of the concern and political excitement they produced a mere five years ago.

The Japanese-American defense relationship has all along been the focus of major political debate within Japan and our most serious bilateral problem, but even in this area there has been a sharp reduction of friction. The inevitable local irritants resulting from the presence of foreign bases are no longer blown up into major political issues but are seen as the essentially minor matters that they are. In recent years the only "base" problem which has received major public attention and caused relatively large, though only localized, street demonstrations was the decision by the Japanese government to allow the United States to exercise its treaty prerogative of bringing nuclear-propelled naval vessels into our bases in Japan.

At a more basic level, there seems to be a growing realization that the defense relationship with us is not just a convenience for the United States, forced on Japan in behalf of a dubious American Far Eastern policy, but is very much in Japan's own interests. Even certain elements of the opposition are beginning to talk about the modification, rather than the abolition, of the defense

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ties with the United States. The government and its supporters, who once simply tried to dodge leftist attacks on the Security Treaty, are now publicly discussing how best to continue the Treaty after 1970—whether by a specific extension for ten years or by simply letting it go on automatically, as was no doubt the original intention. There is growing general interest in the problem of whether Japan should take on a larger share of its own defense and a rising assumption that, whatever the Left may try to do in 1970 to break the defense relationship, common sense dictates that it must go on.

The Viet Nam War has, of course, lent some new strength to the argument that military association with the United States may be dangerous for Japan, but it has also helped to develop an awareness of Japan's own interests in peace and stability in Southeast Asia. As a trading area, Southeast Asia is far more important to the Japanese economy than to ours, and Japan's dependence for close to half of its energy resources on the Middle Eastern and Soviet oil that passes through the Straits of Malacca has made some Japanese realize the great strategic stake Japan has in the narrow sea-lanes of Southeast Asia.

While the first general emotional reaction in Japan in 1965 to the escalation of the war and its risks was a strong desire that the United States would simply withdraw from Viet Nam, the Japanese public has increasingly come to appreciate the complexities of the situation and to hope for a negotiated settlement that might give more promise of stability in the region than would an American withdrawal. Thus, while the pervasive pacificism that has dominated Japan ever since the end of the war precludes any overseas military role for Japan, the public has become much more conscious than before of the need for political stability and military security for the less developed countries of Asia.

There is one problem in our defense relationship with Japan, however, that has become more serious over the last few years. This is the problem of Okinawa, or the Ryukyus. The more that Japanese self-confidence has recovered, the greater has become the problem of American military administration over the million Japanese inhabitants of these islands. This situation, 21 years after the end of the war, is clearly an historical anomaly, to be explained only by the necessity for having in that area American bases that are free of the restrictions on weapons and movement imposed by the Security Treaty on the American

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bases in Japan proper. The Japanese government recognizes this need in Japan's own interests. It is for this reason that it has tolerated the situation and coöperated closely with us in programs of economic betterment designed to help the Okinawans catch up to the other Japanese.

The demand for full reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration, however, will inevitably keep growing. Formerly only the leftists paid much attention to this issue, motivated largely by a desire to break the Japanese-American defense relationship. Now conservatives too are equally concerned about the return of Okinawa to the homeland. Today this constitutes perhaps the gravest single problem in Japanese-American relations. A happy solution probably depends on one of three developments: a decline in the need for the Okinawan bases because of reduced dangers in the area, a decline in their necessity because of progress in technology that makes them no longer essential, or a change in popular Japanese attitudes toward defense that would permit the Japanese government to agree to the existence of bases of this kind on Okinawa even after it had reverted to Japan.

## VI

Perhaps the greatest change in Japanese-American relations over the past few years has not been the decline in the number and intensity of specific problems so much as the shift in the whole mood. In 1960 most Japanese assumed that their country was a helpless follower of a more or less suspect American foreign policy. The Japanese-American defense relationship was commonly considered to be a disagreeably high price Japan paid for the close economic relations it had with the United States, on which it was pathetically dependent. It was widely assumed that the Japanese government did not dare speak up frankly to the United States, and, if it did, it would not be listened to.

No one can deny that many of these attitudes still persist in certain quarters in Japan. And the problem of disparity in size, which plagues us in all our international relationships, will no doubt continue. We are, after all, roughly twice Japan's size in population and ten times its size in productive power. This makes it hard for the Japanese (just like our European and Canadian friends) to feel fully equal. In addition, the Japanese have clear memories of the war, in which we defeated them so thoroughly,

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and of the Occupation, in which we controlled them completely.

There is, nonetheless, a great change in prevailing attitudes in Japan. The change is most marked in the younger generation, which is free from the psychological burden of the war and the Occupation. Now that the Japanese have come to have a better appreciation of the strength of Japan and its potential for exerting an influence on world affairs, they increasingly see Japan's foreign policy as a matter for Japanese choice on the basis of Japan's own interests. When viewed in this light, a close partnership with the United States, including a defense relationship, is seen to be greatly in Japan's interests, and not an undesirable situation forced on Japan by American might or historical accident. As some young scholars have put it, nothing is more important to Japan than American friendship.

This change in viewpoint also puts a new light on Japan's relations with its neighbors. It becomes clear that Japan has a strong interest in playing a positive role in furthering the stability and economic growth of the countries of Southeast Asia. Formerly the Japanese tended to look at the problems of that area as American concerns and sat back in critical judgment on our apparent ineptness in handling them. Now that the Japanese see the future of Southeast Asia as of vital concern to their own country, they think more about what they themselves can usefully do. In grappling with the problems in this way, they become more sympathetic with the difficulties we have encountered and more appreciative of the value of the American partnership in facing the situation in Southeast Asia.

The Japanese are beginning to see even the key issue of relations with China in a new light. One of the most serious and long-standing strains in the Japanese-American relationship has resulted from the popular feeling in Japan that, because of geographic propinquity to China, long and close cultural association, and economic interests, Japanese have much more reason than Americans to seek fuller and friendlier ties with Communist China, but are prevented from doing so by their close association with a stubborn and shortsighted America.

Recently, however, Japanese have begun to realize that it is their own strong economic, political and emotional bonds with Taiwan that stand as the major obstacle to the rapprochement they hope for with Peking. Beyond that, the Chinese nuclear explosions, the growing intransigence of the statements of the

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Peking leaders, and, most of all, the distressing excesses of the Cultural Purge and Red Guard movement have led to increasing disenchantment with Communist China. Japanese are beginning to see that the China problem they face stems more from Peking, Taiwan and Southeast Asia than from Washington.

Perhaps the greatest change in the tone of Japanese-American relations has been the growing feeling that the Japanese can and do speak fully and frankly to Americans and that their voices are heard. At the time that my impending resignation was announced last July, every major newspaper, remembering the earlier talk of our "broken dialogue with Japan," took the occasion to comment editorially that the dialogue between the United States and Japan was now a frank and equal one. This attitude, together with the fact that, as two modernized, industrialized and democratic countries, we do share basic interests and ideals, makes me confident that our bilateral problems will continue to decline and our partnership in facing other problems will continue to grow. In fact, I feel that, despite the admittedly high barriers between us of sharply different languages, differing cultural traditions and contrasting historical experiences, we shall move steadily forward toward the kind of easy and full partnership that the United States already has with the United Kingdom.

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# CHINA IN CONTEXT

*By Lucian W. Pye*

FOR some months, 1966 promised to be a year of significant albeit gradual change in American policy toward Communist China. In a strange and paradoxical fashion, the emotional issues of the Viet Nam War opened the way for the most sober, responsible and even-handed public discussion of China since the Communists came to power. At Congressional hearings and in the mass media, scholars and leaders of opinion have dispassionately calculated the possibilities for change, and Administration leaders have in their customarily guarded language intimated that change was not impossible. Most significant of all, the American public demonstrated a gratifying degree of maturity by forgetting the old passions and asking for only facts and analyses about the new China. Our national mood was increasingly one of believing that with prudence and wisdom it would be possible to work toward gradually incorporating China into responsible world relationships.

All of this, of course, was before the Cultural Revolution and the startling appearance of the Red Guards shook the gradually emerging American consensus as to what China was likely to become. While it is still too early to forecast the full implications of the current upheavals, we manifestly shall have to revise some of the estimates which informed that growing consensus. The Chinese are going to have more difficulties with the problems of succession than was generally believed a few years ago. Also, it now seems likely that more time than we had expected will have to pass before Chinese Communism will accept the realities of domestic economic and social life as inevitably limiting change. Although it is still appropriate for American policy to be guided by the certain fact that eventually Chinese Communism, like all underdeveloped but modernizing systems, will have to come to terms with both its own society and the world community, there is now more uncertainty as to how soon and in what form this will take place.

Once again we may be in the classic situation in which American hopes and sentiment are out of phase with Asian developments. It would indeed be tragic if the current American mood of exploration for new approaches should be frustrated by the

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current phase of Chinese domestic developments. Yet to humor this mood without regard to Asian realities could lead to an even greater tragedy, for it would surely produce bitterness toward those who were seen, however unjustifiably, as having given false forecasts about the Chinese response to our efforts at being reasonable. If we are to take advantage of the opportunities offered by current American attitudes, and to avoid the dangers of bitter backlashes if all does not go well, then it is important to reach a realistic judgment of the precise limits of our capacity to influence Chinese developments in particular and Asian events in general. What can we realistically expect of American policy? And what are the responsibilities we must try to meet?

When nearly thirty years ago A. Whitney Griswold sought to find the central theme in American policy in East Asia, he was most impressed with the rhythmic fluctuations of our involvement and withdrawal. This pattern suggested that we were indeed the masters of our policies, that we could choose at will to become more or less deeply committed. Today some Americans feel that the inevitable change in the tide has come and that we should be working gradually toward disengagement from the exasperating problems of Asia. Others are equally convinced that only a little more intensification and determination in our Asian involvements will bring a new era of security. Both points of view, however, share the assumption that the initiative lies primarily with the American government.

Today we see a more complex picture than that of rhythmic involvement and withdrawal. We can now appreciate that our involvement in Asia has been governed not only by our own inspiration but also by the instabilities of Asian politics. Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that the principal dynamic element has been shifts in the Asian balance of power itself. The profoundly destabilizing consequences of the modernization process in Asian societies have made these shifts sharper and more extreme than in Europe. The rhythm of change has been Asia's and it has dictated both the depth of American involvement and the possibilities of American withdrawal.

In coping with the situation, the United States has been prone to take as permanent what are separate and at times only limited phases in the history of modern Asia. Of equal importance, American policy has tried to increase predictability and purposeful change. Time and again we have followed the cycle of recogni-

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zing a disruptive situation early, proclaiming a principle in order to give support to the forces of order, and then stubbornly holding to a position so that others could adjust their behavior in response to the element of predictability we had introduced. The effort to interject a greater sense of stability into the area has at times made American policy appear to be a blend of opportunism and rigidity.

This combination of contradictions has been heightened by the fact that although we have been a constant actor on the Asian scene we have been only marginally absorbed with Asian affairs. Our typical policy approach has been to adopt unambiguous postures of a high order of generality which can easily be explained to the American public and which appear to provide a steadfast element in a changing Asia. We have not had to engage in the continual adjustment and manœuvre characteristic of deeply involved participants in an intense political process. The risks and returns alike have generally been uncertain and remote enough so that we could afford to stress high principles. Whenever the stakes have risen and we have had to follow more subtle and ambiguous policies, large numbers of the American public have been easily confused, for this is not what they have expected of Asia.

These are some of the themes and realities that have to be appreciated as a part of the historic American approach to Asia. They were all present at the time we responded to the realities of an impotent Chinese empire by enunciating the Open Door. Much has been made of our propensity at that time for legalistic formulations and moralistic pronouncements, but the basic fact was that we were trying to offset Chinese weakness by strengthening the prospects for orderly development. Later American policy had to respond to the reality that a modernizing and militaristic Japan was disrupting the Asian balance by its growing naval power. Again, behind the legalism of the Washington Naval Conference and the non-recognition of Manchukuo there was the reality of the American effort to bring stability and order to changes in the Asian power balance.

After World War II and the collapse of Japanese power, we were suddenly confronted with the unexpected phenomenon of a united China, apparently strong, and allied to the Soviet Union, leading to the theory that a Communist bloc would be forever bound together by ideology. Meantime, in Southern Asia the

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emergence of the former colonial countries, dramatized above all by India, produced the American stereotype, if not the doctrine, that Afro-Asian societies are typically devoted to rapid and planned economic development and neutralism in cold-war affairs. In seeking to stabilize a new Asian balance of power around the effort to contain China and vitalize a string of weak and disorganized new states, the United States has once again been led into being rigid and uncompromising. And since the Chinese threat has seemed more real than the prospects for rapid nation-building in the rest of Asia, the dogmatic element in the American position has had to be more negative than constructive.

As we have continued responding to erratic change in Asia, our position has inevitably become more complex. We have over the years developed a variety of commitments, a system of military bases for dealing with an assortment of contingency threats, and an array of techniques and programs for assisting Asians. These elements of policy have not been fitted together in an orderly or coherent fashion and in consequence provide only the bases for dealing pragmatically with new crises. Thus we now seem to be in the unique situation in Asia of having a greater potential for policy action but less coherence in policy than at any other time in our history.

II

The process of change in Asia and of response by America is still going on, and now American policy will have to respond to a new and complex set of changes. However, we have not as yet settled upon a new set of principles to guide us in dealing with an Asia with the following features: first, an emerging but isolated China absorbed with the domestic traumas of purge and succession; second, an India bitter toward China but ambivalent toward Communism and still groping for the key to both domestic development and greater international prestige; third, a vigorous Japan with more potential for power and influence than it is yet prepared to realize; fourth, a bankrupt Indonesia that has swung back from the brink of Communism to violent anti-Communism. And finally, of course, there is Viet Nam, not to mention the old problem of Laos and the possibilities of further crisis in Thailand.

The problem of finding an appropriate and coherent response to these novel developments is further complicated by the fact

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that American policy, at least since the Korean War, has been composed of two quite separate, but presumably complementary, dimensions. One has consisted of direct responses to the phenomenon of Communist China, in the form largely of security and general military measures, but involving also such troublesome diplomatic issues as recognition of the Peking régime and its admission to the United Nations. The other dimension has been our policies toward the countries of free Asia, including our concern to provide various forms of aid and assistance for economic and social development.

In the rather loose and general rhetoric in which grand policy pronouncements are made, it is possible to pretend that what our left hand and our right hand have been doing are all a part of a single great mission to contain Communist China and build up the rest of Asia. In practice, however, there has been a great gulf between those who have been centrally concerned with the problem posed by China and those who are professionally concerned with mainly economic but also other forms of development. The first have tended to feel that they are dealing with the basic problem of Asia and that all else is rather marginal. On the other hand, those absorbed with development problems have frequently been impatient with the logic of the cold war, bored with Chinese Communism and unconvinced that China is nearly as important as the China watchers claim it to be.

Each approach has had its distinctive rationale and each has called for different emphases and priorities. Yet for nearly a decade after the Korean War it has been possible for different Americans to react to their rather different Asias on the basis of a tolerable division of labor. At times one prong of the policy would compromise the other, as for example when the desire for security alliances and the apparent advantages of military aid challenged the logic of pure economic development strategies. In the main, however, the question of priorities could be put off, and there seemed to be little need to combine all our efforts into a single policy equation and to measure the relevance and effectiveness of all programs and activities against a truly coherent set of objectives in Asia.

We were able to avoid the question of priorities largely because during the first decades after World War II the new countries of Asia had such massive domestic problems of development that they quite understandably tended to turn inward and to ignore

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the problems of their neighbors, thereby allowing the United States to fall into the practice of providing bilateral aid and of treating the problems of each country separately. This tendency to treat development problems on a country-by-country basis minimized the need to deal with Asian problems as a whole. Although the Marshall Plan has been generally credited with establishing the principle of development aid, it is significant that when the scene shifted from Europe to Asia the focus also changed from regional planning to bilateral planning. During this period the problems of Asian development were seen in such a narrow national perspective that it was possible to talk about a development "race" between India and China that would of itself virtually determine the fate of Asia, without either country having to engage in any foreign-policy activities. At times we seemed to believe that most of the problems of Asia could be resolved if the free countries of the area would forego all foreign relations and single-mindedly concentrate each on its own internal development problems.

This benign and rather non-political view of the potency of economic development, enriched by our expectation as to what India might be able to represent to the whole developing world, was thrown into disarray, as were Indian policies themselves, by the shock effects of the Sino-Indian border conflict and by the growing war in Viet Nam. These and other recent fundamental changes have brought back into focus the inescapable fact that inter-state relations are going to be critical in determining the future of Asia. At the same time the Southeast Asian nations have gradually but significantly turned away from isolated concerns with domestic developments and have shown a growing interest in incipient forms of Asian coöperation. Not the least important reason for this trend is the fact that several of them are beginning to realize that there is an absolute ceiling on their prospects for economic development so long as they are limited to their small national markets. They have had to realize that their relatively small size and populations are not adequate for the creation of domestic markets large enough for setting up the heavy capital-goods industries requiring economies of scale. This new appreciation, which has come from the Asians themselves, is setting the stage for significant forms of regional coöperation.

This development can be profoundly significant in establishing the critically important mechanism of inter-state relations neces-

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sary if there is to be a balance of power in which the states of Southeast Asia supported by Japan, India and the United States can realistically find security. In fact, in looking ahead, it seems most likely that one almost certain consequence of any probable settlement of the Viet Nam War will be a massive infusion of American economic assistance to Southeast Asia which will spill over the boundaries of Viet Nam and provide a powerful stimulus for regional coöperation at a level which would have been inconceivable only a few years ago. In the light of what the United States did after previous Asian wars to rebuild and advance the economies of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and given our intense emotional reactions to the Viet Nam War, we can expect that after the end of hostilities aid will be injected into Southeast Asia in quantities which will structurally change elements of the neutral economies involved and significantly advance regional development. As a result, economic development efforts in Southeast Asia will be based not on the earlier bilateral approach but rather on the broader foundations of multi-national markets.

In this respect Southeast Asian developments are likely to be less influenced in the future by the model of India and more by the realities of the Japanese economic contribution. Indeed, even limited coöperation among a few of the Southeast Asian states can provide the necessary formula for bringing Japan effectively into the process of supporting the Asian balance of power. As long as the countries of the region were dealing separately with their problems and as long as Japan was unsure of its role, there was no way of overcoming the residual feelings that trace back to World War II and the Japanese occupation of most of Southeast Asia.

In sum, it would appear not too unrealistic to see beyond the Viet Nam War the prospect of a considerably stronger and more integrated Southeast Asia in which Japan will be able to play an increasingly constructive role. Already Japan has taken the initiative in organizing the Asian Development Bank and in seeking more substantive ways of assuming a greater role in developing an Asian system of states.

III

Pronouncements about American policy which dwell mainly on optimistic possibilities for the economic development of Southeast Asia must seem to evade reality as long as no mention is made

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of Asia's central problem, Communist China. Has the time arrived to face more openly all the issues inherent in direct relations with China? As we observed at the outset, it seemed early in 1966 that a gradual but significant shift in American policy toward Communist China might take place which would lead to a broader range of relations. The Chinese, however, having plunged into their current self-destructive spiral of purge, succession crisis and teen-age rampage, are at present clearly in no position to talk soberly with anyone. They certainly cannot be expected at this time to engage in the delicate forms of communication which would have to precede any direct effort at improving United States-China relations.

Indeed, at a time when the Red Guards are producing the impression that the Chinese leaders have taken leave of their senses and when even Castro has concluded that Peking is "making a laughing stock of Socialism," an American effort to widen Chinese contacts with the outside world would appear to be merely a cynical act of psychological warfare. For the more people learn about the current realities of Communist China, the more they are likely to be shocked and distrustful of the ability of Peking to act responsibly in the international community. The fact is, however, that more direct and frequent forms of communication with the Chinese are not particularly central to the problem of American policy today. The real issues have little to do with human contacts but are deeply rooted in questions of military security and the future organization of Asia.

Indeed the key issue of policy toward China is the very basic judgment of what kind of a future force China is going to represent in Asia and the world. How powerful is China likely to become, and to what ends will the Chinese leaders direct this power?

Ever since the Korean War, security considerations have dominated American policy toward China. They bulked large in our overall policy at first because we were concerned about a China closely allied to the Soviet Union. Military planning with respect to China at that time had to include the possibility of general war against an extremely powerful enemy. Strangely, American security policies have not yet taken full account of the Sino-Soviet split and the consequent decline in Chinese power. The detonation of Chinese nuclear devices has helped to cover up Chinese weaknesses and has given a vague sense of justifica-

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tion for continuing to place a high priority on security considerations in the Western Pacific.

Looking ahead to the next stage in Asian developments, United States policy in general and security policies in particular will have to recognize the dramatic decline in what was once the Sino-Soviet combined threat and what is now only a nearly isolated Chinese threat. At present we are still uncertain as to how much weight should be given to Chinese military capabilities; and we have not only different judgments about Chinese capabilities but quite different policy deductions from similar evaluations. Thus it is possible to identify four influential views about the appropriate American attitude toward China, two of which stress China as a power and a threat and two of which emphasize the limits on Chinese capabilities.

First, there is the view reflected in some of Secretary McNamara's statements that China is a serious and growing military threat, and that therefore prudence demands a systematic increase in our security safeguards. And indeed the remarkable pace at which the Chinese have made progress in both nuclear and missile development suggests that we must give most serious attention to projections of what the Chinese may be capable of doing in the next few years and by the end of another decade.

It is important to recognize, however, that the tremendous efforts being made by the Chinese in this field constitute a grotesque pattern of national development which still leaves China weak in conventional military forces. The only way that they can use their investment in nuclear and missile development to cover up their basic weaknesses is for others to believe that this can be done. A sober military appraisal of foreseeable Chinese gains in conventional forces deflates considerably the notion of spectacular advance in Chinese strength. It is hard to believe that forces which were once considered sufficient to deter China when it was closely supported by the Soviets should not be adequate for checking an isolated China. Indeed, the realization that China now stands alone and that Chinese power depends solely upon Chinese resources has encouraged a trend in Japan toward more realistic security policies. Combined with the Indian build-up after the border war, this development suggests the possibility of a greater Asian contribution to the balancing of China in non-nuclear respects. As long as American nuclear forces are employed to deter the Chinese nuclear threat, China does not appear

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to have the necessary conventional strength to disrupt the Asian balance. Therefore, in the meantime we would be playing the Chinese game if we allowed their militant language and rhetoric to exaggerate our estimate of their actual power.

A second influential American view also sees China as a rising power but counsels an exactly opposite response. Foreseeing ominous but unspecified dangers, the spokesmen for this position conclude that the only way the United States can get off a "collision course" with Communist China is to disengage gradually from the Asian mainland and retreat to offshore positions from which we can apply our advantages in air and sea power. The image of a powerful and dangerous China also reinforces vague anxieties that the United States may be overextended, particularly in Asia. This view is probably shaped more by reaction to the war in Viet Nam than to the realities of Communist China. Indeed, since much of the sense of urgency behind this view is inspired by concern over any form of escalation in the Viet Nam conflict, it is difficult to judge how significant it will be in the post-Viet Nam period. In the meantime, it has been considerably undermined by the contradictory arguments that China can be effectively contained by United States airpower but that the current air attacks can have no effect on Hanoi. Also, the very pace at which the Chinese have been developing their nuclear and missile programs, combined with our determination to prevent further nuclear proliferation, means that in time it will become increasingly difficult to consider any withdrawal of American nuclear force from Asia.

In contrast to these two viewpoints is the position of those who see a significant decline in Chinese military capabilities since the break with Russia. One influential group recognizes China's military weaknesses and argues that from our position of strength we can now follow a policy of "containment without isolation." It assumes that Peking's rule is firm, that the transfer of leadership will be relatively orderly and that China will steadily become a more significant actor on the international stage. Therefore, in this view, the time has arrived to work toward more extensive and presumably more mutually satisfying relations with Peking.

Finally, there is a fourth view which also sees the weaknesses of the Chinese, but concludes that now is the time not to treat with Peking but rather to establish as firmly as possible the norms or standards of future international relations in Asia. And of

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course the critical principle to be established at this moment is the inadmissibility of indirect forms of aggression. Partisans of this view are convinced of the inability of the Chinese to intervene directly in Viet Nam, but are impressed with the Chinese potential for coaxing others into international mischief. More generally they hold that there is little to be gained from trying to establish a broader dialogue with Peking, that the mere effort can be frustrating and exhausting because even a weak China is hopelessly stubborn, and that therefore there is more to be gained by concentrating on the other dimension of American policy in Asia.

Any attempt to evaluate these points of view must be tempered by an appreciation of all the imponderables which will shape the prospects of Communist China. Current developments in that strange land, however, suggest that those who have taken the more qualified view of Chinese power are on firmer ground. This means that the serious debate about American policy will be between those who hold the third and fourth points of view and that some variation of these positions should provide the guiding principles for the next phase of American policy.

At this moment the upheavals in China make it exceedingly awkward for those who have pressed for finding ways to reduce Chinese isolation. Indeed, the proponents of this point of view, who deserve serious consideration precisely because they do appreciate the realities of Chinese weakness, run the danger of appearing to be rigidly doctrinaire if they cannot adjust to changing circumstances. Yet it would be quite improper to dismiss a policy approach for the longer run which seems absurd in the immediate context of the current Chinese fit of madness. Any strategy for maximizing the possibilities of moderation in China deserves sympathetic but rigorous analysis.

On the face of it, and taken solely as a slogan of policy, the recommendation that the United States should actively encourage the forces of moderation in China has considerable appeal. The problem, of course, is whether a gratifying posture can be an effective policy. Often the case for a "more relaxed and flexible posture" toward China is based on little more than an innocent faith in what might be called the pull of symmetry; if we display moderation and restraint the Chinese will gradually do likewise, but if we are rigid and hostile they will be the same. Thus the mere act of appearing to be more moderate is supposed to

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strengthen moderate forces in China, if not right away, at least in the next generation.

Leaving aside whether this proposition is valid, there is still the more limited question of its applicability to the Chinese Communists. Even if everyone agrees that the American objective should be to encourage a more moderate China, is this the best way of going about it? Is there any reason to believe that it is likely to be more effective than, say, the exact opposite approach —that of inhibiting and frustrating the Chinese until they are prepared to be more moderate and reasonable in international relations? Or is this a matter which cannot be appraised objectively, which means that the question is reduced to which approach is subjectively the most satisfying for Americans? After all, there are those who say that for some time we have been using China policy primarily to gratify our moralistic bent, and that the time has come to demonstrate the other side of our national character: pragmatic reasonableness.

Over the last few years there has been almost nothing in the record of Peking's behavior to suggest we can so easily influence Chinese attitudes. Indeed, it would be easier to make the case that the Chinese have tended to adopt postures directly opposite to those of the United States. For example, when we were being most rigid in opposition to Peking, the Chinese were enthusiastically joining in the benign spirit of Bandung and talking generally about good will among nations. More recently, the more we have tempered our criticism of China, the more intemperate the Chinese denunciations of the United States have become.

Those who advocate explicitly encouraging Chinese forces of moderation are generally realistic enough to recognize that it will be impossible to shake the fanaticism of the generation of the Long March, suggesting rather that our object should be to persuade the next generation of leaders that they can afford to be moderate and reasonable. The difficulty with this argument, of course, is that much of Mao's seeming madness stems precisely from the fact that he suspects this may be our game. Whatever the state of Mao's mind at this stage of his life may be, he certainly is sensitive to any signs that the spirit of his brand of Communism may be softening. More important, he has explicitly demonstrated that he makes the same deduction about the eroding effects of science and technology upon Communist ideology

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as Western analysts have done. Indeed, almost the essence of Mao's charge against "revisionism" is that Khrushchev allowed a technocratic class to come to positions of influence in the Soviet Union, and even worse, he allowed Russian scientists to meet their Western colleagues in situations which emphasized the universality of technical considerations and muted the importance of politics. A prime purpose of the "cultural revolution" is to drive out all vestiges of "bourgeois thought," which has increasingly come to mean any willingness to hold political considerations in abeyance. Therefore those qualities which we count on the most to produce moderation in the next generation, the technocratic approach to problem-solving and the apolitical spirit of science, are precisely those that Mao recognizes as the most dangerous.

In short, the Chinese are determined that what happened in the Soviet Union and in Soviet-American relations will not be repeated in their case, and they will certainly devise policies to thwart any American attempts to further such a development. Given this, any strategy explicitly designed to offer comfort to potential moderates in China is likely to be self-defeating, and, even worse, destructive of precisely the very individuals we would want to help. It is understandable that Americans would like to forget aspects of Stalin's Russia, but it is inexcusable to forget so soon the elementary principles of prudence called for in dealing with totalitarian systems and to compromise the safety of people who must live under the emotionalism of Mao's China. For American policy to take as its avowed goal the "encouragement of moderate elements" can be to make suspect the very people we want to help. This is a very high price to pay, even though it gives us a sense of satisfaction at being eminently reasonable in the face of China's hate and hostility.

To gain a sense of perspective on what the United States can realistically hope to accomplish in influencing developments in China, it is helpful to keep in mind the difficulties others have had in trying to do the same thing. The Russians had far more intimate associations with the Chinese than the United States can possibly have in the foreseeable future, and were presumably anxious to influence the Chinese in the direction of moderation, yet clearly they not only failed but made matters worse for themselves. This despite the fact that they had the advantage of presumably sharing a common ideological framework with

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the Chinese and not being initially identified, as America is, as a sworn enemy. Likewise, it is difficult to see how the Indians, the Japanese, the British and the French, each in their quite different ways, have had any influence at all in reshaping Chinese developments in the direction of moderation.

It is of course true that other countries, in spite of their difficulties with China, have been exceedingly flattering of American influence by suggesting that a modest shift in American attitudes could produce profound changes in Chinese behavior. American policy-makers, however, cannot afford to confuse Chinese weaknesses and the basic inabilities of the Chinese to support materially their revolutionary pretensions throughout the underdeveloped world with an exaggerated view of what America can do to influence the evolution of Chinese society. The fact that China cannot effectively export her brand of revolution should not suggest that she is now vulnerable to the importation of American moderation.

None of this is to say that the ultimate trend of history is not in the direction of a steady moderation of the Chinese revolution. Although it is impossible to foresee the precise turn that events are likely to take in China, the general drift there is now fairly clear. Just as the Great Leap brought an end to the illusion that the Chinese Communists might have a magical solution to the problems of rapid economic development, the "Great Cultural Revolution" and the rampaging of the Red Guards have ended the remaining illusion about the magic of Chinese organizational abilities. The Chinese advances in economic development are never going to seem quite as impressive as they might have had there not been the pretensions of the Great Leap; and similarly, Chinese political development will be indefinitely compromised by the folly of using teenagers to purge both party and country. It is hard to imagine what could have caused Mao Tse-tung to set into motion a series of acts which can only destroy the precious mystique of party authority. From now on, government is going to be more difficult than before, and in spite of all the chanting of slogans it will be difficult to recapture its revolutionary élan.

What all this means, then, is that paradoxically the current upheavals will accelerate the day on which Chinese Communism will have to give up its pretensions and come to terms with the realities of Chinese resources and the basic facts of Chinese

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society. For American policy this means that we should have firm confidence that time will bring moderation in China and that the Chinese will be proved wrong in their forecast that "people's revolutions" will ignite the developing areas. This is now the basic issue which has in a sense replaced the earlier debate as to whether history is on the side of Capitalism or of Communism.

Precisely because we can have such confidence in our analysis of the eventual trend of events, it is we who should be prepared to settle for "peaceful competition" and not try to engage in small manipulations to "speed up the course of history." Specifically, this means that we should forego the temptation to engage in petty and marginal attempts to accelerate the processes of change by seeking "channels of communications" which can only be irritants to the Chinese. Just as we once learned that there was little to be gained and possibly much lost by trying to manipulate the weakening of Soviet Communism, so we should recognize that the same is true with Chinese Communism.

IV

In the next phase of the history of Asia, American policy is going to have to learn how to stand by while the Chinese go through the inevitable process of adapting and accommodating Communism to the real needs of their society. Until they have worked out for themselves what is to be the nature of Chinese, as opposed to Maoist, Communism, it is going to be exceedingly difficult to seek direct adjustment in American-Chinese relations. A counsel of patience should in the meantime replace the appeal of urgency which surrounded so much of the earlier discussion of the emergence of revolutionary Chinese power. To look back over the record of change in China in the last few years is to recognize the costs that would have been entailed in premature efforts to establish broader relations with China.

It is clear, for example, that China as it was before the Great Leap would have been more difficult to integrate into world politics than the later China. Similarly, a China that had experienced only the Great Leap and not the Red Guards would have been a more troublesome partner in international relations than the China that is going to emerge out of the current upheavals. Time has also given the rest of the world an increasingly clear appreciation of the pretensions and realities of Communist China. Indeed, it is precisely the need to understand better this gap be-

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tween pretension and reality, between rhetoric and capability, that is a prerequisite of an improved China policy.

To counsel patience in finding possible ways of "communicating" with the Chinese is not to say that we should sit back and wait. On the contrary, the situation seems to call for far more significant action than such comparatively trivial matters as trying to arrange for exchange visits of newsmen and scholars. What is urgently needed is for America to apply again its classic approach of responding to the uncertainties of Asian developments—this time by directing attention to establishing a new Asian system of inter-state relationships in which Chinese power and interests will be appropriately recognized.

There are already a number of fundamental issues affecting the Asian balance of power which involve the structure of American bases and nuclear policies. These should be clarified in any comprehensive formulation of the future of Asia. And if we can assume a satisfactory outcome to the Viet Nam conflict, it will be urgently necessary to balance the Chinese sense of defeat with a constructive and very concrete statement of just what the United States means when it says that it is prepared to respect the "legitimate interests" of China.

The need is to make unmistakably clear what kind of Asia it is to which China must adjust, and to mobilize the rest of Asia to convince the Chinese that they can find security in such an Asia. In the past when we made our grand statements about Asia, such as in our enunciation of the Open Door, we did not have the capabilities we have now to affect Asian developments. What we lack now, however, is the grand formulation. This cannot be merely a matter of rhetoric; it must deal with such hard matters as the disposition of nuclear forces and the possibilities for trade and travel between parts of divided countries.

The reason that it is appropriate at this time, and would have been premature any earlier, is that at last much of the illusion about China has been stripped away and it is possible to discern fairly clearly the realities of Chinese power and the pace of Chinese progress. We can help to reduce the remaining gap between Chinese pretensions and reality by providing Chinese leaders, whether extremists or moderates, with a vivid sense of the kind of Asia they will have to live in.

With such large matters to be resolved in Asia in the immediate years ahead, it would be most unfortunate if the current American

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interest in discussing new approaches to China were to lead only to the examination of tactics for communicating with the Chinese and the old issue of United Nations membership. Only a slight raising of our sights might make it possible for us to reëstablish a true coherence in our policies by at last bringing together the two parts of what has been our bifurcated approach to Asia.

It may seem quixotic at a time when American forces are deeply involved in an ugly war in Viet Nam to call for discussion about what should follow after containment in Asia. Yet unfortunately so much of the discussion about Viet Nam has focused upon how we got there that we are in danger of once again fighting through a war without developing a vision of the political possibilities and necessities of the postwar period. The Viet Nam War itself and the advancing forces of regionalism in Southeast Asia will have demonstrated that China has been contained. Therefore many of the issues which have dominated debates on both China policy and the Viet Nam War should be put aside and vision should be directed to the far larger matter of the organization of a post-containment Asia.

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# CHINA CONVULSED

*By Mark Gayn*

MAO Tse-tung's latest battle is almost certainly his last. It will also probably lead to his first major and irreversible defeat. A superb political tactician, he should be able to destroy his old companions who have turned against him. But this will not attain for Mao what he set out to achieve with his "cultural revolution." For he seeks nothing less than the rejuvenation of a great revolution, the rebirth in middle age of the drive, the passion, the selflessness and the discipline it had in its youth a third of a century ago. But the clock can hardly be turned back, and a nation in the age of nuclear bombs and computers cannot behave as if this were still the age of millet and rifles.

The cultural revolution is pure Mao, with its roots not in Karl Marx but in Mao's own experience and memories, in his own idealized image of what the revolution was in its years in the wilderness, in the Chingkang mountains, in Kiangsi and, above all, in the caves of Yenan. His political ideas are permeated with nostalgia—with the Yenan syndrome. Classical revolutions spring out of popular suffering, grievance against injustice, popular protest. Mao's own revolution of the twenties and the thirties sprang out of the agonies of rural China. But his cultural revolution is made of different stuff. It is a revolution decreed from above. It is fired by no social or economic or even political protest. And even the enemies it is supposed to battle remain shadowy, nameless figures high in the party and the state.

But though this new revolution does not have its roots in popular angers, it has already produced radical changes. Above all, it has altered the balance of political power that has endured since the day Mao rode into Peking in triumph back in 1949. From that day until the autumn of 1965, the Communist party had a monopoly of political power, with no challengers allowed or even likely. The party shaped policy and governed. It controlled the arts, political thought and the classroom. It dominated the army and dealt harshly with those who wanted the army free of political commissars. It decided what was to be on the store shelves and in the rice bowls. It dictated manners and fashions. It was all, everywhere and always.

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This is no longer true. As a result of the cultural revolution, the party is divided and in the throes of a purge that will go on for a long time. Its offshoot, the Communist Youth League, is inactive and awaiting the surgery of reorganization. More important, the party now faces two major challengers, both supported by Mao. One of these is the army, which, under the command of Mao's new heir-designate, Lin Piao, is more than ever a political instrument. The other rival is the network of "cultural revolution groups" and the Red Guards. This body is still incomplete and formless, but it is already a power in the land. Perhaps the most startling political fact in China today is the existence of three parallel and often conflicting instruments of power, whose relationships have not yet been clearly defined.

The second major fact is Mao's sharp swing to the left. If a Red Guard were asked what this means, he would readily explain that it signifies destruction of the "Four Olds" (the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of "the exploiting classes") and introduction of the "Four News." But, in fact, the turn to the left will sooner or later affect every phase of national life, from economic planning and management to military strategy. It is obvious that Peking has not yet thought out the implications of this move. What will happen to agricultural production if the peasant is to be deprived of his small private patch of land? What will be the impact of the proposed educational reform—shortened school terms, simplified curricula, more time spent on studying the thought of Mao Tse-tung—on the nation's technological progress? And what is likely to happen to governmental efficiency if Mao goes through with his plans to create a network of mass organizations patterned on those of the Paris Commune?

The third major fact—and one not yet properly assessed in the West—is that China has gone isolationist. Just as Stalin withdrew into isolationism after his fiasco in China in 1927, so has Peking now withdrawn into its shell. The reason for this is that the Chinese leaders wish to resolve their domestic problems before they return to the barricades of the world revolution. The bridges to the outside are being demolished: by the Red Guards' seizure of translations of Western authors found in private homes; by terminating the contracts of foreign teachers in China; or by curtailing the work of Chinese translators.

Coupled with this retreat into isolationism is a reassessment of American intentions. Sometime late in 1965 or early in 1966,

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Peking decided that the United States did not for the moment wish to go to war with China.

II

The tempest stirred by Mao has been extraordinary in many ways. There was the drama of a political giant who in his last years discovered that *his* revolution and *his* party were changing in ways he could not tolerate. There was the fury, only partly concealed from the public, of a historic debate between Mao and some of his old comrades. There was the total unpredictability of events. In a Greek tragedy, the onlooker can anticipate the tragic resolution and know in advance which heroes and which villains are doomed. In the tempest in China, the unexpected keeps happening and the most unlikely figures are struck down. The scene is somber, the theme is violence, and the spectator is constantly surprised.

Peking itself dates the cultural revolution from that day in November 1965 when a Shanghai journal opened an attack on Wu Han, deputy mayor of Peking, a historian of note and a playwright, whose great transgression was in writing historical plays about ancient villainy and virtue that made the audience think of the present. But the real beginnings of the crisis go back to the spring of 1965, when the United States began to build up its military strength in South Viet Nam and to bomb the North. The sound of explosions just beyond China's borders inevitably produced a troubled debate in Peking. Would this lead to another Korea? If yes, when would the American attack come? What should be done to prepare for this war with an enemy equipped with the most devastating weapons known to man?

China's leaders have always believed that war with "Wall Street imperialism" was unavoidable. But what was a Marxist abstraction a year earlier had suddenly acquired the feel of reality. While in Peking in April and May of 1965, I saw no panic, but my notebooks record much speculation, both private and public, on what would happen when the attack came. For the first time, the people were told that nuclear bombs might fall on Chinese cities and do grave damage. But an old intimate of Mao assured me one day that the fabric of political and social organization was so strong and resilient that it would survive a nuclear attack even if parts of it were destroyed.

The debate on American intentions went on through much of

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the summer of 1965. But the wars of today being what they are, the debate could not be confined to the issue of peace or war. Very soon it came to involve questions of national priorities, economic controls, public morale and loyalty, dissent on the campuses and in the arts, and the attitudes of the young.

One of the hottest debates was within the military establishment. For the third time since the Korean War, the exponents of "people's [or guerrilla] war" were locked in argument with the "professionals," who wanted a smaller, highly trained, modern armed force. The West was offered an insight into this controversy in September 1965 with Marshal Lin Piao's famous statement, "Long Live The Victory of People's War." Unfortunately, however, the West did not understand. In Washington the statement was described as an Asian *Mein Kampf*. Others saw it primarily as a warning to North Viet Nam not to depart from guerrilla tactics. It is now clear that the statement was rather a part of the furious debate within the high command, with Lin Piao expounding the view that finally prevailed. It is known that the professionals wanted less politics and weed-hoeing for the army, and more military training and better arms. They may even have argued in favor of renewed ties with the Soviet Union, which alone could supply the modern hardware they wanted. Lin Piao rejected all these arguments, and in the process became the principal authorized exponent of Chairman Mao's thinking. The spokesman for the professionals appeared to be Marshal Lo Jui-ching, a former police specialist and himself a rising star in Chinese politics. He vanished from sight in late November 1965.

The military crisis in Viet Nam and the disaster in Indonesia came at a bad moment for Peking. The failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1959–62 brought with it political ferment whose scope the West did not appreciate until very recently. Even the party intellectuals—its political philosophers, the editors of its newspapers, the people toiling in the maze of the propaganda committee—were beset by doubts. Political columnists in the Peking dailies were beginning to question the wisdom of the leaders, the integrity of the officialdom, the dogma itself. Emboldened, writers in the provinces began to speak of official blunders and of despair in the villages. By 1965 the economy was advancing once again, but not enough to match the dreams of the leaders or to cope with the high birth rate. The details of the new

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Five Year Plan were not revealed, but it clearly provided for only a modest growth.

Even more disturbing from Mao's point of view were the social currents. The gap between the city and the village, between the new urbanites and the peasants, kept widening. The new intellectual élite produced by the industrial revolution was fast losing interest in the countryside. The youth, born too late to learn revolution-making at first hand, was no longer fired by second-hand accounts. The poison of "revisionism," which Mao felt had corrupted the minds of the young in the Soviet Union, was now also at work in China.

The revolution was in peril. It was going flabby and losing its sense of direction before it had fully succeeded. Mao felt the revolution was in danger not only from the Americans, but from lack of faith and discipline, from the temptations of peacetime, from the reawakened bourgeois yearnings for comfort, status, education, stability. Heroic steps were needed to deal with this and all the other domestic problems. In 1959 and again in 1962, Mao had spoken of the need for a cultural revolution, which he made synonymous with political militancy. His wishes were briefly heeded, and then ignored. Now, with the American threat hanging over China, he wanted to regenerate his revolution, to make it dynamic again and pure of faith. At meetings of the inner circle in the fall of 1965, Mao proposed that it take the road to the extreme left.

Mao wanted more than militant slogans and resolutions. He wanted to crush the disloyal intellectuals until none would forget the things he preached at the Yenan Forum nearly a quarter of a century earlier. He wanted the professionals curbed, whether in the army or in industry, and he wanted everyone to know that it was more important to be Red than Expert. He wanted to destroy all the newfangled notions of managerial powers, incentives, profits and free market. The enemy was at the gates. Nothing but total mobilization of faith and effort could save the revolution for a century, nay, for ten thousand years.

But Mao's demand for a sharp swing to the left met with opposition among some of his old companions. Although many of these "monsters and demons" have not yet been named, the arguments they advanced in the historic debate were revealed in the party and army press. Like Mao, his opponents were aware of the grave social and political strains, the economic problems, the

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divisions in the army, and the threat posed by the American presence in Viet Nam. On many issues they saw eye to eye with Mao. Like him, for instance, they must have been troubled by the voices of dissent in the arts, the press and the university forums, and they were ready to join in yet another cultural purge —which may explain why the upheaval began with an attack on intellectuals. But the opponents were also pragmatists. They did not believe that the simple and violent methods and solutions of the mid-thirties could be applied in the complicated late sixties. It was time to let the experts, under party direction, cope with the problems of production, quality, costs, efficiency, priorities and marketing. The new urban class and the new intellectual élite could not be treated as if they still wore straw sandals. China, the argument seemed to run, should look forward to computers and not back to the simplicities and improvisations of the early days of the revolution.

III

It was in these debates, which began with the consideration of the American threat and developed into an argument on the course China is to follow for generations to come, that Mao discovered he was no longer in control of the party he had created. One reason for this was his age and indifferent health; he was no longer the man who could impose his will on his companions. But another reason was that his colleagues did not think his approach would work, and they feared the disruptive effect of the measures he urged on society, the party and the economy.

Ever since the Tsunyi Conference in 1935, early in the Long March, the party had been Mao's only power base. It was the source of authority and the real government; and it had a well-defined line of succession. For nearly a quarter of a century Liu Shao-ch'i had been Mao's heir apparent, and it seemed as if China would be immune to the kind of violent power struggles that took place in the Soviet Union. Now, suddenly, just as Mao was preparing for a momentous change of course, he discovered he could no longer fully rely on the party. He still had many allies but he could not be certain that the political machine would execute his orders as it had in the past.

Therefore, with boldness and imagination that few leaders of today could match, the old man began to build a new power base from which to launch a new revolution. Almost instinctively he

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turned to the army as he had so often in his crises in the wilderness. Under Lin Piao it had again become a revolutionary instrument. The dissident generals had been purged in 1959 and again in late 1965. The political commissars were supreme. The army might not be quite as effective an instrument as the party machine, but it was a political organization and each soldier was a propagandist.

But the army alone was not enough. Thus Mao looked back to the days of 1926–27, when he toured five counties in Hunan and watched peasant bands wage class war. He needed shock troops like them to create conditions in which the party regulars opposed to him would be prevented from using their accustomed methods and controls. In early August 1966, the Central Committee met in a curious session. Neither the names nor even the number of the members present was given, so that it was impossible to know the extent of the purge, but the proceedings turned out to be vitally important. Those present called for "the recapture of the leadership" from "those within the party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road." They provided for the creation of a new permanent organ of power—in the form of "cultural revolutionary groups, committees and congresses." One of the sessions of this policy-making body was—incredibly as it then seemed—packed with teenagers, who were told to "cast out fear," and not to "be afraid of disorder." Never before had the governors of any major state called for disarray in the land.

Not long afterwards, the *Liberation Army Journal* urged all to study Mao's famous "Report of an Investigation Into the Peasant Movement in Hunan" as a guide to understanding the new "great proletarian cultural revolution." It was helpful advice. The Red Guards and all that followed have been patterned on the peasants of Hunan—the bands of youngsters sweeping through villages and towns with banners, drums and cymbals; the dunce caps and other humiliations for the opponents, real or imagined; the beatings and, here and there, the killings; the raids on private homes; the violence against established authority. And all these were accompanied by internal discipline, fervor and the kind of self-denial the Puritans would have envied.

The idea of using the Red Guards must have been born either very late in 1965 or early in 1966. One evidence of this is the long vacation unexpectedly given to university students in the late winter. They were as pleased with it as they were baffled, and it

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was not until many months later that they understood the vacation was meant in lieu of their summer holidays, which they were to spend as shock troops of the cultural revolution. The first unit of the Red Guards was organized almost surreptitiously in May 1966, at the middle school attached to the Tsing Hua University in Peking. Only a little later the storm broke out on the campus of the University of Peking, which Mao had long regarded as a dangerous center of dissent. A virago from the department of philosophy began it with "big character" posters denouncing the university's president (who was also a veteran Communist). After that came fisticuffs, turmoil, the humiliation of the president and numerous professors, almost ceaseless meetings, the deafening pounding of gongs, a purge of the faculty and the student body, suicides of teachers—and the creation of the Red Guard. From Peking the movement spread with lightning speed to other cities, and the presidents of the universities of Nanking, Sian, Chengchow and Wuhan all suffered humiliation before dismissal. The Red Guards were formally unveiled at the Square of the Gate of Eternal Peace on August 18, 1966, in the first of the immense rallies at which, as the saying went, "Chairman Mao met the revolutionary masses." This first meeting became doubly significant because it was used to present Marshal Lin Piao to the nation as Mao's new heir-designate and as the principal interpreter of his thought.

The belief that the Red Guards are a mob of hooligans who have taken over the streets is misguided. They are Mao's task force used to intimidate or even to destroy his opponents; they are an effective political tool created and used with imagination and with what the opposition must regard as total ruthlessness. Coincidentally, the movement is also a device for arousing revolutionary fervor among the young who have never experienced the real thing. (Their slogan now is, "Learn revolution-making by making revolution.") In the fall of 1966, the army took the Red Guards under its wing, and uniformed advisers began to organize the youngsters into para-military formations.

To make millions of youths available for the tempest in the streets, Mao shut down all the middle schools and universities in the land. It was a radical move that must have met with strong opposition. Indeed, no major state in this century has called such a holiday on education, in effect taking eight months or more from the school lives of millions of teenagers. The

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official argument that the schools were closed to allow the party to draft new educational reforms is hardly credible, for they could have been drawn up while the youths pursued their studies. But Mao needed shock troops in a hurry, and he was prepared to pay for them with time out from study.

Mao and Lin Piao made one more imaginative move in preparation for the great struggle. On Lin's orders, first the army and then the entire population began to "study the thought of Mao Tse-tung" on a scale never matched. Every soldier and Red Guard acquired his book of Mao's quotations. Passersby in the street, passengers in buses or on trains, workers at their lathes, peasants wading through paddies, all had quotations read to them by the relentless youngsters. A Westerner come to do business at the Canton fair had a nightly call from his interpreter anxious to impart to him the thought of Mao. Diners eating their chow mein did so to the sound of Mao's quotations read by girls not yet in their teens. Little paper or labor was available for other authors, as the printing presses turned out 35 million copies of Mao's essays, and railwaymen made solemn pledges to move this precious cargo ahead of all others. Some experts in the West mistakenly ascribed all this to an old man's paranoia. It was rather a brilliant device to create a climate in which no man could speak out in opposition to Mao and his ideas. No commander-in-chief had prepared for battle with greater skill and thoroughness.

One of the early highlights of the cultural revolution came in late January 1966, at a conference of the army political cadres. It was there that Hsiao Hua, the army's top political commissar, reiterated the theme of "Politics in Command" which was to dominate the nation's life in the year ahead. The meeting was given the highest publicity. At dozens of other conferences that followed, factory directors and commune chairmen, engineers and railwaymen and so many others, were given their new commandments. They were told that industrial productivity was less important than the workers' revolutionary souls; that in the seventeenth year of proletarian dictatorship, the class enemy still had his agents in high places, and they must be destroyed.

After the fall of the historian Wu Han, the purge spread to powerful ideologues in the Peking municipal party machine. By the time I visited South China in May 1966, the campaign against the "black gang" of leading party intellectuals was in full fury. At an agricultural college outside of Canton I saw more than a thou-

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sand small placards attacking the "black gang." The broadsides had been written after a mass meeting the previous evening, and the fiercest of all the denunciations was from the brush of a kitchen helper.

P'eng Chen's own fate appears to have been decided in the first fortnight of April 1966, when the one man who might have sided with him, Chief of State Liu Shao-ch'i, was out of the country. P'eng was replaced by Li Hsueh-feng, head of the party's North China bureau, who promptly instituted a purge of the Peking municipal machine. The party leaders traditionally worry about the big cities. Indeed, Shanghai and Peking have long been governed by members of the Politburo. Now Li was making sure that the capital was cleansed of dissenters and enemies, actual or potential. But he was thought to be insufficiently ruthless. By October 1966, printed "big character" posters on the wall facing the municipal party's headquarters were denouncing Li for his softness. One of the charges against him was that for a month after he had purged the party bureau the purged officials sat in on the meetings of the purgers, and received from them tea, sympathy and shelter from the pursuing Red Guards.

But the Peking municipal party was only one of the bastions captured by Mao and Lin Piao. Rapidly, as spring ran into summer, they moved to widen their foothold in the party and to limit that of the opposition. Within the party's Central Committee a cultural revolution group was set up under Ch'en Po-ta, once Mao's private secretary. The group had wide autonomy and did not limit itself to cultural matters. The next Mao-Lin act was to move in on the powerful propaganda committee. Its head, Lu Ting-yi, a pudgy and intense little man who for a quarter of a century had toiled at Mao's elbow, was cast aside. His place was given to the new star, Tao Chu, for long the party boss in the southeast and now, at 60, a leading actor in the Peking drama. Tao at once embarked on a thorough purge of the propaganda machine. His role was crucial, for through him Mao and Lin Piao now controlled all media of expression. While they could mold opinion as they wished, the opponents were denied any public forum. Still another party nerve-center taken over was the Central Committee's General Affairs office, long headed by Yang Shang-k'un, a Soviet-trained revolutionary, a Long Marcher and for many years Mao's man Friday; he simply vanished from the list of Central Committee members.

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The most important of all the victories was scored in the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the seven men, led by Mao himself, who hold all power, set policies and make all major decisions. By August of 1966, Lin Piao, who had been ranked fifth, had been given the heir's place, and Liu Shao-ch'i had been cast out of the group. Chou En-lai was still Number Three. But there were now three newcomers, Tao Chu, Ch'en Po-ta and K'ang Sheng. With at least five votes out of seven, Mao could now speak, as he had in the past, for the Central Committee and for the party apparatus.

There was yet one more move to be made in this intricate and dangerous game. Mao appears to have created a sort of a "kitchen cabinet," including such close followers as Ch'en Po-ta and K'ang Sheng. Another key member of this group was Mrs. Mao Tse-tung, who emerged from the obscurity of private life to become a leading figure in the cultural revolution. The virtue of this small, tight, informal band was that Mao could wholly trust all its members.

## IV

In August 1966 came the declaration of war on Mao's opposition. The threats grew more violent until, in October, the *People's Daily* urged no mercy for the opponents. It called on the faithful to follow the precept of the writer, Lu Hsun, who believed in "beating the wild dog even though it is already in the water," and "once you start beating it, beat it to death." The Red Guards turned to parades, oratory and violence. By and large, it was violence controlled and meant to create a feeling of tension and fear. The teenagers who invaded private homes in Peking, smashed or seized furniture, and manhandled the occupants were guided by lists posted in each block—presumably by the police.

But inevitably, violence on such a scale could not be controlled fully. Rival groups of Red Guards appeared in schools, and they battled each other for the honor of serving the cultural revolution. So long as the Red Guards confined themselves to renaming streets, stores, restaurants, factories and noodle shops, the trouble was minor. But once the teenagers invaded factories and communes, attacked the local cadres and disrupted production, bloody clashes began to erupt between the workers or peasants on the one hand and the Red Guards on the other. The disruption

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of production was not heavy—affecting only a textile mill here, a tire factory there, a railway-undercarriage works elsewhere. But even this was enough to set the alarm bells ringing in Peking. Thus, at one rally after another, Premier Chou En-lai, a possibly reluctant ally of Mao and Lin Piao, began to warn the youngsters that production was sacred. In the provinces, the talk was sterner. The Red Guards were told bluntly to keep out of factories and fields, and the workers and peasants were told to stay out of Red Guard meetings, or to send only a few representatives. In September, the young militants were ordered to cease and desist until the autumn harvest was in—or go to help with the work in the fields.

If the nameless opponents in the inner circle were cowed, there was no obvious sign of it. Having gone through the same revolutionary trials as Mao and Lin Piao, they were also hard men and skilled fighters. They now had no public forum where they could dissent. Nor was it possible for anyone to stand at a street corner and voice doubt of Mao's policies, for this would have been a form of suicide. But Mao's opponents in Peking were not entirely helpless. They still controlled some important wheels in the Central Commitee, and they had numerous allies and friends in the provinces. In the hinterland, orders from Mao and Lin Piao could be deliberately misinterpreted or their execution delayed. One provincial boss was accused of shelving for two months Lin Piao's order to intensify the study of Mao's works. Another was charged with failing to publish Mao's poems in the local press. Still another was accused of having spread the rumor among local cadres that Mao meant to destroy the party.

The purge in the provinces never came close to Stalinist proportions. It was selective and highly publicized to produce the widest psychological impact. Those purged included provincial party secretaries, editors, writers, propaganda experts, heads of radio stations and educators (but never a factory director or an army officer). Once chosen for the purge at a closed meeting of party leaders, the victim was put through a series of extra-legal trials culminating in meetings sometimes attended by tens of thousands of people. It was at such a "trial" that the once-famous writer, Ouyang Shan, was denounced by his former cook, his nurse and his school-age son, who (to quote the Canton *Hung-wei Pao*) "with irrepressible indignation shouted, 'Down with Ouyang Shan! Thoroughly indict the crimes of the anti-party element

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Ouyang Shan!' " To make the break complete, the boy changed his name from Ouyang Yen-hsing to Hsiang Tung-sheng.

Nothing illustrates the basic weakness of the cultural revolution better than the fact that the Chinese press could, in the same week, report both the latest nuclear test and a series of meetings at which young people ate weeds to "remember the past miseries." What Mao is seeking to do is to create a glorious tomorrow while constantly looking at yesterday. But to do this is to run against the grain of China's changing society. One of every five Chinese now belongs to the new urban society, whose tastes, needs and urges are a century ahead of those of rural China. Mao himself can take full credit for China's growing urbanization. But he will not recognize the fact that the new urbanite, having left this primitive world, does not understand why he should go back, either in time or in place. The city dwellers are physically involved in the cultural revolution; they study Mao's works, they memorize his quotations, they march and fill the squares for immense rallies. But neither politically nor psychologically is this their revolution.

This alienation of the urbanite contributes to the erosion of authority. For a decade and a half, the greatest asset of the system that Mao created was its stability. There were no cabinet crises, no massive purges, no political upheavals of the kind that rocked the Soviet Union. The line of succession was firmly established and everyone knew exactly where power reposed. The leaders made policy blunders; they often reversed themselves. But they did provide order and political stability after nearly four decades of disunity and disorder. The cultural revolution has changed this. The Central Committee commends disorder as if it were a virtue. In the provinces, party leaders sing praise of chaos. The Red Guards are sent into the streets on a rampage, and the nation's leaders not only offer their blessings but even order that no one interfere with the youngsters. Equally important has been the constant talk of leaders entrenched in high state and party posts who had to be destroyed. Who were they? What were their specific crimes? If they were enemies, why were they not brought to task at once? The denunciations might serve to promote the revolution, but they also undermined public confidence in the stability of the system.

As the powers of the party were whittled down by its rivals, Mao sought to fill the vacuum in authority with cultural revolu-

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tion groups. There has been talk of new mass organizations patterned after those of the Paris Commune. But the process of creating all these new organs of power is slow and the vacuum persists. And the party leaders in the provinces, who are always held responsible for the maintenance of order, now do not know how to reconcile their duty with Peking's praise of disorder; and if their prime task has been to maintain production, they are not clear how this can be ensured while there is disorder in the streets.

These are some of the dilemmas that Mao and Lin Piao face in their great debate with the nameless opponents. As a tactician, Mao has done all he can, and even more, to make the position of his enemies untenable. But the trouble is that this is not enough. The revolution that he is trying to bring to China is a heroic project that runs counter to the aspirations of the new urban society and to the nation's urge to progress. No society that wishes to advance can long endure isolationism or a truncated educational system or an anti-intellectual climate or constant dwelling on the past, no matter how glorious. This is why the forecast is for continued tempest.

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# CUBA, CASTRO AND THE UNITED STATES

*By Philip W. Bonsal*

FIDEL Castro's prestige at home and abroad continues to decline. In the comparatively near future the Cuban people may be confronted with real political choices and the United States may once again have to deal with the question of relations with Cuba.

As Ambassador to Cuba in 1959 and 1960, the first two years of the Castro régime, I witnessed the spectacle of Cuba's take-over by a personal dictatorship which eventually became Communist-oriented. I believe that the Cuban people have as great a capacity as any through trial and error to run their own affairs. The opportunities for the Cubans to demonstrate this capacity have in the past been curtailed by the special relationship of their government with that of the United States and by the wide fluctuations of the sugar market on which their economy depends.

The enlargement of these opportunities for responsible self-government should be a major sequel to the liberation of the island from the phenomenally gifted, erratic and unscrupulous autocrat who "freed his country from American imperialism" only to reduce it to a satellite of Moscow (now that the Peking alternative has disappeared).

II

From the outbreak of our war with Spain in 1898 to the suspension of our quota for Cuban sugar in 1960, the United States exercised a major influence on the economic and political development of Cuba. Judgment of that influence is broadly divided between traditional and revisionist schools of thought. The former holds that the United States consistently played a benevolent role, showering moral and material benefits on an often unappreciative, ungrateful and sometimes badly behaved small neighbor, and views our policy, especially in the earlier years of the relationship, as extraordinarily enlightened in comparison with that of the predatory powers of Europe in other areas. To the revisionists, on the other hand, Cuba has been, during much of her history and especially since 1898, the hapless victim of

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materialistic, imperialistic exploitation by the Colossus of the North. In the fashion of conventional wisdoms, each of these views over the years has incorporated a fair number of fallacies and myths.

In the traditional view, United States military intervention was the deciding factor in the independence of Cuba. At a sizable cost in blood and treasure, the United States freed an oppressed and mistreated people from a harsh, backward tyranny and set it on the road to self-government. In contrast, the thesis of the revisionists in its extreme form is that the Cuban uprising of 1895 was the final episode in a purely Cuban struggle for independence begun nearly thirty years earlier. Not until the victory of the insurgents appeared both certain and imminent did the United States intervene militarily, snatching their triumph from the Cuban patriots and using the four-year military occupation to transfer power in the island to reactionary groups. Called by our representatives "the better elements," many of these groups had coöperated with the Spanish régime and were now disposed to coöperate with us in saddling Cuba with a semi-colonial status and in exploiting her people.

In like manner, other major episodes in the relations between the two countries have been contrastingly interpreted. In Cuba, the revisionist school grew steadily in acceptance and was much favored by Castro and his followers: their vicious distortions of fact and of American motivations were and are notorious.

The traditionalists and the revisionists agree on one point: that the influence of the United States in Cuba or the threat of it—whether as a generous benefactor and wise counselor or as a neo-colonialist exploiter—has limited the ability of the Cubans to make their own decisions in many matters theoretically the exclusive concern of a sovereign state. Dependence upon the United States, coupled with dependence upon the vagaries of the sugar market, has worked over the years to frustrate the growth of a full sense of responsibility in the Cuban leadership and of a popular belief in the possibility of such responsibility. The island mentality was conditioned by a conviction that the fate of Cuba, in the larger sense, was not in Cuban hands.

From 1902 to 1934 our influence was exercised according to what was known as the Platt Amendment, a statement of our view of the relations that should prevail between the United States and the newly independent republic, and one that was

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incorporated at our direction into the Cuban constitution of 1902. Among other things, it gave us the right to intervene when we thought it desirable to do so for the preservation of Cuban independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.

The Platt Amendment was an expression of the thinking embodied in the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. We believed that because certain Caribbean countries were inept in handling their affairs and because predatory imperialisms were ready to take advantage of this ineptness we must assume broad contingent responsibilities toward them. We believed that by acting as a sort of benevolent policeman we would encourage the investment (largely American) needed in those countries to promote their well-being and ours. And we had the generous if mistaken belief that the threat of our restraining hand and, if necessary, the hand itself would develop the capacity of these countries for self-government, and accelerate their progress toward political maturity.

Since the termination of our military occupation, the inauguration of a Cuban government and commercial reciprocity with the United States on a preferential basis were all contingent on the acceptance of the Platt Amendment, the Cubans reluctantly accepted it. Elihu Root, then Secretary of War, sweetened the pill by stating that the Amendment would not be interpreted as a charter for constant interference in Cuban affairs but would be invoked only if the Cubans themselves created the unhappy conditions contemplated therein. After our intervention from 1906 to 1908, however, the United States, anxious to avoid any further intervention on a formal scale, decided to nip in the bud any activity or project on the part of the Cubans which could possibly make invocation of the Amendment necessary. This policy, involving a generally well-intentioned but irksome interference in many Cuban matters, came to full flower in the efforts of General Crowder in the early twenties to furnish Cuba with a set of laws and institutions, the latter preferably to be operated by Cubans enjoying the General's confidence. The General's industry and good intentions are beyond praise, nor can the existence of the ills he hoped to cure be denied, but it can be concluded, in hindsight, that all this was hardly a nation-building exercise.

As the twenties wore to a close, the policy of intervention in the Caribbean area came more and more to be questioned both in

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view of the unsatisfactory results being achieved and because extra-continental imperialisms were not at the time plausible threats. For these reasons, as well as to conciliate Latin American opinion, we abjured intervention under any circumstances and laid the foundations of the Good Neighbor Policy.

In the case of Cuba, the change to the new policy was incomplete. Overproduction of sugar during the worldwide depression of the early thirties brought a catastrophic drop in prices and demand, accentuated by the Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930 which helped stimulate the production of cane sugar under the American flag at Cuba's expense. The resulting severe economic and social distress, in conjunction with the intolerable conditions created by the wholesale terrorism and counter-terrorism of the opponents and supporters of the Machado régime, put Cuba close to the top of the agenda of the New Deal administration. As Ambassador in 1933, Sumner Welles acted as mediator of the political struggle, but the new government on which he secured agreement lasted only three weeks, giving way to a military and civilian movement of revolutionary renovation headed by Sergeant Batista and Professor Grau San Martin. Fearing the extremism of some elements in the Grau government, we refused to recognize it and, after a few months, persuaded Batista to withdraw his vital support from it. Our success in getting rid of Grau resulted from Cuba's desperate need to participate as favorably as possible in our sugar program and to secure a reciprocal tariff agreement.

Our judgment about Grau may or may not have been sound. When he became President a decade later, he disconcerted both those who had believed in him and those who had feared him in 1934. The point here, however, is that in the last year of the Platt Amendment and only a few months after the adoption of the Good Neighbor Policy, the United States, through the exercise of its superior power, critically affected the course of Cuban political life. The elimination of the Amendment a few months later left many Cubans—even those who favored our action—skeptical as to the completeness of the island's independence. Our supporters appeared to owe the defense of their interests to our intervention—an unfortunate precedent.

The new American sugar program replaced competition under a protective tariff with a system whereby the executive branch fixed the total amount of sugar put on the American market. The

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level was designed to produce reasonable prices for all concerned, the consumers included. Within this total, quotas were allotted to the various producing areas, domestic and foreign, in accordance with laws passed by Congress at periodic intervals. Thus Cuba's share in our market did not rest upon a contractual basis but was dependent on the will of Congress. Cuts were made from time to time in the Cuban quota for the benefit of domestic areas or even of other foreign areas. The need for Cuba to avoid actions or attitudes which might put her in a bad light with Congress at quota time was a fact of life generally understood.

The Sugar Act of 1934 and the reciprocal trade agreement of the same year raised the island from the desperate straits caused by the depression plus our tariff to a level of genteel poverty with sugar income only 50 percent below the average of the twenties instead of the 75 percent of the disaster years (1932 and 1933). World War II produced a new era of prosperity for Cuba, and succeeding crises such as those of Korea and Suez bailed out the Cuban sugar industry and reinforced an attitude of ironic providentialism in the Cuban people. On the world market, wide swings in price and quantity continued to be normal.

III

Batista's military coup in 1952 and the apathy with which it was received by the masses and all but a few leaders gave evidence of the political bankruptcy which allowed Castro to flourish seven years later. While the constitutional governments of Grau and Prio (1944 to 1952) had enlisted the participation of many representative and devoted Cubans, the administrations themselves were generally regarded as corrupt, especially at the top, and dominated by vicious political gangsterism at lower levels. The people had little faith in their government or in the integrity of their political leaders.

In 1956, a number of distinguished Cubans made an effort to find a constitutional way out for the dictatorship. Their effort, known as the "Civic Dialogue," failed because of the intransigence of Batista and those profiting from his rule. This was the point of no return in the tragic course of Castro's rise to power.

Meanwhile, our representation in Havana was using its not inconsiderable influence primarily in matters of concern to American business interests. These were numerous, important and generally constructive. They had contributed substantially to the

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economic and social development of the country. Taken as a whole, however, their impact was irritating, stifling and frustrating to the rising sense of Cuban nationalism.

Although Americans no longer controlled more than a third of the Cuban sugar production—the most modern and perhaps the most profitable third—our sugar interests played a major part in the varied and wide-ranging strategy to protect the United States quota. And many American companies owned or controlled vast Cuban cane plantations in spite of a clause in the Cuban constitution which established a policy of separate ownership of mills and plantations.

In addition, American interests dominated many key activities, including telephone and electric light and power companies, which operated in an atmosphere of general public hostility. A major railroad system serving the eastern half of the island was American-controlled. Crude oil was imported, refined and distributed by three large corporations, two American and one Anglo-Dutch. Exploration for oil in Cuba, still one of the great unfulfilled hopes (the Russians have not found any either), was largely carried out by American companies. The active exploitation of Cuba's important nickel resources was in the hands of Americans. Others were prominent in the fields of banking, retail merchandising and manufacturing of many different kinds. The cement plant which supplied the booming construction of Havana was American-owned and operated; so were, to a large extent, the hotels and gambling. Nor was our all-pervasive popular culture—except baseball—pleasing in all its aspects to those seeking the affirmation of indigenous values.

While the Batista government was giving these American interests in general benevolent treatment, and while it was attracting substantial amounts of badly needed private investment, it was itself becoming increasingly alienated from Cuban public opinion. A frenzy of self-enrichment was believed to have seized many of its high officials. Terrorism was met by a savage official counter-terrorism. Though much exaggerated later by the Castro propaganda machine, the number of murders by the Batista security establishment during those bitter years created thousands of deep hatreds—a potent element in the support for Castro. The corruption and the sadism of many Batista henchmen united most Cubans against the régime.

This widespread opposition did not look to the top leadership

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of Cuba's recent constitutional past. The so-called legitimate opposition which participated in the elections of November 1958 and lost to Batista's nominee was far from filling the need. Because of this vacuum, people's imaginations were captured by Fidel Castro who was conducting small-scale guerrilla operations in the remote fastnesses of eastern Cuba against Batista's armed forces more and more demoralized by the corruption in their midst and by the popular repudiation of the régime they served. The role of the guerrillas in bringing about the fall of the régime has been much exaggerated. However, by early 1958, most of the opposition elements were trying to work with Castro. The Communists were among the last to decide to support him.

After serving as Ambassador in Bolivia, I spent two weeks in Washington on my way to Cuba in February of 1959, examining material on the political beliefs and affiliations of Castro and his principal followers. On the basis of abundant though contradictory evidence, I concluded that Castro was not then a Communist, though some of his group, including his brother Raul, had Communist ties. It was clear that support for the new régime was widespread throughout Cuban society, and it seemed to me that many elements of that society, dominated by a relatively prosperous middle class with strong leanings toward the constitutional system then advocated by Castro himself, had far brighter prospects than the Communists eventually to control the government. The field of action of the new leaders would, I thought, be bounded by the nature of this community.

This diagnosis soon had to be modified. It failed to allow for the phenomenal personality and unprecedented charisma of Fidel Castro. It did not foresee the dearth of any acceptable leadership through which non-Communist elements might exert their influence. Indeed, many such elements abandoned the struggle and the country early in the game. Nor did the diagnosis take into account the use Castro was to make of sectors of the population hitherto vegetating outside the mainstream of Cuban development—the 15 to 20 percent of the people of working age unemployed or underemployed, the frustrated intellectuals who controlled the students, the subsistence farmers. From all these Castro drew his strength and they followed him as though he were indeed a redeemer. Castro was further helped at the outset by the attitudes of many people who, though not pro-Communist and certainly not anti-American, welcomed actions aimed at

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reducing American influence in the island as a reassertion of Cuban nationalism.

Castro turned out to be a cruel and extreme consequence of two factors: the shortcomings of Cuban society and of the Cuban-American relationship. Without him, the revolution made inevitable by Batista's excesses and by the politico-social failures of two generations would have been comparatively moderate. We soon learned that Castro was far more than an adventurer or a guerrilla leader, that he was perhaps the greatest demagogue ever to have appeared anywhere in Latin America. He had a power to persuade with words quite independent of the intrinsic worth of the particular notions he might be advancing at the moment. As Theodore Draper makes plain in his works on Castroism, ideas are for Castro little more than servants of his lust for power. The same masses who in 1959 roared their approval of his democratic and then of his humanistic pronouncements shouted themselves hoarse approving his Marxism in 1961.

Through all Castro's gyrations, the only constant has been his determination to free Cuba from American influence (which he equates with domination) even at the eventual cost of submitting his country to the Soviet Union. It was not Castro's predilection for Communism but his pathological hatred of the American power structure as he believed it to be operative in Cuba, together with his discovery of the impotence of Cuba's supposedly influential classes, that led him eventually into the Communist camp. Only from that base, he thought, could he achieve his goal of eliminating American influence.

In early 1959, our government was aware of the almost unanimous support which Castro enjoyed in Cuba and of the hopeful attitude which he inspired in many of our own forward-looking people. Its attitude, therefore, was one of watchful waiting. In this period I saw Castro a number of times and had contacts with all the members of his cabinet, which then represented a variety of political and economic views. I made every effort in these contacts, and in talking with newspaper and magazine editors and many other influential citizens, to convey the good will of the people and the government of the United States. I stressed their satisfaction that the people of Cuba were recovering control of their destiny, and their conviction that relations between the two countries were mutually advantageous. However, I said, our government was willing to discuss any proposals for changes

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which the new régime might wish to advance. The actual and potential value of the American investment was stressed in an awareness of the régime's intention to investigate certain situations about which public opinion was exercised.

This effort, aimed at establishing a basis of coöperation and understanding with Castro and his followers, seemed to be making some progress with Cuban public opinion when it was interrupted by Castro's trip to the United States at the invitation of an association of American editors. The visit, which began in mid-April, proved a heady diet for Castro's voracious ego and may have given him a warped notion of the state of American public opinion. Our government strove to make a success of the visit, although it was not official. Castro was cordially received in Washington by the Secretary of State and by the Vice President. His party of over fifty included his top advisers in the economic field. We assumed these were disposed to discuss current economic relations and problems with us, but though we demonstrated our willingness to meet them halfway, we met a blank wall. There is reason to believe Castro forbade them to engage in any substantive conversations.

On Castro's return from his travels at the beginning of May, I met him at the airport and suggested an early renewal of our contacts. Although Castro agreed cordially, five weeks elapsed before the next interview and it was largely devoted to the agrarian reform law which had meanwhile been promulgated. I was surprised to note in a recent lecture by Senator Fulbright a reference to a statement purportedly made by Castro to an American newspaperman to the effect that "the American reaction to the agrarian reform of May 1959 made me realize that there was no chance of reaching an accommodation with the United States." The American reaction was friendly and understanding. Our legitimate preoccupation with the compensation of our citizens was reflected in discussions with Cuban officials over a period of months, during which the possibility of long-term bonds was contemplated. But the law was never really implemented. Most of the confiscations and other arbitrary actions of the Cuban authorities regarding the agricultural property of foreigners and Cubans had no sanction in the law.

Raul Roa was appointed foreign minister in June. He was far closer to Castro than was his distinguished predecessor, Roberto Agramonte, a man of principle. There followed an ex-

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change of views in depth on all phases of Cuban-American relations, the climax of which was a five-hour interview with Castro at Roa's apartment the evening of September 5—after a number of implausible postponements. The atmosphere was relaxed and friendly. I reiterated the understanding sympathy of our government with the desires of the Cuban people for reform and renovation and went so far as to anticipate some of the elements of our more liberal policies toward Latin America of a year or two later. I described American economic interests in Cuba in terms of their potential for the progress of the Cuban economy and drew Castro's attention to the arbitrary treatment to which some of them had already been subjected. I endeavored to dispel a myth recounted to Castro with regard to one of these American enterprises. Referring to the rising tempo of vicious anti-American propaganda, I mentioned some of the outrageous statements being made by Ché Guevara in the course of his world travels. As many people before and since, I had the impression that Castro had given a polite and appreciative hearing to my views on subjects deserving mutual discussion and accommodation. Castro said something to the effect that I was perhaps giving too much importance to the propaganda excesses of young people working in an atmosphere of revolutionary enthusiasm not yet tempered by experience. The interview left me in a moderately hopeful mood—soon to be destroyed by Castro's actions and words of the next few weeks.

During this period Castro must have come to realize how frail were the obstacles to his achieving complete power in Cuba. There were conspiracies against him, including one with Trujillo's support; he overcame them easily. He had some setbacks when expeditions which he organized and sent out from Cuba to destroy the governments of the Dominican Republic and of Nicaragua proved fiascoes involving (particularly in the Dominican case) considerable loss of life. But he must have been consoled in part for these failures when he noted how gingerly his interventions were treated by an inter-American community supposedly devoted to the principle of nonintervention. Its attitude was symptomatic of the state of the continent's conscience at the time—an asset for Castro.

Also during these months, the issue of Communism came into sharper focus. Castro had often expressed opposition to Communism, but he gratefully exploited the red herring supplied by

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those in Cuba and in the United States to whom any proposal for a change in the status quo is *prima facie* made in Moscow. The remaining miasma of McCarthyism also served him well. Soon it became anathema for Cuban revolutionaries to express anti-Communist sentiments. Castro fired the head of his air force over this issue and, after a typical mob-manœuvre, eliminated, on the grounds of anti-Communism, the President whom he himself had picked. The final showdown on the issue came in October with the arrest of Huber Matos, one of the rebel army's important leaders.

In the same week that Matos was arrested, an incident occurred which seemed finally to dash any hopes of establishing useful relations. A plane piloted by the former head of the Castro air force evaded the vigilance of our authorities in Florida (regrettably not the only such case) and dropped anti-Castro leaflets over Havana where trigger-happy antiaircraft units opened fire on it. Their missiles came down in busy Havana streets killing two or three and wounding over forty people. Responsibility for the careless shooting devolved equally upon our authorities, in that the plane left Florida illegally, and the Cuban army. The government, after a fleeting moment of honesty in a soon-suppressed communiqué describing what had actually happened, lashed itself into a towering artificial passion over the alleged bombing of Havana with American connivance. A pamphlet put out by the foreign office described the incident as another Pearl Harbor. At the end of the week, Castro, addressing a mammoth gathering on this imaginary bombing, bellowed, shook his fist and foamed at the mouth to the roaring applause of the mob.

In late November, the cabinet was reorganized in a manner precluding any further possibility of rational dialogue between our two governments. Exchanges of statements continued on both sides, our aim being to demonstrate the degree to which we had shown patience, understanding and moderation in the face of hostility, prevarication and provocation, while Castro's purpose was to promote the beleaguered-citadel mentality which he had found so favorable to the extension of his authority.

In the circumstances, it became incumbent upon us to work out the policy we would now follow. A statement of our position, which I assisted in drafting, was issued from the White House toward the end of January 1960. It made the following points: (1) a reiteration of the United States's commitment to non-

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intervention in accordance with our treaty obligations; (2) the determination of the United States to do all in its power to prevent the use of its territory for the preparation of illegal acts against Cuba, although it was recognized that Cuban territory had been the point of departure for the launching of invasions against other countries; (3) the concern of the United States at the unfounded accusations directed against it by the Cuban authorities and its regret that its efforts to establish a basis of confidence and understanding had not been reciprocated; (4) a recognition of the sovereign right of the Cubans to engage in domestic reforms with due regard for their obligations under international law; (5) a determination on the part of the United States to defend the rights of its citizens in Cuba as provided under international law after they had exhausted their remedies under Cuban law.

This policy implied continued moderation and restraint on our part, denying Castro the chance to make political capital out of alleged American economic aggression. It could have slowed down the Soviet involvement in the Cuban economy, an involvement, in my judgment, more ardently desired at that time by Castro and Guevara than by Moscow. It would have given the Soviets the opportunity to counsel moderation instead of being forced either to act or to let Castro fall. And even if the policy had failed to prevent Castro's move into the Soviet orbit, it would have gained sympathy and support for our Cuban policy in inter-American and international public opinion by relieving us of responsibility for precipitating events or destroying existing ties. Further, it would have created more favorable conditions for local opposition to crystallize. And considering the state of disorganization and confusion then existing in the Cuban government, it was not Micawberish to hope that if events were not precipitated something might well turn up to alter the situation before Castro consolidated his security controls.

This policy lasted but a few weeks. Factors leading to its abandonment included continued provocation from the Cubans, the visit of Mikoyan to Havana in February (invading what had so long been an almost exclusively American sphere of influence), and perhaps the rising pressures of an election year in our own country. The proverbial straw may have been Castro's outrageous allegation that we were responsible for the explosion and loss of life on a French munitions ship in Havana harbor early in

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March. According to reports published in later years, it was in that same month that our government decided to train and equip Cuban nationals for armed action against the Castro government, a decision wholly inconsistent with the policy we had announced only two months earlier.

It is worth emphasizing that the January policy had been a considerable embarrassment to the Castro régime. On the other hand, our new policy, which accelerated the break-up of the ties between the two countries, was, I believe, welcomed by Castro and Guevara. We did not force them into the arms of the Soviets but we were, in my judgment, unwisely coöperative in removing the obstacles in their chosen path.

The first crisis provoked by our new policy involved a Cuban demand in May that the American and British oil refineries process about a million tons of Soviet crude oil in the balance of the year, instead of the Venezuelan oil they had been using. (This million tons was about 40 percent of total needs.) The companies had been most tolerant in letting the government accumulate large foreign-exchange arrears covering crude oil already supplied; but they questioned the government's right under Cuban law to order them to refine the Soviet oil. For its part, the government wished to increase its purchases from the Soviet Union and questioned the prices charged by the companies for the crude oil they supplied. The companies would probably have reluctantly gone along with the government's request, seeking remedies through the courts and eventually, if necessary, through channels provided under international law. However, early in June, I was informed by an oil company executive in Havana that he had a couple of days earlier attended a meeting of representatives of the companies in the office of the Secretary of the Treasury in Washington, at which the Secretary had strongly urged the companies to refuse to refine the Soviet crude oil. The companies accepted this recommendation.

The Cuban government, informed of the companies' negative decision, took over the refineries. The Soviets were now faced with the necessity of doubling the original million tons of crude oil to be shipped during the rest of the year to meet total Cuban requirements. While this may have strained tanker availabilities, the Soviets accomplished the task in such a manner that the Cuban consumers were hardly aware of any change in the source of supply. The revolution had won a great and stimulating tri-

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umph, comparable to that of the Egyptians when they showed they could operate the Suez Canal without Western help. This was probably not the result contemplated by our government.

Early in July, while the outcome of the crude-oil crisis was still in doubt, President Eisenhower, using the discretion granted him by Congress, suspended the balance of the Cuban sugar quota for the year 1960 on the basis that under prevailing conditions Cuba was no longer a reliable supplier to the American market. The implication was clear that as long as conditions remained as they were Cuba would have no more market in the United States. The Soviets took the sugar we had refused. Cuban planters, cane-cutters, sugar-mill hands, dock workers—all those involved in the industry—went to work for the Russian instead of the American consumer. Castro and Guevara doubtless were highly pleased at our decision, the Russians perhaps less so. When my view on this decision was sought shortly before it was made public, I opposed it as nullifying the advantages we had derived from our previous policy. My belief was that if we were to modify the Cuban quota we should have done so only after negotiations with the Cuban government which would have made clear to all concerned the issues involved. I remain convinced that turning over to the Soviet Union the major responsibility for Cuba's sugar economy was a most regrettable step.

Within a month of the suspension of the quota, Castro had in retaliation nationalized the American sugar mills. Within three months he had taken over what was left of American investments and had made great progress in the elimination of private ownership of most productive assets in Cuba, including those of the Cubans themselves. The process was carried out in an atmosphere of heightened zeal and enthusiasm by those who felt that the fate of their movement depended on successfully meeting the challenge we had posed. Otherwise the revolution would have moved at a slower pace and might have met with strong resistance.

The rising revolutionary fervor was further stimulated by the realization during the summer that anti-Castro guerrillas were receiving arms-drops from a source generally assumed to be a United States agency. These guerrilla bands, brave as they were, posed no real threat to the régime. And the urban opposition to Castro was being deprived more and more of the positions of economic power which might have proved useful in furthering underground activity.

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In this atmosphere, the break in diplomatic relations came as an anticlimax. It took place in early January 1961 as a result of Castro's demand that we reduce the establishment we were maintaining in Havana (very largely to facilitate the mass exit of Cubans from their homeland) to the level of the by then totally useless Cuban establishment in Washington.

In April 1961, 1,500 brave Cubans—selected, equipped, trained, financed, transported, misled and eventually (the survivors) ransomed by us—landed at the Bay of Pigs as the major element in an enterprise to free their 7,000,000 compatriots from Castro's military and security apparatus of something over 100,000 comparatively well prepared men and women. That fiasco, in conjunction with our replacement by Soviet Russia as Cuba's major economic partner, consolidated Castro's position. After the Bay of Pigs, the régime became so strong internally that even the missile crisis of October 1962, revealing as it did the true relative dimensions of the partners in the Castro-Khrushchev dialogue, failed to shake it.

## IV

There will be no resumption of relations between Cuba and the United States as long as Castro is in power. His fall may come either because he is rejected by the long-suffering Cuban people or because he realizes himself that his magic is exhausted. It should not come as a result of outside intervention, although some form of collective international action may be needed to prevent outside intervention on behalf of the régime.

When Castro departs, there should be a rapid change in the nature of the system. Guevara has already disappeared. He was the only other man with even an outside chance of maintaining one-man rule—perhaps that is why he was removed. Castro's brother Raul, his designated successor, is decidedly unmagnetic as a public figure. President Dorticos' talents lie in the fields of administration and backroom politicking.

When change comes, a prime necessity will be for the Cuban government to organize promptly a consultation of national opinion concerning what to eliminate from the Castro heritage and what to keep. It is likely that outside help in this may be requested by a transitional Cuban government and that the request will be addressed to the United Nations, of which Cuba is a member, rather than to the Organization of American States

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from which she has been suspended. Cuba's eventual return to active membership in the O.A.S. would, of course, be a preferred objective of hemisphere policy.

In this process of change, the role of the Cuban exiles or refugees must be considered. Hopefully, it will be possible at an early stage for most of those who desire to return to their homeland to do so. Among them are some with a part to play in the future of their country and others who have illusions on the subject. But no one outside of Cuba should presume to prejudge their roles. That will have to be left to those who have remained in Cuba and are called upon to decide how their country is to be reorganized. The notion that the passing of Castro is bound to produce an automatic restoration in Cuba of people and institutions identified with earlier times should be rejected.

Sugar was, is and will be the key to the Cuban economy. Up to 1960, Cuban sugar enjoyed a preferential position in the American market that was the envy of other producers. When we eliminated the Cuban quota, the Russians absorbed the three million tons or so that we had been buying. At the same time, we had relatively little difficulty in acquiring replacement supplies both from other foreign countries and at home. Under our present sugar legislation, Cuba could be given, at the time we resume diplomatic relations, a quota equivalent to about one-third of what she had in 1960. This would involve displacing much sugar from Western Hemisphere countries whose sales in our market are valuable assets in pursuing the goals of the Alliance for Progress. Important questions will arise. If there is a change in the Cuban régime, will the Russians continue to need Cuban sugar and will they continue to buy it, especially if the Cubans begin to cut down on imports of Russian goods in favor of traditionally preferred sources of supply? To what extent are we wedded to a system under which Congress, amid intense lobbying, doles out sugar quotas to specific foreign countries?

Without trying to answer these questions, I suggest that the general plight of cane-sugar producers offers a real opportunity for international statesmanship and, because of the role Russia has played in this field since 1960, for coöperation between East and West. Must cane-sugar producers be eternally condemned to a ramshackle system under which they sell a part of their output at protected prices and must then get rid of the balance in an anarchic so-called world market which actually handles but a

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small fraction of the world's consumption needs? And must they sell at prices which often, as at present, are far below production costs? It would seem possible to apply some of the principles of our own sugar program—now in its fourth decade of successful operation, so far as domestic producers and consumers are concerned—to the organization of a rational and truly worldwide market for cane sugar.

When Castro falls, the claims of the thousands of Cubans and Americans and other foreigners whose assets have been confiscated by his régime will come up for consideration. There can be no easy or automatic solution. A first question will concern the kind of society which the people of liberated Cuba desire to make for themselves. For example, to what extent will they wish to restore private ownership of the means of production in the sugar industry? To what extent will they desire to maintain nationalization in the public utilities field? Similar questions will have to be answered about a wide range of assets in order to determine whether restitution or compensation is to be the rule. The process is apt to be long-drawn-out and it is hard to conceive of any result which will be fully satisfactory both to the claimants and to those responsible for Cuba's future.

Finally, when the United States and the new Cuba come to reëstablish relations, they will presumably find it neither practical nor desirable to restore the old preferential ties. The United States will wish to recognize that the progress of the smaller developing nations, of which Cuba can once more become one of the most promising, depends largely on the extent to which they are able to achieve conscious responsibility for their own destinies. The United States and the other industrialized powers can, through commodity arrangements as well as assistance programs, bring about rational and steady expansion in the economic field. It is my conviction that the restrictions on the freedom of the smaller nations to control their own affairs increase the anarchic nationalism of which they are sometimes guilty. Only when they are truly responsible for their own progress and development can they contemplate making the reciprocal sacrifices of sovereignty required by the regional arrangements which are essential to progress in the modern world.

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# PLANNING OUR MILITARY FORCES

*By Harold Brown*

UNCERTAINTY is necessarily the lot of the planner, since he deals with the future. Uncertainty can never be completely removed. However, it can be compensated for, and to do so is a continuing responsibility of those who plan military forces. Primarily this can be done by insuring, in so far as we can, that future weapons and forces will be adaptable to the right range of defense needs or, as defense planners often put it, by insuring flexibility.

Modern weapons need not of themselves inexorably beget more sophisticated, expensive and destructive devices. It is true that pressures exist which, if unrestrained, would needlessly proliferate and duplicate weapon designs. There is a tendency to do what potential opponents are doing, or thought to be doing, or predicted to be able to do. But restraint and direction *are* exercised. In acquiring the capability to defend the United States, direction is given and decisions are made at the highest level, by the President with the advice of the Secretaries of Defense and State. Assumptions, concepts, economic analyses, divergent estimates of potential danger to our national security—all periodically are translated into an explicit defense program for the United States. At least twice a year the Department of Defense updates this program and projects forces five years or more into the future. Specific decisions flow from a continuing interaction between perceptions of what is technologically and economically feasible, and defense policy—the broad guidelines for achieving national objectives by the direct or potential use of armed force. In turn, specific program decisions and their subsequent results condition both future weapons development and future defense policy.

To say that there is uncertainty in tomorrow or virtue in flexibility is hardly novel. Reconciling the two, however, is a job calling for much diverse information and refined analysis. To evaluate the process, we must examine further the uncertainty which surrounds weapon choices and consider how best to minimize it and live with it. Let us first consider some uses and limitations of intelligence estimates and then examine the interaction of strategy and technology. In the light of these two exercises, the timing of decisions leading to full-scale weapon development

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takes on special importance, because such decisions rough out critical boundaries of the capabilities of our future forces and the sensitivity of that capability to the actions of others. Finally, within these boundaries, we can attempt to indicate some general factors which enhance force flexibility and some examples of the sort of flexibility which may be demanded of weapons currently under development.

### II. THE UTILITY OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

There are, of course, numerous broad areas where uncertainty complicates choices about the composition and overall magnitude of our forces. What, for example, are the prospects in fifteen or twenty years for widespread nuclear proliferation, for shifts in alliances, for a largely disarmed world, for increased or decreased Soviet or Communist Chinese militancy, for external aggression and subversion directed against developing nations, for a world realignment leading to conflict between the developed and the developing? Here the face of possible long-range political and strategic futures varies from perpetual peace to Armageddon. The temptation is strong to satisfy one's own policy predilections by immediately trying to leap over the ravine of short-range and mid-range uncertainty in order to program developments and deployments which meet (or encourage) one or two of these long-range futures. But this ravine—the next five years—is far better lighted than the distant future. Within it the most pressing aspects of external military challenges appear. Here uncertainties about specific opposing deployments narrow; estimates of opposing capabilities in ballistic missile defenses, bombers, bomber defenses, submarines and advanced tactical aircraft become more precise. The pattern they present becomes extremely important in stimulating shifts in our own defense policy and development priorities.

By and large, our possible responses to five-year forecasts have to do with force procurement and deployment. At ten years, the forecasts are much less reliable, and our responses tend to become related more to questions of the development of particular weapons and systems. However, whether the forecast is for five or (less reliably) for ten years, intelligence gleaned across this wide range of subjects plays a critical role in determining what weapons and forces to proceed with part way, all the way or not at all, and in the timing of specific decisions.

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Intelligence estimates provide no panacea, particularly if one insists on viewing policy-making as beginning with the "threat," a protean word whose meaning includes intent as well as capability, and embraces not only the number of ballistic missiles an opponent may have but the number of his targets that we want to be able to destroy. Because our planning is projected forward at least ten and sometimes fifteen years, intelligence estimates are made of what forces the other side will have far in the future. This may be a necessary exercise, but we sometimes tend to depend too much on the results. We may know with reasonable precision how many missiles the Soviets will have in their active force a year or two from now, because they must already have begun work on their deployment. We may have a fair idea how many they will have four or even five years from now, though a less precise idea of what kind of missiles and what their payloads will be. Yet in fact we know very little about how many or what kind of missiles the Russians will have ten years from now, because they probably have not reached a decision themselves. And even if they have, they might change their minds. Consequently, estimates beyond the immediate future enter, at best, a realm of educated extrapolation. They can readily pass beyond intelligence information, through telepathy—what others plan but have not done anything about—to clairvoyance—what they have not yet decided.

How many missiles the Soviets will have at the beginning of 1977 does not, of course, depend solely on their technical and productive capabilities—on what they *can* do. That is one kind of intelligence estimate often given—generally by people who want to "play it safe" by gearing our plans to the worst imaginable (even if not feasible) contingency. The development of Soviet forces will be influenced by the technical possibilities, of course, but even more strongly: (a) by Soviet military and foreign-policy goals; (b) by the Soviets' own fiscal requirements and allocations; and (c) by what the United States does, and the signals that we transmit, accurate or inaccurate, intentional or unintentional, about what we plan to do. When we try to look ahead ten to fifteen years, what we get are not intelligence estimates at all, but *planning* estimates. They should be treated as such. The "estimate" becomes more an examination of the question: "If countries A, B and C plan well (or poorly), what will they do in response to U. S. course of action X or Y?" This is the

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kind of question we ask ourselves frequently about military and political actions projected over the next year or two. We must learn to ask it (and try to give an answer) about developments and deployments other countries may make over a period of the next ten years. Our objective in military planning should be to provide ourselves with the capacity to take initiatives of our own, or to make timely responses to the force deployments of others at later times, as their actions inevitably become much clearer to us.

We are rightly concerned about the time that elapses between a decision to acquire a certain capability and the actual existence of that capability. This lead time may be as long as ten years. It can, of course, be compressed to some extent by giving a development program high priority. The urgency of a particular program often is based on intelligence information about an opponent's technical capabilities (or an imputation to him of our own present or future technical capabilities) and—always less certain—his intentions. But lead time cuts both ways. We often forget that our opponents also require substantial time between decision and the achievement of a particular military capability. We sometimes are tempted to act as though the Soviets have a capability in being as soon as our calculations indicate that a particular piece of hardware is technically feasible. In fact, to develop, produce, deploy and train is no mean task for any nation when large and complex new weapons systems are involved.

A good example of the two-edged nature of lead time and intelligence estimates is the intercontinental ballistic missile, which the Soviets were working on in the early 1950s. Knowledge that they were developing an I.C.B.M. was a major factor in the initiation of our own program in 1954–55. But the Soviets did not have a substantial I.C.B.M. capability until 1962, an elapsed time of about ten years. Starting two or three years later, we managed to finish about two years earlier than they—in addition to developing during the same period the solid-propellent Minuteman and an entirely separate ballistic-missile system, the submarine-launched Polaris. This is not to say that we can always make up a late start that well. Complacent contemplation of past achievements would be extremely dangerous. However, this example does show that the interval between our discovery that the other side is thinking about something (or our conjecture that they are thinking about something because we just thought of it) and

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the time they actually have a useable weapon generally will be long enough for us to take appropriate counteraction if our decisions are made expeditiously. Our counteraction need not always take the form of a parallel response. If we have been skillful in our evaluation of intelligence and wise in our choices of options, we may offset a particular challenge by making a quantitative rather than qualitative change in weaponry, by adaptation or minor improvements in existing weapons, or by producing a new weapon for which early development has already been done. On occasion we may also get good results by making a doctrinal change—that is, a change in how existing weapons are used.

### III. INTERACTION OF STRATEGY AND TECHNOLOGY

Whether strategy or technology comes first is (perhaps fruitlessly) debatable, though flow charts frequently are drawn by operational or technological planners depicting one or the other as the fount of most really significant activity. There appears to be no foolproof cyclical pattern encompassing the two, nor any *yin-yang* replacement of one by the other. If, as some suggest, a pendulum swings between strategy and technology, its period has not been convincingly measured. At a given time when we ask what technologies should be developed, strategic aims must provide the direction. Yet, if we examine how our strategy got to be what it is, clearly technology had a big part in getting us there. Broad strategic direction must be given if there is to be coherence in and among development programs and the military forces which result. But the effect of technology on strategy also should be continuous. Technology provides opportunities which may or may not be recognized immediately; strategy, while usually dominant in terms of authority, must be informed by knowledge of these opportunities if it is to be fully effective.

At the onset of the cold war in the late 1940s, technical factors —our possession of the atomic bomb and aircraft which could deliver it—dominated our military strategy. The American monopoly or preponderance of nuclear power and its relatively low cost, combined with our abrupt demobilization of conventional forces, set in motion a strategy heavily committed to deterrence based on the Strategic Air Command's capability for nuclear retaliation. This strategy was, of course, a response to the evidence of Communist aggressiveness that accumulated in the

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years immediately following World War II, and it lasted through the 1950s. After the Korean War, the Air Force consistently received just under half of the total defense budget, and the lion's share of its money went to strategic forces.

However, as the Soviet Union strengthened its own nuclear capability, the mutual devastation to be expected from a general nuclear exchange increased the likelihood of less dangerous forms of aggression. By 1961, strategy per se probably regained ascendancy over technology. Strategy would remain partially captive to nuclear technology; but in limited confrontations the end of extreme U.S. nuclear predominance had put a premium on uses of military force more believable than threatening the extinction of powers which, as they died, could cause the United States grave damage. Consequently, our ability to apply carefully measured, limited force increased in importance, though our ability to assure the destruction of any aggressor who might strike us retained first priority, as it does today. Development emphasis shifted to modernization of conventional forces, while long-range strategic nuclear capabilities were concurrently improved.

Since technology and strategy are so closely related and since so many fields of technology are growing increasingly complex and expensive, it is often assumed that lead time grows correspondingly and that there is unbearable danger in not having every technological bet covered. This assumption is too simplistic, and it would be impossible to pursue every promising idea to the point of producing hardware. Instead, we must seek innovation by providing adequate resources for basic research and exploratory development. We must hold open our option to adopt weapon systems which look promising, by developing those components which require long lead times. But we have no business buying insurance against every conceivable action by potential enemies, without regard for how likely or profitable that action may be.

Here the purposeful influence of strategy can be valuable, for it lends central direction and consistency to the commitment of technological resources. It determines whether a project should be pushed hard, placed on the back burner, or taken off the stove altogether. During the 1950s, for example, the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missile enjoyed a high priority as a feasible interim system until missiles of intercontinental range could be developed; hence, this radically new weapon took only three

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years to develop. On the other hand, in small-arms development, which during that period was given a low priority, the M-14 rifle was scheduled for eleven years in research and development and was to be followed by gradual replacement of the old M-1 rifle over a period of seven years.

An important part of the interaction between strategy and technology is a nation's total technological and productive capacity. In spite of current political evolution away from bipolarity, there remain two super*technical* powers in the world: the United States and the Soviet Union. There is a good deal of merit in making clear to third powers that in the face of the capabilities of the two supertechnical powers the entry stakes into this technological competition are higher than the return in military capability and the political power it buys. This is a most important message to communicate, for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by additional powers, including some nations whose limited resources could be better used for their economic development, is likely to be far more destabilizing than acquisition of new weapons by the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

We have security today because deterrence has worked, and to the degree that deterrence remains assured we are more secure than in the past. But in another sense we are less secure, because the physical consequences of the "failure" of deterrence are worse. Technology has caused this. But since the Soviets detonated an atomic device in 1949, we have demonstrated that, with *two* principal nuclear powers involved, deterrence of general nuclear war can remain reasonably stable despite successive qualitative advances in weaponry, and despite asymmetry of purpose between the two great powers since World War II.

### IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FULL-SCALE DEVELOPMENT

Considering the limitations of long-range intelligence and the complex interaction between strategy and technology, there is much to recommend a pragmatic approach to the development of major new weapons. The decision to proceed with full-scale development of a major new weapon system is an important event; almost without exception it indicates a large commitment of resources, and it defines, limits or expands the conditions under which future combat forces will be able to fight effectively. Normally the decision is made by the President or at the highest level in the Defense Department with Presidential concurrence.

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The first important indication of full-scale development comes when the Secretary of Defense approves "contract definition" for a new weapon. It follows a period of "concept formulation," the thorough analysis of military need and concept of operation, studies of technical feasibility to determine "best" characteristics, cost and scheduling. The objective is to check earlier assumptions and to get a good contract, one which is unambiguous and is based on a fixed price or incentives which will properly motivate the contractor. The conditional decision to proceed with full-scale development can then be reviewed on the basis of firm costs, schedules and capabilities, and of any changes in conditions since the contract definition began.

Because the commitment of resources is large, decisions to undertake full-scale development or deployment must be made deliberately. Deliberation does not imply unwarranted delay, however.

The decision to go ahead at least a small part of the way may be made without irrevocable commitment to complete the project. Research and early development generally require 30 to 40 percent of the total time from conception to operational capability, and account for perhaps 5 to 20 percent of the development cost. The number of options that one can afford to take out in this way, while not unlimited, is none the less large. In sufficiently important cases we may have to go through full-scale development while reserving decision on deployment until the indications of need become apparent. An indication might be an opponent's deployment of a similar system, or more likely, of a related one which ours may be designed to neutralize. If we start after the other side has begun to deploy a new system, we may not have time for both development and production. Nike-X is an example of a system where development was pushed without a decision having been made as to deployment. However, it should be noted that a deployment decision on Nike-X depends on the nature and weight of the offensive forces we may expect to be used against us rather than on whether another country displays an anti-ballistic missile system. Unless the defense is much less expensive than the offense (informed analyses show it to be more expensive), the correct counter to an opponent's A.B.M. deployment is an improved or increased offensive force.

Here again the directing and restraining influences of strategy deserve emphasis. If anything, strategy and the criterion of

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utility in support of national objectives merit increasing influence on development decisions. The development community argues too often for going ahead "because you can do it." This is a fine reason for mountain climbing, but not for multi-billion dollar development programs. In building big systems, developers lacking explicit guidance tend to do the "best" job they can. A hazy operational concept encourages excessive performance requirements at the cost of utility, reliability, simplicity and early availability. Conversely, but less frequently, the same effect can result from too detailed an operational concept or one which through ignorance makes excessive demands on available technology.

The health of our technological base directly supports our ability to move ahead rapidly with full-scale development. Contrary to the belief of some critics, there is no paucity of basic research and exploratory development money. The Department of Defense spends about $1.5 billion a year for these categories alone and $800 million more for advanced development short of full systems development.[1] Though none of this is tied in detail to a specific military strategy, very little of it is largesse to be dispensed annually for the general advance of technology.

Development of technology represents one level of effort; development of big systems is an entirely different and far more costly effort. Costs rise dramatically as we leave research and exploratory and advanced development and move into engineering development and procurement in quantity of equipment for the field. The jump is likely to be from a level of tens or hundreds of millions for advanced development to a billion or even ten billion dollars for deployment of a major weapon system. Hopefully, by the time we have completed 5 or 10 percent—the development part—of the total cost of a large system, we can be confident of a project's high operational utility. But this magnitude of cost is a compelling reason for the Secretary of Defense to insist—as he does—on a convincing demonstration of operational utility within an overall national defense strategy before he will make decisions tantamount to full-scale development and procurement. This is precisely the problem faced by advocates of large anti-missile defenses or a follow-on bomber to replace the B-52 Gs and Hs.

[1] This is aside from perhaps another $2 billion in support of the equivalent categories of broadly applicable research and technology from other government agencies—the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Atomic Energy Commission and others.

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The latter, for example, has required a massive study effort to determine its characteristics. Less than two years ago, few would have predicted that the B-52 would be delivering conventional bombs on the scale we have seen in Viet Nam. Yet we must attempt to predict whether this role will exist for the manned bomber 15 years from now. Bombing guerrilla supply areas with non-nuclear weapons requires a large payload, but high speed is not essential as long as enemy air defenses are absent or relatively primitive. On the other hand, in a nuclear role supplementing our strategic missiles, a bomber may need high speed to penetrate advanced defense systems, but a very large payload may be less important. Is a satisfactory compromise feasible? Do we need two distinct types of manned bombers? Should we develop an optimum bomber for only one role? If so, which role? The questions whether to go ahead with *any* new bomber, if so what kind, and how far to commit it to development thus bring into focus a wide range of complex technological questions which must be squared with an even broader range of strategic and political issues.

Sometimes the divergence between the needs of strategy on the one hand and the use of technology to advance a poorly thought-out concept of operation on the other leads to cancellation of a development project before commitment to, or before completion of, full-scale development. Invariably the result is traumatic for individuals who have invested years of talent and energy in the project. Nevertheless, in varying degrees a cancelled project leaves a heritage of improved technology. The XB-70 program has significantly advanced our knowledge of structures, engines and aerodynamics of large aircraft in supersonic flight. This knowledge cost us a billion and a half dollars. It is doubtful that the information was worth that price. But full-scale development and acquisition of the B-70 truly would have been a waste, and of a different order of magnitude. It could easily have led to a $10 to $15 billion program, inadequately related to strategy. The same is true of many other programs.

### V. PROSPECTS FOR FORCE FLEXIBILITY

If continued military strength is still necessary to achieve a more peaceful world, the single most important characteristic of future forces will probably be flexibility. The United States must be able to deter or combat aggression in such diverse forms

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as subversive insurgency or general nuclear war. The variety of contingencies which our military systems must be prepared to meet is very great, and the most efficient composition of *tactical* forces employed in future limited conflict can never be fully known long before the fact.

The development of tactical forces inevitably has called for choice and compromise. Our technical capabilities and the variety of the possible small-war situations we may face present us with far more options than our resources will allow us to take up. For example, to design one or more types of aircraft solely for each specific tactical air function—air superiority, interdiction, reconnaissance, close support—not only would reduce the flexibility of our tactical air force but would be prohibitively expensive. Also, we must make some compromise in meeting the vast numbers and kinds of contingencies that may occur in widely differing environments: from the arctic to the tropics, from Europe to Latin America. This is why our tactical aircraft have been designed or modified to provide a dual capability, nuclear and non-nuclear, and to perform outstandingly in one tactical function and creditably in one or more others—thus providing the *total* force with great flexibility at all levels of conflict. But against a capable enemy, all people and all units cannot do all jobs equally well—if they are to do anything well enough. To meet unique missions and fight in unique environments requires a high degree of specialization, and this in turn requires an ability to train or retrain skilled personnel rapidly; a modern, dynamic and rapidly expandable training capability is absolutely essential to force flexibility.

In the emphasis and publicity given to items of hardware, it is sometimes forgotten that the first necessity is for a highly qualified professional force-in-being capable of quick reaction and rapid doctrinal change. Adaptability and willing institutional support, as opposed to mere obedience, are important elements of a total capability. These are not achieved overnight, although the policy decision to effect change may have to come that quickly. The important requirement is that military doctrine be alive and responsive to shifts in national policy—whatever the individual frustration which may be caused by shifts in the prominence of particular types of weapons and military units.

Second, flexibility is improved by the existence of competent, well-equipped and readily available reserve forces. Whether or

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not they are activated in a given crisis, their availability provides greater leeway in the employment of active forces. As in the 1961 Berlin crisis, they also serve to reinforce the known U. S. strategy, lending credence to a position which it is most important for the opponent to comprehend fully.

Third, flexibility is enhanced by a broad research and industrial base. We cannot hope to equip our forces completely for every conceivable contingency. However, in particular combat situations, such as Viet Nam, the cost of achieving success can be reduced by a capacity to make swift innovations tailored to the immediate circumstances. In this respect the United States has a relative advantage because of our unequaled economic and technical strength.

These three factors, among others, greatly affect our ability to maintain flexibility in our armed forces. But current choices of specific weapons still under development will also set future boundaries within which policy initiatives can be taken. Acquisition of these weapons will generate new political problems and ease others. It may be instructive to consider a few of these developments and how they both derive from and influence defense policy.

Dramatic increases in range, payload and versatility for both our fighter and airlift forces come quickly to mind—specifically the versatility of the variable-wing F-111 fighter and the huge C-5 cargo aircraft. Both will soon be in our inventory. Ten C-5s could have handled the entire Berlin Airlift, which required more than 140 C-54s (the equivalent of a civilian DC-4). The range of these two aircraft, without refueling, will give us much wider choices as to how many troops and supplies need to be based overseas. For example, the "basic mission" of the C-5 calls for delivering a 100,000-pound payload a distance of 5,500 nautical miles. For shorter ranges of 2,500 miles, the payload increases to 265,000 pounds.

During Operation Big Lift in 1963, we airlifted 15,000 troops, a combat division, from Texas to Europe in 63 hours. This took 204 aircraft. Forty-two C-5s could do the same job in 13 hours. But while Big Lift was a great operational success, even with older aircraft, a number of Europeans expressed apprehension about American "neo-isolationism." While this concern was ill-founded, it is apparent that the broad political implications of our mushrooming airlift and fighter capability have to be con-

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tinually reëxamined. The structure of our overseas bases will certainly be influenced by the increased capabilities of our troop and cargo carriers and fighters. It will also depend on many strategic factors, such as our estimate of how rapidly conflict might build up in specific locations. In some places, such as Europe, political and military considerations may require us both to have forces immediately available and to have others with which we can reinforce rapidly.

Still another area where current development is likely to affect future policy is our response to subversive insurgency. The Defense Department has given high priority to the development of weapons designed for the unique environment of Southeast Asia. Moreover, we are cutting lead times sharply. Thus far we have been quite successful in translating known technology into more effective non-nuclear ordnance and improved capability for aerial reconnaissance, finding targets, night and all-weather operations, and bombing accuracy. But our performance in these areas still leaves much to be desired; enormous changes for the better can be expected in the future. We are also seeking imaginative and effective ways to remove or transform incipient sources of insurgency wherever they may occur. For example, one of the most important tasks of Air Force Special Air Warfare Forces is to help the people in developing areas to better their economic and social environment. We would prefer to teach indigenous military forces how to use aircraft to fertilize crops rather than to drop bombs, to improve rather than interdict transportation. The problems of these and comparable American units, such as the Army's Special Forces, are as much political as military. Undoubtedly, their experience and success in Viet Nam will have a great bearing on their role in future programs.

Our greatest continuing concern must inevitably be in that area where we stand to lose the most, quickest: general nuclear war. Here we can afford no gaping holes either in our capacity to retaliate or in the technology to ensure that capability. Our most important current effort is the modernization of our strategic offensive forces through acquisition of Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles. This constitutes a forecast of our intention to deter general war by making it unprofitable for any potential enemy. It is important that enemies, allies and neutrals alike be spared misinterpretation. Even beginning development of a particular weapon system can have such an effect, since foreign

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perceptions are influenced before the weapon is translated into combat capability. By maintaining strategic deterrence, we gain considerable freedom at lesser levels to employ technology in support of strategies that will make limited aggression increasingly unprofitable.

Until greater congruity of purpose exists among nations, military forces will continue to be a foundation of policy. We must be wise enough to manage the interaction between weapons development and defense policy so that our weapons are always responsive to policy and our policy is based on a full consideration of the options made available by technology. This will remain a supreme challenge to policy-makers, who from a position of final responsibility must look at a partially obscure tomorrow and a distant future that seems opaque. They will find, almost invariably, that it is easier to produce military hardware than it is to know what policy to follow.

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# NEW HORIZONS IN FOREIGN TRADE

*By William Diebold, Jr.*

UNLESS there is new legislation, the President will, at midnight on June 30, 1967, lose his power to cut American tariffs in trade bargains with other countries. The situation is familiar enough. Eleven times already the country has faced the question of renewing the grant of power first made in the Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Each time, Congress has prolonged the power, sometimes enlarging and sometimes reducing it. Mixing long-run policy and short-run tactics to get the best possible terms for the renewal of trade legislation is an old art in Washington. But this renewal is different.

It is different because if the Kennedy Round—the tariff negotiations that have been going on in Geneva for the last few years—comes out as it seems likely to, we shall be on the threshold of a period in which trade negotiations among industrialized countries will take on new forms and a greatly enlarged scope. Sooner or later, though not necessarily in 1967, the President will have to be given new kinds of powers to engage in trade negotiations: an extension of the existing ones to cut tariffs will no longer suffice. (And if the Kennedy Round does not live up to reasonable expectations, the issues involved in a 1967 renewal will look different again, but for other reasons.)

Though trade negotiations may not be quite as unpredictable as dice or cards, it is surprising how much agreement there is among those who have looked into the matter as to what may come out of the Kennedy Round. The main impact will be on trade in manufactured goods among the advanced industrial areas—North America, Western Europe and Japan. Some important products will not be touched, but for many others duties will be cut in half (the largest possible reduction under American law, with a few exceptions). For still other goods there will be some kind of in-between cut, especially if one country has very high tariffs and another very low ones. Averaging tariffs is a questionable practice, but some brave souls find it reasonable to say that the total effect will be a reduction of tariffs amounting to perhaps 25 percent or, with luck, as much as 35. Something may also be done about non-tariff barriers, but for the most part this will be unfinished business, opening questions for the future.

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Agricultural exports are important for the United States, but it is hard to see how anything more can be expected than tariff concessions on a few products, some temporary understandings about the course of trade over the next few years in some major products and the beginning of a serious effort to negotiate in quite new ways so as to mitigate the costly clash of national farm policies in the future.

All this sounds prosaic enough. Where are the new horizons? Only as we look at the problems that will have to be dealt with after the Kennedy Round does the new prospect unfold.

II

The tariffs that remain after the Kennedy Round will not be negligible, and any new legislation aimed at them will have to start by renewing at least the President's existing powers. But would another 50 percent reduction be worth the trouble of going through the mill of another massive multilateral tariff negotiation? Simpler ways can be found, provided, of course, governments are willing to make further cuts. For example, tariff rates might be reduced a certain percent each year. Or levels could be set to which all countries would reduce their duties on certain products, thus producing a degree of "harmonization" which many people feel desirable. Rules can be devised to allow enough flexibility to permit each country to move a little more slowly on its hard cases if it moves a little more rapidly on others, or to permit a country with low duties to reduce them more slowly than those with higher rates. Formulas are neither magical nor scientific, but one can see that a general rule of this sort would simplify trade negotiations and probably enhance their effect.

Tariffs on trade among the industrial countries have been reduced much more than is generally realized. Many are far lower than at any time since the depression or, in some cases, since the end of the last century. The United States has quite a few rates that are one-quarter of what they were in 1934 and many that are almost as low. Within the Common Market and the European Free Trade Area, tariffs will soon disappear. If the Kennedy Round cuts duties by another quarter or a third, much of the world's trade in manufactured goods will move at tariff rates of less than 10 percent *ad valorem,* or not much more. Inevitably one asks, "If that much can be accomplished in twenty years without great disturbance, why not more?" Can the remain-

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der not be removed in, say, another ten—gently, year by year?

This picture may, however, be illusory. The last quarter of a tariff may be what really protects, so that it would prove harder to remove than the first three quarters. A 10 percent tax can be very important in a highly competitive market; also, it may be equivalent to several times that much if what is being protected is only the cost of manufacturing, when raw materials are imported at low or no duties. (But then past cuts may also have been greater than they seemed.) An opposite view of things after the Kennedy Round would be that if tariffs are low enough they make so little difference to trade that they may not be worth the effort of removing. The evidence on all these points is limited and conflicting; generalizations are unwise. The fact of the matter is almost certainly that some low tariffs have a significant effect while others do not, and that negotiations will reveal more than analysis will about which further steps will be relatively easy and which very hard.

We can be sure in advance that governments will not be willing to apply simplified procedures for the reduction of tariffs to all their trade. Some of the hard cases might be attacked instead by a new way of negotiating that is taking shape during the Kennedy Round. Called the sector or industry-by-industry approach, it largely grew out of the fact that there was a danger of no significant tariff reductions being made in several major industries because one country or another wanted to hold out key products from the across-the-board cut of 50 percent. Consequently others were unwilling to make their best offers. So long as the approach was product by product, reluctance in the most timorous country blocked all action, often to the disadvantage of other parts of the same industry. In chemicals and steel, for instance, several major countries have both an export interest and a protected sector. By looking at each of these industries as a whole, the negotiators opened the possibility of working out balanced bargains covering tariffs and non-tariff barriers as well. Too little is publicly known as yet to make a confident appraisal of this technique. It suggests questions about relations between governments and businesses and among producers in various countries that will have to be looked at warily. Still it is noteworthy that Eric Wyndham White, the Director General of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has suggested that this approach could provide a way of moving toward free trade in a number of in-

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dustries, particularly those with large enterprises and fairly advanced technologies.

If that technique works in the hard cases, and deep cuts are made in other across-the-board duty rates, then the Kennedy Round will have opened the prospect of the elimination of tariffs on trade in manufactured goods among industrial countries. Free trade, so long an impossible ideal for some and a worrisome spectre for others, will become, for the first time in nearly a century, something that can be seriously contemplated as a reasonable objective of policy. But the Kennedy Round has also made clear—if there was ever any doubt—that the removal of tariffs does not by itself produce free trade.

One of the advantages of the industry-by-industry approach has been to clarify the significance of non-tariff barriers in each industry and to help link their removal or modification to tariff changes. But no matter what technique is used, non-tariff barriers will have a prominent place in future trade negotiations. So far as quotas and exchange controls are concerned, the question is largely one of enforcing existing rules. But large numbers of other barriers fall outside any agreed international code and present difficult problems. Their variety is great. Some devices enhance the effect of tariffs—for example, by using artificial prices to calculate duties and assigning goods arbitrarily to customs classifications with higher duties. There are suspected abuses of legitimate practices, as in the application of anti-dumping duties. "Buy American" laws are only the best-known example of the very widespread practice of discriminating against foreign goods in governmental purchasing. Some European countries have taxes that fall disproportionately on large (and therefore largely American) automobiles. Sanitary rules, marking and labelling requirements, copyright and trademark laws, and many other regulations may also have the effect of restricting trade. So do some private business practices. Sometimes restriction is a by-product of activities that have other major purposes, but many practices are undoubtedly subterfuges. How damaging each is, and to whom, are matters still in dispute.

These barriers are too numerous and too diverse to be dealt with in a simple, comprehensive way. Some would require detailed agreements; some might yield to a more general code; others will undoubtedly have to be dealt with case by case, or under some kind of complaints procedure. Concern with non-

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tariff barriers is not entirely new, but the Kennedy Round has moved them to a new position of prominence and set them firmly on the agenda of future trade negotiations. As tariffs become less restrictive, non-tariff barriers become more important; and they affect the pace of tariff reduction as well. For example, European countries may link their reductions of duties on chemicals to the modification of the "American selling price" rule which has the effect of raising United States duties on some of their products. Other non-tariff barriers are likely to be treated in the same way in the future. What Percy Bidwell christened "the invisible tariff" is becoming more visible.

This prospect that the Kennedy Round has opened leads to another one. To start talking about non-tariff barriers is to open a subject that has no logical end. All manner of government activities undertaken for all sorts of reasons may have the effect of restricting trade, or at least of putting foreigners at a disadvantage compared to domestic producers. What is a trade barrier? When will it be brought into international negotiations? These are questions of new scope for the future. For example, border taxes related to domestic turnover taxes and the like have traditionally been regarded as not affecting foreign trade. Now that idea is being called in question, but the implication of change reaches deep into national tax structures and raises questions about exchange rates as well. And as tariffs fall, national laws and policies about prices, wages and business practices take on a new international importance. The foreigner's concern with depreciation allowances, shipping laws, government-financed research and the more recondite forms of subsidy grows. Only far in the future can one imagine international negotiations covering quite so wide a range of subjects, but much sooner there will be questions about these practices and others that influence trade negotiations.

Agriculture, for so long the bad boy of international trade liberalization, is already posing similar questions. For decades large segments of agricultural trade have not only been exempted from the general process of lowering trade barriers but have been subjected to new restrictions. More than simple protectionism and the political strength of farmers went into this process. Many of the restrictions were the logical consequence of domestic farm programs like those in the United States which kept domestic prices above world levels and often sought to limit output as

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well. In the Kennedy Round the United States and other producers outside the E.E.C. found themselves faced with a complicated new agricultural policy applied to the whole Common Market. Close and ingenious attention had been given to working out its implications for imports with a degree of logical rigor that promised to create something very much like a self-sealing mechanism. For some important products the outside world seemed likely to be put in the position of being able to supply the Six only when their own production fell short. The effect was enhanced by an increase in production and productivity coming not only from the prices offered under the new policy but even more from a technological revolution in agriculture comparable to that which put the United States back into its historical position as a low-cost exporter.

There is no way out of this impasse if negotiations are confined to trade barriers alone. So long as countries adhere to policies of this sort, there is little hope of liberalizing agricultural trade except by agreements that affect the policies themselves, not just the tariffs, quotas and variable levies that support them. If there is to be progress at all, governments have to be willing to talk, negotiate and give undertakings about such things as price-support levels, subsidies, production control and the financing of surpluses, as well as about the regulation of imports. This awkward fact is widely recognized, but whether governments will be willing to act on these premises, will be able to reach agreement and will then be able to overcome the obvious domestic political obstacles to putting agreement into effect are questions which give some inkling of the difficulties of future trade negotiations. The most the Kennedy Round can do is to start the process —and it could fail in the effort.

Agriculture as a mid-sixties exemplar of future international trade negotiations is about as unlikely a picture as one could imagine. The reasons are peculiar to agriculture. The agreements that might be made are not at all like those to be sought in negotiations about manufactured goods. The position in agriculture has been reached through the impossibility of dealing with trade barriers in the conventional way, while in industry it results from success in removing them to the point where other barriers stand revealed. And yet the two have something in common: both indicate that the trade policy of the future, if it is to make progress at all, will entail international discussion, negotia-

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tion and perhaps agreement on a whole range of things normally regarded as domestic.

That conclusion is not quite as shocking as it may seem at first sight. Defense and its economic impact have been of mutual concern to the United States and its allies for a long time. We made the domestic economies of Europe and Japan our business from the end of the war on. It is not just our difficulties with the balance of payments that have given other countries reason to be concerned about American recessions, inflation, interest rates, wage policies and general economic health. From concern has come international discussion, sometimes negotiation and, in varying degrees, undertakings. National autonomy has not given way to international obligations but it has not been left immune either. So it is not surprising if trade, the biggest international economic nexus of all, should lead in the same direction.

At the same time that what was thought to be domestic is becoming of greater international concern, the international economy is developing in ways that raise questions about what is any longer national. Europeans and Canadians ask themselves whether American ownership of segments of their industries and American involvement in their financial systems are denationalizing their economies. In underdeveloped countries some people who long ago thought they knew the answer to that question are now beginning to wonder if the expansion of the economy that is theirs to control does not depend in part on a willingness to accept more foreign enterprise. Oil-producing countries that are financially weaker than some of the companies that operate within their boundaries are finding ways to balance the seesaw while the international companies try to become good citizens of a dozen countries at once. Americans too have some questions. In 1964, manufacturing companies in Western Europe of which Americans owned at least 25 percent, and which they usually controlled, had sales equalling $16.5 billion, over twice the amount of U.S. exports to Western Europe that year. The figures are not strictly comparable and they are obviously very different in their economic meaning, yet they raise questions. Can one fully understand the American trade interest in Europe by looking at exports alone? What is the relation of American investments to European trade barriers? More fundamentally still, what is the American economy? Clearly it is not just a geographical entity surrounded by a tariff and an invisible monetary line. Our

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foreign trade is not just something that crosses the customs frontier or involves the exchange of dollars for other currencies. But how to define the economy is not clear, and so there must be doubt about how to define the national economic interest as well. With the United States government and most foreign governments declaring, in common but for different reasons, their interest in American investment abroad, it takes no vivid imagination to see how the area of international discussion will broaden.

III

Broad as they are, these prospects opened by the Kennedy Round apply only to part of American foreign trade. The possibilities of free trade in manufactured goods, negotiations about national farm policies, greater attention to non-tariff barriers and the increasing international discussion of formerly domestic issues are relevant primarily to our trade with Western Europe, Canada and Japan. The third of our trade that is conducted with the underdeveloped countries and the less than 1 percent with the Communist countries present quite different perspectives.

Trade with the Soviet Union and the Communist countries of Eastern Europe has some of the characteristics of trade among the industrial countries of the free world, but not many. Its own peculiarities make it a realm in which different approaches are needed. This is not just a matter of the security control the United States applies to its exports to these countries. The far larger West European trade with the East still involves quotas, bilateral balancing and even barter. No one has yet found a satisfactory way of laying down a set of rules for relations between state trading bodies and private enterprises. It makes sense to permit Communist states to take part in GATT under reasonable conditions, if they want to, but it is wrong to think that this will solve many problems. What it will do is to provide a way of dealing with the problems of this trade and, as time passes, may produce a more satisfactory kind of relation, perhaps even a workable body of rules. Decentralization of economic authority in the Communist states makes it a bit more likely that they can be fitted into a reasonable system; it even gives their tariffs more meaning than in the past. Trade can expand without all the problems being solved, but not satisfactorily if they are ignored.

In relation to the Soviet Union, the United States needs more flexibility than it has had in the past so that the President can

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negotiate effectively. He already has considerable discretion over export controls, but its use depends on political circumstances. He needs the power called for in a bill not passed by the last Congress to end tariff discrimination against the Communist countries in return for satisfactory commitments on their part. Not commercial advantage but the ability to negotiate should be the main American aim.

Trade with the less developed countries is different again. Our concern with their growth and stability might reasonably lead us to agree to some rather one-sided trade bargains. There is already agreement that the rich countries will not ask full reciprocity from the poor ones, at least so far as the removal of trade barriers is concerned. But this should not be taken to mean that the less developed countries have a blank check and no obligations. If their trade policies amount to nothing more than protection, restriction and the subsidization of exports, they will choke their development instead of fostering it. And even if they follow very enlightened policies, what they can do for themselves in trade depends largely on the developed countries' willingness to open their markets to the competitive products of the poor, low-wage countries.

What blend of measures will contribute most to development and a rational pattern of world trade is a subject going beyond this article. The problems are not simple. For example, a whole choir calls for tariff preferences in favor of the exports of the less developed countries. But any prescriptions ought to be written with a clear recognition that the developed countries have shown less willingness to remove barriers to imports from less developed countries than on trade among themselves. Generous talk about special treatment should always be compared with the reality of the elaborate international arrangements to restrain trade in cotton textiles, one of the few manufactured products that a number of less developed countries are able to export in quantity.

The interconnections between these two segments of trade somewhat blur the distinction implied by saying that the United States needs different policies toward these two kinds of trade. Pointing in the same direction is the fact that a simple division of countries into developed and less developed is too crude to guide policy for very long. Both considerations remind us that the basic elements of American trade policy involve more than the reduction of trade barriers. Other essentials are an agreed

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body of rules, an organization to look after their application and a way of discussing problems and hearing complaints. This last function becomes increasingly important not only as special categories are recognized, such as "advanced less developed countries," but also as negotiations among the industrialized countries move from the familiar field of tariffs into the unfamiliar ones of non-tariff barriers and other practices that interfere with trade but are not covered by clear-cut rules. One more fundamental of American policy is support for the principle of equal treatment. That statement may ring oddly in a world full of discriminatory trade practices and juxtaposed to acceptance of the case for special treatment of less developed countries. But there is no real inconsistency. To accept departures from the principle of non-discrimination because they permit the removal of trade barriers, as in the case of the Common Market, or to meet special circumstances, as in the case of the less developed countries, is entirely different from abandoning the framework of non-discrimination. In that direction lies the hodgepodge of bilateralism that grew up in the depression, the abandonment of past commitments and the erosion of the accomplishments of the postwar period. Quite different horizons would appear from those described in the first part of this article. Not just American political and economic interest but the rational ordering of world trade depends on constant advocacy of equal treatment.

## IV

No trade legislation in the coming year can deal with all these issues. Some are not ready for action, others not yet well enough understood for us to know just what to do. Whatever is done in 1967, whether modest or ambitious, cannot be the solvent for trade-policy problems for the indefinite future, but whatever is done, particularly if it is ambitious, ought to take account of the new prospects that have been opened by the Kennedy Round.

Whether to ask for little or to ask for much is one of the classic problems of the renewal of trade-agreements legislation. A cogent case can be made for the view that with so many new problems arising the best course would be an extension of the existing act for a year or two. That would permit the President to tie up the loose ends the Kennedy Round is bound to leave, while preparing at home and abroad for the kind of approach that will be needed to deal with the problems of the future. The contrary view is also

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cogent: equip the President to take broad initiatives immediately, in order to build on the momentum of the Kennedy Round and guard against erosion or stagnation here or abroad. This view has its attraction. President Kennedy took the plunge when treading water would have been understandable, and he got the greatest advance in trade legislation since 1934. But he had some advantages that are now absent: the chance to break with a stagnant trade policy; the widespread feeling that the United States had to meet the challenge of the Common Market; and the wish to find a concrete expression of "partnership." No political equivalent of that situation exists now. The idea of an Atlantic free-trade area, which attracts some people, not only lacks charisma but has a negative political charge in the present state of transatlantic relations. It might also create more trade-policy problems than it would solve.

Still, the possibilities warrant something more than temporizing and some positive action would be a better earnest of American intentions than putting the decision off.[1] It should not be too difficult to draw up sensible proposals for broadening the President's power to cut or remove tariffs; to start on the problems of non-tariff barriers; to act on some of the issues of concern to the less developed countries; and to negotiate effectively with the Communist countries. How much can be done depends on a number of circumstances that are not now predictable—not least on what sort of agreement the negotiators bring home from Geneva and especially its agricultural provisions. And if instead of the satisfactory outcome of the Kennedy Round assumed earlier in this article there should be a very disappointing result with only dribs and drabs of unimportant trade concessions, still another situation would exist. Then the case for delay would be strong, to give time to consider whether the failure of the most elaborate effort yet made to reduce trade barriers might not mean that we needed new ideas about how to approach the subject. That kind of outcome would also raise very serious doubts about what the American people are willing—or ought to be willing—to do in trade policy.

There is another possibility, one hopes an unlikely one. That is that the Kennedy Round will become a political sacrifice, killed

[1] The Council on Foreign Relations will shortly publish a succinct analysis of future needs and specific proposals for the extension of the President's powers by John Evans, an experienced negotiator who for years headed the American delegation to GATT. I have gained much from talking with Mr. Evans and from reading his manuscript.

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or made barren by some effort to strike at the United States, the *demandeur* who has been more interested than others in its success. If that happened, we would have many decisions to make, and trade policy would quite properly have to be looked at primarily in terms of what use it might be as an instrument of foreign policy. Choices that would be considerably less than second best from the point of view of trade—such as trying to form some kind of trading group omitting the Common Market—would have to be seriously considered. But the prospects of a broad liberalization of world trade are more likely to be set back than advanced by that course.

The less dramatic course suggested earlier does not imply a divorce of American trade policy from foreign policy. Quite the contrary, it assumes that long-run American interests are on the whole well served by persistence in the long and slow process of trade liberalization. There are moments when some foreign-policy aim can hasten the process by galvanizing the country to action it would not otherwise take. There are also risks of setting back the process in the effort to make trade policy respond too closely to relatively short-run political circumstances. Certainly the United States can afford economic sacrifices for foreign-policy ends; it makes them every day. But it is also easy to exaggerate the value of trade policy as a political weapon.

Perhaps trade relations among the industrial countries of the free world—though not East-West or North-South trade—have reached the point at which they should ordinarily be looked at as workaday matters rather than as a form of diplomacy. Certainly the prospects sketched in the earlier part of this article are not those of a preacher's promised land to be attained by those who will be moved to action by a vision. They emerge naturally out of what the advanced industrial countries will have done over the past twenty years and more. That experience has not proved that tariffs and other trade barriers are of no importance or that their removal is the key to prosperity or peace—just that they can be removed without great disturbance and with real benefit.

To look ahead to where we can go after the Kennedy Round is not the same as showing how to get there or laying down a time schedule. The balance of payments of leading countries, and perhaps especially the United States, will offer obstacles; so will difficulties of adjustment and resistance to it. Elections, diplomacy and particular circumstances in one country or another will

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be at work all the time, more often to slow the process than to speed it. Protectionism is not dead and sometimes takes on new forms. The creation of regional trading arrangements liberalizes segments of trade but at the same time introduces new distortions. And the external tariff of such a group may become not just a trade barrier but also a form of political cement, as we have seen in the Common Market. Broadening the range of trade negotiations to include national policies and practices not ordinarily thought of as trade barriers will itself generate new kinds of resistance and stimulate political fright.

The next stages of trade negotiation will be more complicated than those in the past. Maybe they will be harder. There is nothing inevitable about progress toward freer trade; it depends on what governments are willing to do. Trade barriers do not fall, they are removed. That governments ought to persist in their useful if sometimes pedestrian efforts is clear enough. That conclusion was valid in 1945 when the vision of a postwar liberal trading world was new and hopes of moving rapidly toward it were high. It was valid ten years later when the obstacles to free trade seemed great and the will to pursue it was flagging, and again in 1962 when the United States made its bid to link Europe's internal trade liberalization with the world. What is new in 1967 is not the validity of the case for further liberalization but the prospect that its result will be a new concept of trade relations between nations.

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# THE RIGHTS OF PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

## Papua-New Guinea: A Crucial Instance

*By Margaret Mead*

IN the contemporary climate of opinion, all peoples of the world are claiming the right of nationhood, with all its perquisites—sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency and membership in the United Nations. Within this situation, the condition of "primitive peoples"—peoples who only recently lived a self-sufficient life without script or any relationship to script—occupies a peculiar place.

The world may be roughly divided into: modernized nations, some of which are also new nations, in the sense that they were colonized from Europe within the last five hundred years and are dependent upon a European tradition—for instance, the United States, Australia, Argentina; old, traditional or exotic peoples with traditions antedating those of the high cultures of Europe, currently struggling with problems of absorbing new economic and political forms—China, India, Burma, Thailand; and new nations within which the earlier forms of cultural life, while often elaborate and highly organized, lacked script and depended upon an oral tradition—for example, many of the countries of Africa south of the Sudan, Tonga, Samoa, etc., where political power has now passed or is passing to the immediate descendants of peoples who were substantially primitive until they came in contact with modern European or Asian cultures.

Furthermore, within many of the countries dominated by a European or Asian tradition there are minorities which have preserved in their present-day forms of life considerable traces of the unsatisfactory compromise relationships worked out when they encountered the high cultures of Europe, Asia or Africa and were pushed into undesirable land, isolated in special occupations, made dependent and deteriorated wards of the state or were converted into an uneasy peonage, peasantry or proletarian labor force. The word loosely applied to such groups is "tribe," a catchall term for ethnic groups that preserve an internal organization which is both somewhat independent of and indifferent to the superordinate forms of organized state government with

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which they come in contact.[1] They continue to rely on a spoken form of their own language; if they attain literacy in the superordinate culture it is usually of a very limited kind; in values and expectations they are turned inward toward their own "tribal" cultures. World attitudes toward such primitive or tribal peoples are heavily influenced by differential knowledge of or contacts with nomadic tribes of the Middle East, Eskimos in Greenland, Australian Aboriginals, the Maori of New Zealand, Indian populations in Mexico or Peru, Gypsies, Navajo Indians in North America and so on.

In such encounters the extent to which these decendants of former primitive people have preserved forms of their earlier cultures, or insist on new distinctive costumes and manners, is conspicuous; and the ways in which they have adapted to the technologies, ideologies or social customs of the states within which they live are less conspicuous. The fact that they continue to live in tents or hogans or igloos, or dress their women in long skirts, and that they cling to their native tongue and speak it to their children, sets them apart. Furthermore only those primitive peoples who have maintained such a separate and tribal status are visible at all; for ten thousand years comparable groups have become the peasantry and the proletariat of complex societies, speaking the language and following the customs of the state of which they are a part. They may often constitute quite special regional groups and give the special style to a region of a modern state; they may, also, like the Welsh, the Scots and the Irish, the Basques, the Croatians, the Ukrainians, still provide the cultural background for various sorts of irredentism. What is forgotten is the circumstance that they and also those against whom they are rebelling were once the descendants of peoples with an exclusively oral tradition, living in self-contained tribal groups. So, whether the primitive peoples in question have been living in uncomfortable symbiosis with an organized state for a thousand years or five hundred years or only a decade, the emphasis is upon the groups which have not consented to assimilation, and it is to experience with these groups that all new encounters are referred.

The standard expectation is that "primitive peoples" when they encounter "civilized" peoples react by refusal to become

[1] Morton H. Fried, "On the Concept of 'Tribe' and 'Tribal Society'," *Transactions*, New York Academy of Sciences, Series II, v. 28, no. 4, p. 527–540.

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assimilated, and after various efforts by missionaries and government, revert to their primitive styles of life. Then, according to the ethic of the period of encounter, they may be hunted like game, have a price set on their heads like vermin, be relegated to reservations or subjected to elaborate plans for education, rehabilitation and welfare. When an account of a new African state is prefaced by remarks of how recently the majority of the citizens lived (or still live) in a tribal state, the expectations of the future fate of the country are pessimistic in spite of the fact that it may have large modern cities and a sizable university-educated and sophisticated urban population. Or in the case of new states like the Philippines or Indonesia, the continued existence of some relatively unassimilated pagan tribes on some of the smaller islands compromises the national image of the country, and we hear derogatory phrases that include references to "savage" or "heathen" customs. The centuries of sophisticated contacts with Asia and Europe are not allowed for; the primitive minorities come temporarily to stand for the whole.

II

Within this setting, the process of nation-building in the eastern half of the immense island of New Guinea does, nevertheless, present very complicated problems. In this area,[2] governed by Australia, live some 2,000,000 Melanesians and Papuans, a dark-skinned people with a superficial resemblance to Africans and a physical appearance that evoked the racial exclusiveness of their European discoverers. They had been cut off from the rest of the world for thousands of years and at the time of discovery lacked any knowledge of script, metals, the wheel, the plough or of any form of political organization capable of uniting originally disparate peoples into political units larger than congeries of hamlets of a few hundred people and occasional temporary larger alliances for purposes of raiding or warfare. Their backward state can be reasonably attributed to their isolation. They had not, as have many other so-called tribal peoples, lived cheek by jowl in uncomfortable symbiosis with more civilized neighbors with whom they did not choose to amalgamate, or who, for various religious, racial or political reasons, refused to incorporate

[2] This area constitutes the Territory of Papua-New Guinea, resulting from the administrative merger of Australian New Guinea (Papua) and the Australian Trust Territory of New Guinea. The latter was established after World War I from the former German colony of Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Bismarck Archipelago.

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them—as is the case, for instance, with alien groups within China, India and parts of Southeast Asia and some countries of the Middle East and Africa. They can therefore be regarded, in the contemporary ethic of the mid-twentieth century, as having been treated unfairly by history, as having lacked a location on the earth's surface that would have given them an opportunity to accept the culture of more advanced civilizations, and so prove their superiority, or to reject or be rejected by it and so prove their inferiority. As the exploration and pacification of the interior of New Guinea is a post-World War II phenomenon, it




has involved the most striking discrepancy in recorded history between the newly discovered and the discoverers, men who lived in a stone-age horticultural state of technology confronting members of an airborne society. The relevant Metropolitan powers—Germany, Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Indonesia—can all be saddled with responsibility for the continued backwardness of the peoples whom they have ruled under various colonial mandates and trusteeship arrangements.

The forms of social organization in the Territory of Papua-New Guinea, although differing in detail, can be characterized for the entire area as clusters of hamlets, the inhabitants of which have ties of common or claimed descent, common language and territory, and intermarriage. Between the clusters there occur trade, warfare, headhunting and, less frequently, intermarriage. Hereditary positions of authority hardly exist: those who organize large-scale feasts, exchanges and war parties are "Big

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Men" who emerge briefly and who cannot pass on their power directly. Absent are the institutions or practices on which state-like forms have been based, such as rank, conquest, tribute and annexation. Instead, the principal value of an enemy group has been that it provided a means to attain honors and prizes for bravery. Expanding populations did sometimes drive neighboring groups from their land, sometimes permanently, or sometimes exterminated, another group, but the type of social organization did not lend itself to the development of complex stratified societies. There is a tremendous premium upon differentiating one group from another, the smallest details of dialect being seized upon and elaborated; there is great specialization of crafts and materials for trade, with various forms of compulsive barter to stimulate trading partners to fish, hunt, make baskets, net bags, spears, wooden bowls to provide for the needs of those who lack particular foods or objects or manufacturing skills.

Contact took place under such conditions that missionizing and governing groups had minimum estimates of the potentialities of the people. Before World War II efforts to educate the peoples of Papua-New Guinea were very limited indeed. Training as clerks, catechists and elementary schoolteachers was just sufficient to staff local establishments at the lowest levels. There was no tertiary education and very little secondary education of any kind. Those trained within the missions were not admitted to ordination. Intermarriage with the colonists, from which slightly more socially advanced groups elsewhere have produced a native élite, was almost totally lacking.

When the trusteeship power, Australia, was confronted in the post-World War II climate of world opinion with demands that Papua-New Guinea be given early independence, the enormity of the problem became evident. Other new nations are less viable in terms of size and economic resources than Papua-New Guinea, but none faces the prodigious problem of governing a territory in which the people to whom authority within the country would fall have all come so recently—some within the last ten years—directly out of stone-age cultures. For this is a country in which cannibalism and headhunting are in some parts only just coming under control, where old feuds over land and fishing rights simmer beneath the surface even in fully missionized villages, and in which no educated élite has been built up.

In the debates which will undoubtedly quicken in tempo and

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intensity over the future of Papua-New Guinea, many of the perennial questions of the relationships between isolated tribal peoples and the civilized peoples who attempt to conquer, enslave, convert, pacify or improve and elevate them come to the fore. If the progress toward independence and if the attainment of independence itself are accompanied by violence and disorder, this will have repercussions in discussions around the world regarding the political competence of peoples emerging from early states of technical and political development. It will also reinforce arguments that confuse the consequences of racial discrimination with an attributed lesser capacity of peoples with darker pigmentation of the skin.

III

The principal questions that are already coming up for review are: Do civilized people have a right to destroy, by overwhelming power, the specific particular cultures of groups of people who owe the persistence of these local styles to their isolation? Do civilized people have an obligation to bring such people as rapidly as possible up to the standard of their own citizens by spending large amounts of money, time and manpower on education, health, and economic and political development? If civilized people have this obligation, should it fall on those particular modern or modernizing nation-states which are, often through some unrelated historical event, in a position of suzerainty, or is this an obligation of the entire industrialized world? What is known about the capacity for political development of individuals whose grandparents or parents lived a culturally isolated, primitive life—as individuals, as whole communities and as members of a recent aggregation of communities which have historically been inimical to their close neighbors and unaware of the existence of the more remote neighbors with whom they are now asked to identify themselves? What political models, old or new, can appropriately be invoked to create conditions in which political independence can be made viable?

The question of the right of any people to the particular style of culture which they have developed over time has multiple origins in European theories of human rights, self-determination of ethnic groups within the European setting, the tendency to identify language and the right to political autonomy; there also are confusions between race and culture, so that those with dif-

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ferent customs were thought of as being intrinsically different as a group and therefore substantially unsuitable for complete assimilation. As there developed a society based on contract rather than status, the exclusion of certain groups who were physically distinguishable and culturally very diverse became a way of begging the question of their rights as individuals. Indians in the United States and Canada, the Aboriginal population in Australia, could be protected—as groups—and denied status as individual citizens. Forcing and bribing a primitive group to live on assigned territory—a reservation (the term is uncomfortably reminiscent today of the phrase "preservation of game")—and sentimentalizing their way of life was the outcome of this mixed position, reinforced in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth by the testimony of anthropologists as to the destructiveness of forcible acculturation and by missionization. Artists and humanitarians both responded to the intrinsic appeal of traditional culture, with its internal consistency and sense of harmony, and claimed that interference was wrong. These attitudes became variously expressed in policy toward native peoples within large states, in colonial policies like the Netherlands' respect for local customary law, and in the protective policies of colonial and trust-territory governments which kept native peoples attached to their villages or districts, prevented the alienation of land, limited recruitment and otherwise promoted the preservation of local cultures and retarded any development of wider allegiances and sophistication.

Since World War II, it has ceased to be ethically respectable to advocate cultural preservation except in those cases, like that of North American Indians, where the indigenous people are deeply imbedded within a historical ethic and a contemporary expanding economy. Those who argue today for the preservation of local languages and for slow change are identified with those who wish to prevent an indigenous people from receiving the benefits to which they are entitled. The emphasis has shifted from language, religion and customary law to the standardized categories of schooling, public health and political democracy. Attempts to perpetuate local identity or local ethnocentrism are identified as "tribalism"—ethically based factionalism which retards the development of modern states.

But aside from the demands for more education and for externally supported economic development, the tendency has

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been to rely on the development of types of nationalism, the intensity of which depends on enmity toward some outside power —the ex-colonial or neo-colonial power, or neighboring states with a different political ideology (as when citizens of Papua-New Guinea fear "infiltration" from the inhabitants of West New Guinea) or difference in physique—which may be a matter of stature or skin color or small traces of previous disallowed ancestry. Alternatively, reliance may be placed upon religion as the basis of a wider identity.

If tribalism can be defined as a form of political self-identification which places all ties within the group above ties to any wider group, then the forms of nationalism which are current in emerging states are in fact simply an attempt to produce a larger unit with the characteristic ethnocentrism of the component smaller units. Just as tribalism—whether it be of the Yoruba in Nigeria, the Uzbeks in the Soviet Union, the Pathans in Pakistan or the German sects living in isolation within the United States —can be seen as essentially incompatible with the demands of a modern state for individual responsibility and autonomy, so the forms of nationalism which are emerging in the formation of the new nations can be seen as the exportation onto the world scene of this kind of exclusive, ethnocentric self-identification. Nazism was of course an extreme example of an overweening sense of identity that was both ethnic and national.

So the question of the rights of indigenous and culturally backward people to the benefits of the modern world has become almost inextricably combined with their right to political autonomy—within a variety of historically accidental units—as the necessary condition of their obtaining their proper share of education, health and economic well-being. Questions of the superiority of regional economic and political arrangements become submerged under the discussion of what are essentially magnified "tribal" claims to all the trappings of nationalism.

There is little recognition of the contribution that those peoples who have stubbornly maintained their cultural differences, clung to their languages, and insisted on their separate identities have made to our understanding of the extent of possible variety in human cultures. It is, none the less, important; and vital issues remain, such as whether many of these passionately preserved local languages are to be swept away by the expansionism of the great powers or preserved through the timely adoption of some

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secondary world language. But they have less salience in world public opinion than the importance of a higher standard of living and greater political autonomy.

When a culturally isolated people come into contact with the modern world, the question arises of how fast they can learn, as individuals and in groups. Learning, whether to behave like a stone-age primitive man, or like a member of a submerged urban proletariat, or like the heir of a royal family, or like a future physicist, has, as an essential component, the question of self-identification and expectancy. There are, of course, great innate differences among individuals in primitive groups quite comparable to the differences between members of civilized societies. But for the individual who has the original endowment to become a statesman or a scientist, an artist or a scholar, an organizer or an inventor, the socio-cultural environment within which he is reared is crucial. Thus the question of the educability of *individual* members of a primitive group is significant only when—as a method of bringing them into step with the modern world—individuals are taken from their villages and educated in boarding schools or as residents in communities of the dominant culture. If individuals are taken entirely away from their primitive villages, to whatever extent they successfully assimilate the different culture of those among whom they live, they may become too alienated from their culture of birth to play a useful role when they return to it. On the other hand, in boarding schools with partly acculturated indigenous teachers drawn from a variety of local cultures, pupils tend to lose their local identity while gaining a very inferior, watered-down, partial version of the majority culture into which they hope to move. The graduates of such schools tend to cluster in the growing towns, unable to deal either with the full representatives of the dominant culture or with their own kin and fellow villagers.

A third method of bringing a primitive people into the modern world is by community development, in which the entire community, from grandparents to grandchildren, participates in learning new forms of political and economic behavior.[8] In such cases, it is possible to introduce new behavior models in the form of village teachers and technical assistance leaders through whom the children, supported by their active and aspiring elders, can

[8] See the author's "New Lives for Old: Cultural Transformation, Manus, 1928–1953." New York: William Morrow, 1955.

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move on into forms of education that need not become alienating. Even though the elders in many cases may attain only a caricature of modern behavior, the self-identification and progress of the children is much easier provided what they learn is of a sort to support change. But this kind of wide cultural progress of a community is dependent upon a large amount of genuine spontaneity and a sense of intrinsic potentiality and dignity, which most modernization activities inhibit. The educated villager who has embraced a different way of life looks down on his past, while the foreign technical-assistance expert, or in contemporary jargon the "change agent," is usually too intent on change to respect those who are changing. Contact with those who feel either humiliation or contempt does not promote rapid learning of a new set of cultural forms.

So while it may be said that there is no inherent reason either in the genetic constitution of primitive peoples or in their primitive social structure which would prevent them from skipping the intervening cultural forms in which they have not participated, current political inventions are so unfavorable that the results are likely to suggest that such learning is in fact impossible because of some intrinsic characteristic of race or level of culture. In actual fact, it is probably easier to move from membership in an isolated, proud, indigenous culture to full citizenship in a modern state than to reach the same level starting from membership in a culturally deprived group within a modern state, where generations of low status have created an expectation of inferiority and failure. Comparisons between the achievements of regions of New Guinea which have been within close and denigrating contact with Europeans for over half a century, and those which have had an opportunity to come straight into a world where they were treated with more dignity, are very illuminating. Although mission education has provided some linguistic sophistication and familiarity with European ideas of democracy and responsibility, those who are its product contrast disadvantageously with the individuals of the highland areas which are forging ahead very rapidly. The most primitive and latest entrants to the world scene may be those most able to learn, least encumbered with previous learnings, if they are presented either with a complete model of a viable modern culture —as immigrants are—or with a specially devised system capable of encompassing their divergences.

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IV

In the light of these considerations, we may examine New Guinea more closely, with a primary emphasis on Papua-New Guinea. The merger of the administrative apparatus of Papua and the Australian Trust Territory after World War II has saddled the country with a conflict between the allegiances of former Papuan officials and former Trust Territory officials. Inevitably, this has produced repercussions among the indigenous peoples and heated attempts to find a name and national identity for the merger of the two divisions. This rivalry and hostility are a conspicuous example of the way in which external governmental powers have so often created artificial tribes, districts and kingdoms as part of their governing apparatus.[4]

Within these two recently merged territories, there exist between five hundred and seven hundred languages spoken by the some two million people. Along with the diversification of language there is a bewildering degree of cultural diversity, of such a nature that an attempt by a government official or teacher to understand a local culture will qualify him to deal with perhaps five hundred or a few thousand people but often absolutely disqualify him from dealing with every other group he may encounter. There are no indigenous political chiefdoms or tribal organizations which could or can be used as the basis of political organization. The administration's practice of dealing with villages individually and restricting citizenship and political identity to registration in the village census books was both a consequence and a reinforcement of the low level of political organization.

If the trusteeship power had wished to educate those who would possibly inherit leadership roles, it would have been impossible to identify them without detailed study of particular small groups. Since World War II, a phenomenon called "cargo cults" has created a small amount of native leadership, in which individuals with outstanding charismatic powers have combined organizational skills and imagination with apocalyptic promises

[4] Neo Melanesian, a lingua franca based on Melanesian grammar and a predominantly English vocabulary, was the contact language in the Trust Territory; a little English—with a small smattering of Police Motuan—was that in old Papua. The interchange of Australian officials with different linguistic habits has been disruptive. The influx of New Guinea men and women as laborers into Port Moresby has resulted in the spread of Neo Melanesian, and the recent ecumenical decision to issue an authorized Neo Melanesian version of the New Testament has given it a new impetus. The United Nations missions, on the other hand, have discouraged its use. Another adverse factor is the increasing dominance of the people of the highlands, whose languages are non-Melanesian.

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of an immediately transformed world. Most of these cults crumbled, either because the leaders could not realize the promise or because the administration looked on them as subversive. In Manus (Admiralty Islands) a genuine political movement developed out of a set of very local conditions in the late 1940s[5]. A highly gifted political leader, Paliau, now in late middle age, has been elected to the House of Assembly, established under pressure from the United Nations,[6] and has become chairman of a set of local councils within the Manus archipelago. But he does not speak English, and under the pressure for education and wider experience which may foster a young élite group he is being passed by. Most of the elected members of the assembly have scant influence in their often artificial home constituencies.

In the face of such conditions there is a temptation for analysts to emphasize only deficiencies in the cultures of New Guinea and despair of ever building a viable nation state. Yet at the same time events are inexorably moving towards its creation. The same pressure which works toward the establishment of a nation-state—pressure from the other recently emerged nations, anti-colonialism, anti-neocolonialism, reverse racist thinking—works simultaneously in a case like New Guinea to promote indigenous nationalism and discourage trusteeship. The Australians do not feel that they have tremendous sins to atone for; in fact they have thought of themselves in a colonial predicament vis-à-vis the mother country. Their preference for a white Australia was predominantly a desire to keep other racial groups out rather than any interest in extending dominance over them. A large number of Australians disinterestedly administered Papua and New Guinea between the two world wars, when this was a lifetime career; but today, when the policy is to transform all services rapidly so that they will be staffed by indigenous personnel, there is no career line. Contracts have replaced career commitments. Idealism close to the Peace Corps type did produce a large crop of diverse and dedicated young teachers, but recruitment has been discontinued. Aside from defense—and here experts are divided on the advantage of continued responsibility for New Guinea—there is little incentive for Australia to continue to pour

[5] See Theodore Schwartz, *The Paliau Movement in the Admiralty Islands, 1946–1954.* Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, New York, 1962. v. 49, pt. 2.

[6] See F. J. West, "The New Guinea Question: An Australian View," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1961.

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money and energy into New Guinea only to be abused as an exploitative colonial power.

Some form of authority as an alternative to the continuing demands on Australia would not necessarily solve the problem. If the responsibility were transferred to the United Nations the issues might shift somewhat from the repetitive reproaches that have become the style when the backwardness of any group of people is concerned. But the sense of national responsibility which is a strong element in Australia's commitment of funds and personnel to the process of nation-building in New Guinea would then be lost.

There does seem to be good reason, however, to shift the question from how much can a primitive people learn—to which the answer is, under the right conditions as much as any other kind of people can learn and sometimes more—to the question of how much are the present administrators and planners in New Guinea likely to be able to *teach,* given present conditions of ideology, funds and personnel.

The pages of *New Guinea,* a quarterly published in Sydney, indicate the extent to which the characteristics of a democratic nation-state are being thrust upon perhaps the least prepared group in the entire world. In a single recent issue the subjects dealt with included the fears expressed by a 32-year-old member of the House of Assembly from the Upper Sepik River that infiltrations from West Irian will bring disease, spies and Communists into the Territory; the right of asylum of primitive inhabitants of the interior; wildcat strikes; whether or not to outlaw card playing and problems of restoring wives and children lost in "lucky games" to their rightful husbands and fathers; gloomy prospects for coffee growing, money incomes and traditional standards of diet, clothing and housing; Australian responsibilities in connection with U.N. Trusteeship decisions; and the advantages of maintaining local customary law with a right of appeal to national courts. The list is one small indication of the bewildering set of political and other problems confronting two million people emerging from tiny clusters of population, without definite territorial or linguistic boundaries and with only a handful of very recently educated political leaders.

There seems reason to suggest that the way to deal with these peoples of Papua-New Guinea is to adopt more modern and more rationalized methods than those used in education situa-

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tions where the students are more sophisticated. There is always a tendency, however, to use methods which are less rather than more rationalized—for example, to send technologically obsolete machinery to underdeveloped countries, when we should be sending teaching models based on the very most advanced machinery, possibly specially simplified for learning by the inexperienced.

The question of the handling of names, birth registrations, health treatments, electoral rolls, etc., in Papua-New Guinea is an example. Conventional names differ greatly from one linguistic and local group to another and are intricately related to the local forms of social organization. The names delineate clan membership, relationship to other clans, claims to land; relate an individual to particular ancestors, define reincarnation, memorialize the number of "mother's brothers" who contributed to a birth feast. During the early days of pacification the custom grew and spread of giving the census-taker names that were either false or little used among a number of names which an individual could claim. In our own history, the question of acquiring a stable surname was often solved in a variety of ways on the insistence of tax officials or others; in many cases names were simply assigned arbitrarily. The same kind of unsystematic process is now going on in New Guinea as insistence on the same name, on two names, on a surname, on using the "father's name" undefined, are being indiscriminately urged in different regions. Meanwhile, it is more urgent than ever before to identify individuals and locate them in an increasingly complex system of relations between citizen and state. A number assigned at birth and printed on a metal tag which could be replicated, plus a computerized retrieval system, would at one stroke set up a workable system. Such a rationalized system of names is more needed in New Guinea than in, for example, the United States because none of the intermediate conventions which make our system intelligible and workable, even if not fully rational, are present there. In the same way, it may be convenient to teach Australian schoolchildren, who have grown up on lessons on pounds, shillings and pence, to treat the new Australian dollars as if the dollars belonged in the pounds column and the cents in the shillings, and omit any reference to the decimal system. But for New Guinea schoolchildren, immediate recourse to the decimal system would be more intelligible.

A further advance could also be made if instead of looking at

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New Guinea as a long list of lacks and defects—no complex social organization, no hierarchical system of authority, no clear boundaries, no hereditary positions, no technical experience beyond the stone age, no common language, no calendar, no currency, no educated élite to undertake leadership—some attempt were made to look for unsuspected strengths. It is true that the largest completely effective political unit is about five hundred people and that small adjacent communities are frequently bitter enemies. But this also means that people do not have extended enmities. Regional loyalties and indeed loyalties to any group at all likely to be large enough to be troublesome are all artifacts of the present system of administration. People without strong loyalties to large groups might much more easily become citizens of a nation-state than those who have been bound by centuries of experience (either indigenous or colonial) of factionalisms based on such loyalties. Furthermore, the people of New Guinea have a long tradition of hereditary networks of trade friendships and show great adaptability both in maintaining these ties across enemy lines and in adjusting them to modern conditions like common service in the police. This cultural skill might be utilized in building groups of New Guineans who would be loyal to each other. It might be a feasible basis of an army which in turn might contribute the best form of order to a country where the maintenance of order will be a pressing necessity for a long time to come. But such steps require a willingness to use highly technical help to identify a real cultural strength. In the present state of opinion, such efforts are only too likely to be treated as subversive, or to become the target of political attack.

Primitive peoples are our contemporaries, no matter how isolated they have been from the ongoing stream of civilization or how much they have been damaged by contacts with civilizations which threw them back into reactive and self-defeating isolation. Their histories are as old as ours; their innate capacities are those of the same species. The more primitive they are, the less wounded by various forms of compromise and conflict, the more unspoiled intelligence and curiosity they can bring to the modern world. The one obligation which we may be said to have is to take the trouble to use every skill and invention we have to make the advanced cultures of the modern world possible to teach, and so possible to learn.

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# ECONOMIC REVOLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

*By Marshall I. Goldman*

ON the eve of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Communist Revolution, the Russians have embarked on yet another economic revolution. With hardly a word about ideological purity, Premier Alexei Kosygin has announced that by 1968 profits, sales and rate of return on investment will replace fulfillment of quotas as the main standards of success for every Soviet firm. Moreover, Soviet managers will have to pay interest or capital charges for the capital they use. Profits will be divided up in a form of profit-sharing, and some enterprises will even have to pay rent. The economic reforms are matched in their significance, according to one Russian economist, A. Birman, only by the transition to N.E.P. in 1921 and the launching of the Five Year Plans in 1929–32. Clearly what the Soviets are currently attempting amounts to a repudiation of formerly sacred doctrines.

Why have the Russians picked this juncture to make such basic structural changes? It is not an impetuous action. The call for reform originated with Professor Evsei Liberman in September 1962.[1] This was followed by more than three to four years of active debate and about two years of actual experimentation. During this period the majority of Russian economists came to acknowledge that there was a need for a drastic overhaul. They were obviously shocked when they saw their rate of economic growth fall badly during their Seven Year Plan from 1959 to '65. Most observers came to realize that a long-run upturn in the growth rate would depend on the resolution of some basic underlying problems. What was needed was improvement of day-to-day operating procedures as well as reform of the process by which longer-run changes were made. All of this would require a more productive use of the country's capital and the stimulation of innovation.

[1] Many Westerners have come to refer to all that has followed as Libermanism. The Russians themselves make no such personal identification. As will become apparent, however, the Reform being introduced is a close copy of Liberman's original proposal. For a discussion of the earlier debates see Leon Smolinski, "What Next in Soviet Planning?" *Foreign Affairs*, July 1964, and Marshall I. Goldman, "Economic Controversy in the Soviet Union," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1963. Reportedly, Liberman's earlier articles also sparked the first attempts at reform in Czechoslovakia.

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By the early 1960s, the Soviet economy had become a very complicated mechanism and was in serious danger of self-strangulation. The central planners were finding it harder and harder to make efficient decisions without help from factory managers. There were simply too many eventualities for Moscow to be able to plan for them. Yet the central planners continued to insist on detailed control over day-to-day operations. The factory managers were given little authority to deviate from quantitative plans, frequently drawn up a year or more in advance. Moreover, plant managers were often led to produce completely inappropriate items by a misdirected incentive system. The system contained no mechanism for responding to error. Often there was more concern about the bureaucrats than about the factory's customers. It was true that these methods had brought growth in the past, but increasingly output was unrelated to needs.

Growth and change had been obtained in the past largely by pressure and prodding. Because managers and planners were almost always submerged in their daily operating problems and had very short-term goals, the government had to launch campaign after campaign to shake the economy out of its deeply furrowed ruts. This was the only way to move industry to Siberia or force the growth of the chemical industry or the use of natural gas. While such campaigns often accomplished their stated purpose, Soviet observers began to point out that they also involved considerable waste. Invariably all other activities would be halted in order to devote exclusive efforts to the campaign goal. Occasionally a second campaign would then be necessary to right the balance.

The Russians also discovered that their capital productivity had fallen badly. Capital was less productive because of the inefficient operating methods just described. The problem was intensified because capital was treated as a free good. There was no interest or repayment. Consequently, factory managers would try whenever possible to hoard capital, especially raw materials, for their productive needs. In this way they could insulate themselves from the transportation tie-ups and supply bottlenecks that were a hallmark of centralized planning. But in addition to input accumulations, many factories and stores have begun recently to find themselves with stocks of their output which have accumulated unexpectedly because of unsuitability or poor quality.

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Partially as an effect and partially as a cause of all these factors, little innovation arose from within the factory itself. When the priorities were high enough, as on military and space projects, there could be impressive innovation. But lesser projects produced none of the instant innovation which seemed to characterize Western industry. When innovation came it was often too costly and too late. For instance, Russian officials now admit that during the five years required to work out the production problems of the Ural 4 computer and the Zaporozhets automobile, both had been made obsolete by production advances in the West.[2]

What the Russians needed was some system that would provide them with self-generated flexibility and growth. Only with such a reform could they hope to improve their rate of economic growth, compete more effectively in foreign markets, improve the supply of consumer goods and ameliorate their inventory problem. It would not suffice just to know when to introduce new products; there also had to be some way of knowing when to drop old ones.

For a time many economists thought that the computer would solve all these problems. It was expected that advances in planning and computing technology would eventually make it possible to determine centrally all production, price investment and consumption decisions. The various unknowns would be thrown in and the necessary answers would come parading out in neat formation. Soon, however, even some of the computer specialists came to realize the impracticality of relying on the computer alone.[3] There were simply too many unknowns for everything to be determined centrally.

Looking around, the Russians saw that in the Western countries, and even in a country like Jugoslavia, the market economy handled day-to-day transactions with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of regulation. The Russians also saw that the problems of learning and responding were solved when the market economy was combined with something like the American system of competitive enterprise. Whatever shortcomings it may have, business enterprise in the United States responds to "feedback." In such a system, failure to so respond can lead to financial loss

[2] E. Rakovskii, "Tekhnicheskii Progress i Faktor Vremeni," *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, July 1966, p. 16.

[3] *Izvestiia*, December 4, 1964, p. 5; *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, April 24, 1966.

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for some identifiable group or person. Consequently, managers have a great incentive to respond. The Russians realized that if their problems were to be solved, they would need similar responsive effort and flexibility in their economy.

II

What is so radical about the Reform? First of all, the old system of planning and incentives has been scrapped. No longer will factories be assigned quantitative output targets. The first experiments were conducted in May 1964. *Bolshevichka,* a Moscow factory making men's clothes, and *Maiak,* a Gorki manufacturer of women's dresses, became the first enterprises to be evaluated on something other than quantity of production. To stimulate production of items better suited to the customer's needs, the payment of premiums was made dependent on the fulfillment of delivery and profit plans. In January 1965, some heavy-industrial firms in the Ukraine were also permitted to experiment. The scheme grew rapidly and by the end of the year over 400 consumer-goods manufacturers and 3,000 retail stores had been converted to the new system.

In September 1965, Premier Kosygin himself announced that the reorganization would gradually be extended to the whole economy. He ordered the adoption of a slightly revised set of gauges which in addition to profits included rate of return on capital, interest, capital charges and rent. Market research and advertising were also to be more used. To say the least, such economic forms are highly unorthodox by Soviet standards. None the less, as of January 1966, Soviet managers in 43 major factories were to be judged on the fulfillment of sales or profits targets and the rate of return on capital (profits as a percent of capital). These factory managers will have to deduct interest at a rate of .5 to 2 percent on any bank loans they may have. No longer will sums of capital be allocated to them as a gift from the budget for capital already borrowed. These capital charges are to average 6 percent of the enterprise's fixed and working capital. The interest charge and capital charge are to be supplemented by a rent charge, to vary so that firms and mines more favorably located than others will not earn undue profits. All of these charges must be deducted from profits before premiums can be paid or the rate of return calculated. By January 1967, almost one-third of all the country's industrial workers will have

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been switched to the new incentive system, with the rest of the factories scheduled to be converted by 1968.

Wherever possible, economic standards and charges will be set several years in advance. In this way it is expected that the managers will seek to do their best without fear that their targets will be jacked up the moment they show signs of improved operation. This should free them for more experimentation. Logically they should be more willing to risk the introduction of new processes and products if they know they will not be criticized for making lower profits during periods of innovation and will not have their increased profits taken away from them as soon as they work out the kinks.

Enterprises whose products are already in abundant supply or whose inputs are in short supply will be judged by how well they fulfill their profit plan. It is hoped that this will cause them to produce as efficiently as possible. Firms whose output is in short supply will have to fulfill sales targets. This will insure that such goods will continue to be produced. A sale will not be counted, however, until payment for delivery has been deposited in the bank to the seller's account. Better quality may be stimulated in this way because the buyer will not release his funds until he is satisfied that he has received what he asked for.

In a further effort to increase flexibility, Soviet authorities are introducing new supply procedures. Wherever possible, enterprises are authorized to work out their own purchase and sale agreements without the interference of ministerial authorities. This will ultimately mean the increased use of salesmen, trade fairs, marketing research and advertising. If stocks of merchandise are made readily available in local warehouses, managers should have less reason to hoard supplies in their own private warehouses. Ultimately, it is thought, this could lead to the end of centralized allocations for all but the highest priority goods.

The rate of return is to be used in conjunction with either profits or sales as the second criterion of success. Rate of return is now defined as profit in relation to capital, as Liberman had suggested. Previously when rate of return (*rentabelnost*) was discussed, it referred to profit as a percent of cost.

With the new criteria the manager has a strong incentive to cut back on his capital stock. Anything the manager does to reduce the denominator in the profit-to-capital ratio will presumably lead to a more efficient use of capital and a reduction of

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inventories. But by reducing his capital, the rate of return is further improved because interest and capital deductions will be lower, and therefore profit (the numerator) will be higher. If this curbs the squandering of capital, then capital productivity will be increased and an important goal of the reform will have been achieved.

The net profit that remains after the deduction of interest, capital charge and rent determines not only the rate of return but also the amount that is available for the discretionary use of the factory manager. The manager is entitled to put a specified portion of net profit into three funds—the Incentive Fund, the Cultural and Housing Fund and the Development Fund, all three of them designed to promote the firm's productivity.

Since the size of these funds depends on the enterprise's profitability, they are expected to stimulate the workers' interest in holding down costs more than in the past when extra pay and bonuses ("premiums") depended on the quantities produced. In the new system, fulfillment of targets remains an important factor in calculating the amounts that can be put into the fund, but over-fulfillment is rewarded at a lower rate. This is the reverse of former procedures. According to Liberman, this will stimulate plant directors to seek higher targets in the beginning and not hold back on their efforts.

Managers, engineers and the like will get all their bonuses from the incentive fund, but for the blue-collar workers there will also be some payments from the old wage fund, so that the worker is not penalized if his performance is good but the enterprise fails to be profitable for reasons beyond his control. The size of the bonuses varies from industry to industry and differs according to the situation of the enterprise, but there is a formula that puts a limit on the amount of profits that can be spent this way, in order to be sure that wages do not increase faster than productivity.

The Development Fund is a particularly important one, designed to encourage innovation and investment by the firm itself. The share of profits that can be put into this fund is related to the size of the capital of the enterprise; yearly amortization charges are added to it and also proceeds from the sale of old or surplus capital equipment. Ultimately as much as one-fifth of all the capital investments made in the Soviet Union may come out of the Development Funds of individual enterprises. Liberman

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sees a connection between this kind of decentralization of investment and the direct incentive payments to workers and managers, because the Development Fund, by increasing the importance of self-financing for each enterprise, gives managers much more control than they had in the past. Moreover, the use of bonuses from the other funds and cultural and housing benefits are also to a considerable extent under their control.

## III

No one among Soviet officials pretends that implementation of the Reform will be easy. As Kosygin recently remarked to the Supreme Soviet, there are two immediate problems: poor pricing and bureaucratic resistance. Existing Soviet prices do not adequately reflect the true value of the product. Wholesale prices have not been thoroughly revised since 1955. Supply-and-demand relationships among different commodities have changed markedly since then. By producing those items which have unduly high prices, factory managers will be able to make unintended profits on an undesired assortment of goods. This could easily provoke the reintroduction of detailed controls.

Kosygin also mentioned that there has been resistance to the Reform by those who fear it will undermine their own positions. "A certain conservatism and lack of initiative," he asserted, "are sometimes displayed in trying to solve a number of matters connected with the operation of the economic reforms." There has been foot-dragging by the ministries of the industries affected. Kosygin declared: "The ministries should not demand an excessive amount of reference notes and information of various kinds from the enterprises." To the extent that ministerial intervention limits a firm's ability to deal through direct contracts, it eliminates the possibility of feedback.

Of course it is not just the bureaucrats who oppose the change. Like their counterparts all over the world, many Soviet managers fear the effects of competition and are reluctant to abandon the relatively tranquil climate of fixed markets and stable production quotas in which they have operated. Finally, like the workers in the movie "The Man in the White Suit," there are many Soviet workers who recognize that increased efficiency will mean layoffs and unemployment.

With such opposition there is a possibility that some or all of the Reform may be suspended. After all, Soviet economic history

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is filled with the scraps of brilliantly conceived experiments. A real danger exists that the slow pace of the Reform could create such chaos that the entire program might be discredited. Possibly the Reform should have been introduced throughout the economy simultaneously to prevent the distortions that result from piecemeal change. Yet this too could cause trouble.

Some East European cynics liken the Russian dilemma to the problem supposedly faced by Czech traffic authorities. In order to ease Prague's traffic jams, they recommended that all of Prague's traffic be shifted to the left side of the road, as in England. After some reflection the city fathers decided that this would be too much of a change to make at one time. Instead, they ordered that only the taxis and trucks should move on the left. During the transitional period the automobiles—like the bulk of Soviet industry—would continue to move as they had originally.

Some Soviet officials feel that the new interest rate and capital charge will hold back the introduction of new capital. This indicates a misunderstanding of the function of capital charges. A charge for capital should not frustrate investment if the proposed equipment is productive enough to make possible repayment of the capital charge. If it is not productive enough, then the investment should not be made in the first place. It was just because of the absence of such a restraint that capital has been consumed so wastefully in the past. However, just in case the managers do hold back too much on investment, senior officials have the power to exempt new capital from the capital charge until the new equipment is operating at full capacity.

To the surprise of some, the Reform is also creating problems where it was thought none existed. The introduction of economic guides like interest and rent has created a schizophrenic split between Russia's domestic and foreign-trade interests. With their new economic methods, the Russians have begun to reëvaluate their production possibilities. They have discovered that they have not engaged in the most productive kind of foreign trade. Now that they are beginning to recognize the impact of rent and interest, they find that they have seriously underestimated the substantial costs of the capital and land resources involved in expanding the production of their raw materials. As a result they have complained publicly and repeatedly that they have been *subsidizing* their East European allies with such items as oil, iron

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ore and coal. Naturally this comes as a shock to the East Europeans who have long complained about Soviet *overpricing* of raw materials.[4]

As part of their drive for more effective foreign trade, the Russians may move to free plant managers from some of the controls of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Such changes have already been made in Hungary and Poland where some firms are authorized to deal directly with their foreign counterparts. Now they respond not to command, but to the world market. To the extent that Russian firms become more competitive in the world market, they should also become more efficient as domestic producers.

The new wind of reform also appears to have affected Soviet foreign aid. Now that capital and interest rates are coming into their own, the Russians have adopted a more commercial attitude in their economic relations with the less developed countries. There is more emphasis on economic feasibility and on how much Russia will receive in return for its aid. Some economists have called for an increased emphasis on loans which will lead to greater Soviet and East European exploitation of the raw materials of the developing countries. (Of course the word exploitation is not used in Soviet self-analysis; that appears only when Western countries are involved.) As part of this trend, the Russians apparently intend to charge more for their loans. In August 1966, they provided Brazil with a loan at 4 percent interest, much more than the traditional Russian rate of 2.5 percent.

## IV

Two big questions remain: Will the Reform increase overall administrative efficiency, and will it stimulate the productive innovations so much desired? Undoubtedly there will be improvements on both counts, but will they be enough?

Liberman and the other proponents of the Reform are convinced that decentralization is a necessary step in the right direction. If anything, they feel the Reform will make central planning more effective. They dispute those who worry that the use of direct contracts, wholesalers, market research, advertising and profits will mean the end of central planning or the excessive diversion of natural resources from heavy to light industry. On

[4] For example, see I. Dudinskii, "Toplivno-Syrevaia Problema Stran SEV i Puti ee Resheniia," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, April 1966, p. 85; L. Zevin, "Vzaimnaia Vygoda Ekonomicheskogo Sotrudnichestva Sotsialisticheskikh i Razvivaiushchikhsia Stran," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, February 1965, p. 73.

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the contrary, the reformers insist that freeing the planners from having to deal with so many small details will make it possible for the planning organizations to concentrate their efforts on issues of more importance. No longer will the authorities in Moscow have to worry about such things as whether or not a factory in Novgorod is sending the right size screws to the right factory in Minsk on time. Instead the planners can devote their attention to long-term goals and major investment needs. Where necessary, heavy industry can be protected by use of price adjustments and government subsidies.

By dividing up responsibilities in this way, the planners also hope to make more effective use of computing equipment. Once the central planners are freed of the minutiae of individual plant problems, they should be free to use their computers to project alternative solutions to long-range problems. The reformers also hope that the individual firm will be able to use its own computers to improve its operational efficiency through the use of operations research techniques. However, the Russians will have to face the uncertainty of whether the Reform will be basic enough to make it possible for the risk-taking manager to coexist with the computer. In the United States, the computer and the methods which it makes possible such as input-output and linear programing are like any other business tools. Their main function is to provide additional information for the ultimate decision-maker. But in private competitive enterprise, the manager generally decides to accept or reject the findings of such devices in light of his own independent judgment.

Because all industry in the U.S.S.R. is state-owned, the computer is often viewed in a different light there. State managers must always stand ready to make a public accounting of their actions. Therefore they in turn want someone or something to provide them with authority to act. If there is written authorization to do something, then the person is free to act because he knows that he will be able to point the finger at someone or something else. In such an environment, the use of the computer is considered particularly desirable since it can provide justification or authorization for managerial action.

But there is the danger that the solutions offered by the computer will be viewed not as possibilities but as binding solutions. Just because the answer is from the impersonal computer and just because it is in writing, the manager opens himself up to

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criticism if he takes another course of action. It will be interesting to see if the Reform will make Soviet managers independent enough so they will feel free to use the computer instead of being used by it. If not, it will be found that one form of inflexibility has been substituted for another.

Successful use of the computer is dependent upon the solution of yet another problem. If the computer is to be of value, the information it has processed must be rapidly transmitted to the responsible decision-maker. At present this cannot be done because almost all communications in the U.S.S.R. are written. Since it cannot be used as proof of authorization, a telephone call is seldom if ever used to issue orders or to convey information. This explains the mountains of written work involved in even the simplest transactions. If there is to be efficiency and flexibility, the Russians will have to develop a speedier and more reliable communications system and they will have to free themselves from their over-dependence on the authoritative written word.

Administrative efficiency, in the final analysis, is dependent on more than the availability of hardware; there must also be well-trained managers. Heretofore the Soviets have used production engineers who have been trained to produce in large quantities and to secure unavailable components. Will it be possible to revise the whole concept of managerial administration so that two generations of quantity-oriented production specialists can be converted into quality-conscious innovators? As the Minister of Education has acknowledged, such a change can hardly take place overnight. In recognition of the urgent need to develop a new breed of manager, open admiration is now expressed for such managerial hatcheries as the Harvard Business School.[5] In fact, a Russian exchange student is now enrolled in Cambridge learning the technique of teaching American business administration.

Assuming that managerial practices can be improved, will this also stimulate the flow of innovation? Theoretically, the Russian manager should be able to operate as efficiently and be as inventive as his counterpart in the large American corporation. The Reform, with its emphasis on sales, profit and rate of return, is much the same incentive system that is used by such large American corporations as DuPont and General Electric.

[5] *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta*, No. 43, October 26, 1963, p. 7; No. 12, March 1966, p. 7.

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Similarly, these American corporations permit decentralized investment within certain limits, just as will now be the case in the U.S.S.R. Consequently, like their American counterparts, the new Soviet enterprises should now be able to promote numerous important innovations and move the inventions from their laboratories to the production floor.

Innovation in the United States, however, does not originate solely in the larger corporations. In fact, there are many who argue that much of the American leadership in innovation comes not from the larger corporation, but from the small private enterprise. Despite the growth of large corporate research laboratories, a large proportion of the basic discoveries in the United States continue to come from small firms, which sometimes succeed so well that they turn into large corporations themselves—like Polaroid, Itek or Xerox. It is hard to see how the Russians even with the Reform will be able to avail themselves of this particular kind of innovation.

The phenomenon of the small and creative entrepreneur is possible only where there is private ownership of capital. The man with the idea must be able to solicit financial support for his project from a wide variety of financial sources. It is not enough to have inventors with ideas that are advanced for their day; there must also be a wide variety of financiers around to support them. The more sources of capital there are, the more likely it is that an investor will be found who can appreciate the worth of a particular investment. When the state controls all the society's capital, the sources of capital are sharply reduced. Normally there will be no more than one decision-maker and no court of appeal. If the state's capital controller happens to lack the vision to appreciate a particular invention, no matter how brilliant the discovery may be, it will not move past the idea stage. Innovation also requires a willingness to take a risk and lose. The stewardship of the state's funds, however, generates extreme conservatism, hardly a desirable environment for promoting innovation.

In partial recognition of the handicap associated with state control of capital, the Reform does permit some decentralized investment by the enterprise in the hope that inventors will be able to seek out alternative capital support. Yet even if the single government veto over capital is abolished, there may be a need for something more. To be successful, the Reform must touch off

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a competitive spark among the country's managers. Whatever its limitations, the phenomenon of competition in the West plays a basic role in stimulating the search for new and better processes and products. While the Soviets are trying to emulate this spirit, it is questionable whether they will be successful in generating it at the enterprise level. There have been some very dynamic nationalized enterprises like Volkswagen. But such firms have made their mark in competitive coexistence with private enterprises. So far it has been very difficult to ignite that inventive spark when all the enterprises in a country are owned by the state.

Radical as the Reform is, it does not herald the advent of capitalism. As the Chinese have been quick to note, however, the use of such tools of the marketplace as profit, interest and rent certainly is not a reaffirmation of Marxism. What is in progress seems to be a determined effort to improve the effectiveness of a form of state capitalism. The dynamic operation of a massive and complex industrial system dictates the use of certain universal techniques. The Russians do not have too much choice; it is like trying to go up the down escalator. As their economy becomes more complicated, it becomes harder and harder to move forward at a rapid rate. Without the Reform, their economy may well be carried backward. With the Reform, they hope it will be able to move forward—at the very least, hold its own.

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# THE SHACKLED HISTORIAN

*By Herbert Feis*

IN the foreword to his book "Speaking Frankly," former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes wrote: " I have tried, in short, to give you a seat at the conference table. Some critics may say it is too early for these facts to be made known. My answer is that if it were possible to give the people of this world an actual, rather than a figurative, seat at the Peace Conference table, the fears and worries that now grip our hearts would fade away."

Such avowals by officials of belief in the desirability of open channels of information are common. But all governments make it hard for historians, as chroniclers and informants, to validate them. Usually, they are compelled to extract the truth as best they can from incomplete, random and eroded records. Of these there is no lack. But bountiful bibliography is not the equivalent of bountiful knowledge.

Public American and foreign figures engaged in international affairs give out current accounts of what they are or may be doing. They tell, explain and justify their policies and acts and those of their governments. They correct, contradict and rebut the comments of adversaries and critics. The columns of the press are clogged with their presentations. The airwaves, if they were not already bent, would bend under their weight. The TV screens, if they did not already shimmer, would do so under their fluency.

These are essential sources of information, especially for the texts of pertinent documents and communications. But the historian must grope warily among them. For the authorities themselves decide whether and when the world is let into their confidence, how it is to be let in, and whether shallowly or in depth. Historical completeness is only an incidental consideration —incidental and often troublesome. Only the officials concerned know what they are *not* telling; only they could convey the whole circle of circumstances in which the statements and documents they issue were born and grew.

This continuous current flow of "news" from government sources is supplemented by "inside" stories gathered by probing reporters. In many of these, facts are mingled with surmise and rumor. The more detailed may be derived from arranged inter-

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views; their revelations are shaped by official purpose, sometimes only to counter another "inside" story given out by another official, national or foreign. Confidential information passed on to a favored individual for publication tends to put the author under obligation not to hurt or offend the contributor.

Reaching further into the past, and more systematically, are the histories authorized by government. Some of these are written by members of the staff of one or other government department by request and under direction. Others are written by individuals who are not in the regular employ of the government, but they are chosen by officials and their work is reviewed, and may be revised, censored or suppressed by officials.

Then, on some issues of critical and controversial importance, the historian may be able to learn much from the record of hearings of committees of the Senate and House of Representatives. But executive officials may and often do claim exemption from obligation to disclose information in public hearings. The records of closed hearings may or may not later be published. But before they are, they are carefully reviewed by all and sundry. Parts may be suppressed and the resultant impression distorted. More often than not, versions of what was said in closed hearings appear in the press before the record is in print—versions beginning with the cryptic statement "It was learned. . . ."

Most valuable, in fact indispensable to the historian of recent times, are the memoirs by participants in, witnesses or auditors of momentous events. These have been increasing in volume even as the number of people eager to know what has happened has grown and as the monetary rewards for dredging one's memory have escalated. Moreover, the narrators do not wait as long as they formerly did to publish what they remember or choose to remember. The time span between experience and expression has been shrinking. Historians should be glad of it.

But what a tricky source of historical knowledge individual memoirs may be! The parentage and purpose of the documents themselves must be evaluated: who wrote them, why, and how good and fair a recorder was he? Those who choose to tell, tell; some merely to leave their print on the pad of history; some to clarify; some to shame detractors; each to leave a good image of himself. Who writes a memoir to prove what a stupid official or blundering military commander he was? Who commemorates his own faults and errors? Even granted good conscience and honest

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purpose, memory is incomplete and fallible. And the reasons for being inhibited or restrained are active. Who likes to be regarded as a harsh critic of his country or as "disloyal" to his associates or party? Who wants to give comfort to his opponents or critics? Most memoirs of officials in some measure turn into adversary briefs.

The whole assembly of these sources leaves the historian of the recent past in ignorance and uncertainty. He has no way of knowing what he does not know. In trying to appraise a situation or negotiation, he cannot be sure either of the completeness or accuracy of his facts or the balance of his opinions. Nor can he be confident of his appraisal of individuals and his interpretation of their relations. He longs to be able to tell the whole story and to know it can withstand the harsh cross-winds of opinion. Similarly, in writing of individuals, he longs to know and to be able to tell of the whole man, the real man, justly, and within the cave of circumstance in which he did his work.

II

But the path to original and complete records is strewn with obstacles. Let the historian try to get from the authorities all the extant records, unedited, of what was said and done during the past two decades from 1945 to 1965! He will find out that he cannot. If he persists, eventually doors may be closed to him. Now and then he may manage to hasten the process of declassification. But only exceptionally so. It takes just one quick, easy and safe movement of the wrist to place the stamp of secrecy on a document or communication. But ordinarily that stamp cannot be removed until committees of cautious officials have long pondered the wisdom or utility of doing so. Few of those I have known were disposed to take even faint risks that by declassifying a document they might be exposing their country, department or superiors to controversy and jeopardizing their own jobs. Historical truth pays no direct bounty to them and gives little protection.

The most thorough practitioners of secrecy concerning the recent past are the Communist countries. In the Soviet Union and China no history is written or published that is not officially supported and approved. How could it be otherwise? For their governments are not only dictatorial but conspiratorial. They could not survive if their own people—as well as foreign authori-

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ties—were let in on their secret thoughts, actions and plans. The locks around their records are an integral part of their system of self-preservation. Of course they are not so described; they are lauded as beneficent guardians of national security in an unfriendly world. Unauthorized priers are regarded as spies or enemies. Woe to all if they were admitted into the pit of truth, dark, deep and slippery.

But must the governments of the Western democracies be constrained by the same anxieties? Can they not be more permissive in disclosing the recent past, the yesterdays from which the present has just emerged? Must the period of internment be 50 years—or even 22 years, as it is now in the United States? Need it be longer than, say, ten years, or the term of a presidential administration, or the development of a main policy? Men, while exercising official responsibilities, say it must be; but the same persons in retirement often seem to conclude it need not be.

III

Just because the recent past is so pertinent to the present, the historian should be enabled to inform himself about it rather than be denied the chance. Why? One reason is that lack of adequate and well-confirmed knowledge allows distorted accounts of what occurred, and biased interpretations of why it occurred, to thrive. Reliable—I will not say indisputable—knowledge is essential to counter the imaginative partisan, the biased mind, the deliberate decrier and willful worshipper. As remarked by D. C. Watts in a restrained plea for relaxation of the restrictions on the British records: "No amount of official restrictions can prevent histories of the recent past from being written. They can only secure that they are badly and inaccurately written." [1] Prolonged secrecy permits unjust and uninformed evaluation of policies, decisions and persons to survive.

Let me particularize what the historian who tries to inform this generation about the recent past is up against. Suppose, for example, he is bent on writing an appraising account of the development and course of the cold war—an account which may roughly correspond to the facts and, as correctly and fairly as possible, attribute to nations and individuals their motives, activities and policies.

[1] D. C. Watts, "The Public Interest and the Right to Know," *The Political Quarterly*, London, March–April 1963.

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Since he does not want his narrative to be merely a synopsis, he may limit its span from the dissolution of the war alliance in 1943–1945 up to 1952 when Truman relinquished office and the cold war was dominating world affairs. He would be writing of the first period of the atomic age, a time of dramatic vicissitudes, of momentous decisions, of dangerous straits in which the world still swirls.

Most of all, the historian would like to study collected communications, memos, briefs which tell what the responsible American and foreign officials thought, said, wrote and did. Thus he would first reach for the annual series of volumes of foreign relations of the United States. These are culled from the archives of government departments and agencies and diplomatic missions by the Historical Division of the State Department. Mainly because of necessity, but in some instances by choice, these selections are not complete; but their standard is high. To his dismay he would find that the most recent year documented is 1944. Not so long ago the interval between events and publication of the pertinent diplomatic and military records was about 15 years. But the State Department has stretched the term of withholding to 20 years. Actually, not even that "line" (the expression used by State Department historians) is being held; I do not know whether they think of themselves as policemen or umpires. It has been dented only infrequently and for special reasons: by the issuance of the collection of records concerning our China policy, released in defensive explanation, and the American minutes of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences released in response to a sustained clamor to know.

When queried about the reasons for the interval of secrecy, officials may deplore lack of funds or staff. But it can be taken for granted that in a budget of $110 billions or more it is policy, not penury, that stretches the gap. The historian asks himself what the American government—particularly the Secretary of State—is waiting for, or of what it is afraid.

Similar rules, I believe, keep the records of the Foreign Aid Administration closed for a like period. The records of the activities, successes and failures of the Central Intelligence Agency are slated to be kept secret far longer, perhaps forever; yet how riddled they are by leaks from inside or revelations made to win funds or refute criticisms of the agency! The records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are held to be sacrosanct—except by former

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members when, after retirement, they recall their strategy and fight their battles over again.

Denied access to the departmentally accumulated records of the period of the cold war, our historian may turn hopefully to those that were collected in the White House, called usually the Presidential papers. These he would expect to be able to study in the Truman Memorial Library in Independence. For did not Truman often exalt the educational value of history? But up to now the inquirers have not been permitted to look at any records in the Library which are still marked "confidential" or "secret" or "top secret."

Should the probing mind travel from the Truman Administration to the Eisenhower Administration, it would be less baffled by contradiction but more frustrated by the bans on unpublished and classified official records. Yet President Eisenhower said that he favored virtually complete disclosure; and at the time he seemed to mean disclosure to this generation, not only the ones that outlive him. The papers of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State are still closed. All other memoirs written by officials concerned with foreign affairs during this period are thin.

If we turn to the problem of writing the history of the crucial events in our foreign relations during the short term of office of the gallant John F. Kennedy, the divergence of the restrictions becomes glaring. There is, I presume, no chance that the historian would at present be able to consult the pertinent official records or memos of conferences, instructions to our embassies, and correspondence with foreign statesmen during the period of his presidency. But what an admirable series of privileged and candid narratives and memoirs tell us what may be found in them! What elaborately detailed accounts have appeared in the weekly magazines of how the rout of the Bay of Pigs came about, and what happened in the critical crisis when President Kennedy challenged the Russian installations of missiles in Cuba!

Can the historian be blamed if he is struck by the contrast between the scope and contents of the published official records and the disclosures of participants, confidants or a few favored journalists? This places a very high premium on securing and diffusing information before anyone else, and perhaps exclusively. Men may be drawn into office as the corridor to future careers as historians. Warm the Boswells inside the gates, envious the Boswells left outside!

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IV

Lest I seem to be railing only at American authorities for interposing barriers to knowledge of the recent past, it should be noted that those maintained by almost all foreign governments are even longer-lasting and less penetrable. Comparison with British practices is most usual and natural. These are more restrictive and give rise to even greater divergences. As summarized by Dr. Charles Wilson of Jesus College in the London *Times* of November 19, 1962 (apropos of Lord Avon's memoirs): "Foreign Ministers and retired service officers are free to publish and interpret documents and policy statements not previously revealed. Journalists are apparently accorded similar privileges when it is convenient to the department that this should be done. . . . Professional historians are governed by quite different rules. They have accepted a principle reached by committees of historians and civil servants that research should be restricted to official documents not less than 50 years old."

As a rule the British Foreign Office refuses requests of students for access to records of later date. This long-aging, Foreign Office officials explain, is necessary for diverse reasons: to protect officials from temptation to write and speak with their minds on how they will appear in the public record and to encourage them to be forthright in word and deed. When these justifications have been disputed, the British defenders of the restrictive rules have fallen back on the need to protect British interests and security. But have they truly and effectively done so?

The British government, like the American, does publish collections of official records from time to time on situations or issues of controversial importance. But in the recent past it has done so less frequently—only when it served its purpose, or when the public or parliamentary demand to know became irresistible.

In contrast with this official reticence are the reports of some of the leaders of British foreign relations in the recent past. Those that tell of events during the period of the Truman presidency, for example, are more candid and comprehensive than the works of their American counterparts. The volumes written by Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden (Lord Avon) are the most notable. Those of Lord Attlee are slim and uninformative, but he never had the gift of communicating and was always safely shy. The experiences of Ernest Bevin, Foreign Minister,

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are being written from his papers by Alan Bullock, and will be, I am sure, more enlightening. The papers of Lord Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Bevin's rival for the office of Foreign Secretary, are accessible. Much may be expected of the next volume of memoirs of former Prime Minister Macmillan. And there are many others. British Foreign Office officials and ambassadors give and get much enjoyment from their reminiscences. Having been released from the bonds of office, they write well and freely.

Still, as the historian gropes his way through this profusion, he must regret that he cannot get at the complete, original, unselected, uninterpreted British records themselves. Without them his hope must languish of knowing the whole tale, of being able to discern with confidence cause and effect, action and response, rights and wrongs.

## V

To return to the situation of the historian in the United States, the presidential and other memorial libraries will later on be of service and value to those who write of the safely outdistanced past. But unless present and prospective rules and restrictions are relaxed, they will not aid those who want to study and write about the travelling recent past. Their chances of ascertaining what happened and of being able to appraise it will be as hobbled as they are now.

The creation of these libraries was bathed in the light of promised revelation. They were not conceived merely as memorials and preservative depositories. They were hailed because of the belief that they would enable the American people to learn more—and more easily and quickly—about their past. But the light of revelation is now so filtered through curtains of reserve that the value of these institutions to the historian of the recent past is still to be proven.

There are five presidential libraries at present: the Herbert Hoover Library in Iowa, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York, the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, and the John F. Kennedy Library which is to be in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

These repositories of most important records are under direct executive control. They are run by the General Service Adminis-

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tration through the Archivist of the United States, with members of his staff working in Washington and in each of the libraries. Thus all the papers that may be collected by the magnetism of reputation or association are in the custody of officials who are well stitched into the executive webbing and subject to orders. In decisions about throwing open to general inspection records in the upper realm of historical interest, these archivists neither can nor will exercise independent judgment. They can hardly be expected to risk their careers in espousing the cause of the historians against the heads of executive departments or library trustees.

The records of the recent past now in the custody of these libraries are fenced in with stakes as high and strong as those around the White House grounds. The noted public figures for whom the libraries are named, or persons acting for them, determine in the first place which of the records they have collected will be put in these repositories, and which they or their families will retain. This right is theirs even after the papers have been mined and milled for published memoirs. President Truman has made no secret of the fact that he has kept several filing cabinets of his records out of the custody of the Truman Library—to make sure no one will see them until after he is dead and safe from the barbs of history. No outsider knows what records are or will be placed in the Eisenhower Library and which kept out. The papers of Kennedy are still being garnered; it is to be hoped that those who possess them will not screen them before placing them in public custody.

The donors of the records also retain the right to determine when and under what conditions the independent student may be allowed to acquaint himself with them. They can stipulate that they should be closed for decades. They can grant permission to study them to some students but not to others equally qualified. Lastly, they can rule that notes or manuscripts based on the records be submitted for approval of either the staff of the library or other designated scrutineers. Moreover, the officials and trustees who are guardians of these collections may regard themselves also as guardians of the reputation of the memorialized individual. They may be loath to expose that reputation to sting or stain as long as living persons care deeply.

Even if the restrictions imposed by depositors themselves on these presidential papers should be light, the historian of the

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recent past may still be hindered in their use by the governmental departments and agencies concerned with foreign affairs. Any request made to the directors of these libraries to see records still marked classified by the State or Defense Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the White House are submitted to these branches of government. Their rules will determine whether the request is granted or denied and fix the procedure for clearance of manuscripts or notes. In short, these departments have as firm a clasp around the records in the presidential libraries as around those in their own files.

There is one other plait in the cordon drawn by the American government. "Documents of foreign origin," even in open files, may not be seen by the historian until and unless they are published, presumably with permission of their authors. This practice, except where it is undermined by deliberate seepage, affords each government reciprocal protection against prying historians of the others. As far as I know at present, however, no international organization has been constituted to control the traffic in historical documents (similar, let us say, to those operating to control the white-slave trade or the transmission of cholera).

## VI

While upholding the wish of the historian, I should not ignore the reasons why some records of the *very* recent past had better be kept for a while out of his grasp. These pertain particularly to documents closely connected with negotiations that are either still unfinished or actually in train. Engaged officials need the assurance that what they say will be kept in confidence until revelation is no longer a serious danger to their cause or to themselves. Otherwise they will be more fearful and less inclined to act as sponsors of accords whose value and wisdom the people may not yet have accepted. They are justified in seeking to guard against premature revelations which may be distorted by enemies or critics to defeat their efforts. There are always malicious trouble-makers on the prowl, at home or abroad. Temporary or partial secrecy about current affairs may be justified because publication might make it harder for colleagues to agree and governments to survive or to protect sources of information, licit or illicit.

Also the sensibilities of foreign nations and statesmen must be considered: their pride or vanity or self-defensiveness. Why,

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guardians of the records are apt to argue, perhaps provoke animosity by imparting information only historians or partisans crave? Sometimes this risk is real, and possible consequences to sponsors are serious. But most seldom so. If the record be fair and true, any hurt done is likely to be brief and easily borne; the truth will be salutary.

But what if the record contains traces of deception or double-dealing? Governments can hardly be expected to go in for public confessions. Thus the historian must reconcile himself to some exclusions until any such episodes have been withered by time. But again only most exceptionally. Practitioners of deception are usually suspected by the foreign officials with whom they deal. The historian is apt to dispel the scent of deliberate deception and misdealing more often than stumble into unsuspected cavities of it. He will probably discover fewer scoundrels and more men of honest but mistaken intentions than cynical contemporaries—domestic and foreign—thought.

I would also agree, reluctantly, that public officials should retain the right to screen the notes taken by historians on recent situations or episodes of unusual danger or delicacy, the right to grant or deny clearance to knowledge obtained. But even in the very rare cases that such a procedure may be justified, the officials responsible for the screening should be courageous, professionally trained and eager to assist the historian.

My spirit is still scarred by a recent personal experience of the harassing procedures which must be undergone by probers into unpublished records of the foreign relations of the United States since 1944. My aim was to scan the notes and memos made by former Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and Harvey Bundy, former Special Assistant to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, on discussions about the introduction into international life of the atom bomb. These papers had been thoroughly and well used in the official history of the production of the weapon, written under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission. Nevertheless, permission to look through selected components of this file was granted only after several months of pleading and ponderous correspondence, perhaps only because, as I found out, every significant item of information was already known. Yet that fact did not shorten the subsequent trials of securing clearance of my 20 pages of notes. In pursuit of that clearance I felt like a character of Kafka's. Word reached me that

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my notes were being read by this or that official, this or that committee of officials of the Atomic Energy Commission, State Department, Defense Department. I conferred with desk sergeants, majors, colonels and generals, legal counsels and Assistant Secretaries of State. About two months later I was informed that the last of the needed initials had been placed upon the release. By then proofs of my book, long overdue, had been returned to the publishers, unblessed by the "secret" knowledge I had been allowed to secure.

VII

The authorities in power are not budged by the ardor of historians nor persuaded by the contention that in these times when the lives and fortunes of everyone are so clearly at stake, people are entitled to know the how and the why of the situation in which they find themselves, and thereby be better able to judge for themselves what their obligations are. Official decision is apt to rest on the belief that, in words used by a very high State Department official in a letter to me on the subject: "There is, inevitably, a conflict between the demands of scholarship and the need for regulations controlling the use of privileged government information." I suppose the word "privileged" is a term of art. Perhaps it is intended to mean information which can be disclosed only to those who conduct current affairs because of their need to know what has happened in order to do their work. Perhaps it pertains to information which can be disclosed only by those privileged because they hold or once held government office.

The authorities—American and foreign—should not any longer rest comfortably on generalizations which do not recognize or satisfy the surge of public interest in foreign affairs. They dim the belief in the ideal that libraries be illuminating memorials. And they are constantly being evaded and riddled by "privileged" officials themselves.

The historian of the recent past should not be regarded as low man on the totem pole. His service to the life of the nation, all nations, is too important. The better he can do his work, the more instructed and intelligent that public which officials in a democracy must appeal to and rely on.

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# ASIAN REVOLUTION AND AMERICAN IDEOLOGY

*By Raul S. Manglapus*

ASIA wants revolution; Asia needs revolution. The only Asian nation to which this truth does not apply is Japan, whose society was transformed in the nineteenth century.

Once all of Asia was in a state of equilibrium, with its agrarian societies relying for survival on a delicate balance between land and population. Land suitable for rice-growing was limited and rice-eating populations struggled for subsistence; they had neither the time, ability nor energy to think of governing themselves or even of participating in government. The task of governing was left to the few, a small, specialized class of scholar-officials. To labor and obey was left to the many. Thus the centralized state came into being, strong enough to protect these precarious balances from ever-threatening natural or artificial forces, skilled enough to undertake the control of the flow of water, the life-blood of the staple production.

In the centers of Asian culture, in India, Java, Cambodia, Japan and most especially in China, there was strong central government and a statically arranged society. In China, it was a pyramid, the peasants at the bottom, the land-owning gentry above them, still higher the scholar-administrators and at the summit the emperor, the divine maintainer of the equilibrium between land and population, man and nature, heaven and earth.

Confucius gave this stability a philosophic base which sanctified harmony and reverence for authority. But if the balance were disturbed, if the emperor could not control the avarice of landlords, the corruption of officials, the looting by invading barbarians, and if therefore the masses starved, the sacred work-cycle stopped and there was chaos, there yet was a remedy: the ruler ceased to be divine. Rebellion was permitted, nay called for, and the successful rebel was by his victory ipso facto vested with divine power. A new dynasty was born and the balance was restored. The Chinese formula was adopted, with modifications, throughout East Asia.

This kind of equilibrium was to last four thousand years, until one day Western man arrived with ideas more explosive than the powder the Chinese had invented for firecrackers at the

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harvest festival (and which the Westerner would later push into the mouths of cannon). Among these new ideas were Christianity, proclaiming human rights superior to those of the state; science, substituting immutable laws for the capricious will of the gods; parliamentary government, making the governor responsible to the governed; and new techniques for mass production and the control of disease.

Asian society was shaken to its roots. European governors replaced indigenous rulers, and the land once tilled only for the subsistence of the population was now made to produce raw materials for the colonial power.

When the Manchus fell in China, there was no other dynasty to take their place. The cluster of Western ideas, which the Europeans had never bothered to knit together into one harmonious whole to replace the old Asian equilibrium, fell on Asian ground as separate elements, breeding hope and despair in expectations that could not soon be fulfilled. Mass populations grew, unchecked by the old natural levellers, plague and epidemic; plantation economies stagnated because they were geared to export crops whose markets had faded away with the departure of the colonials.

Asia is left today with more ambition and less fulfillment, more people and less food. The equilibrium is gone. And no new rebel can assume the divine mantle and restore the harmony. The Asian, converted to the ideas of the West, now wants to control his government and his destiny. Though he may still be at the base of the old pyramid he wants dignity for himself—not just for the emperor, the potentate or the scholar-official, and not just for the native aristocrat or the *comprador*.

II

This now is the question: Is America ready to face the necessity of revolution? Many Americans would probably find the question impertinent. Are they not the first revolutionaries of the modern age? Is not their Declaration of Independence a ringing revolutionary document for men of all time to invoke in the cause of justice and equality?

They are, indeed, entitled to be proud. But recalling one's own revolution is perhaps not enough, or at least is a different thing from understanding another's hunger for revolutionary change. It becomes even less adequate when America's original

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revolution and its ideological underpinnings no longer seem relevant to the deep current of human events where men now need revolution most—among the masses of the developing world.

In another era, one of limited population and pure libertarian motives, the American Revolution was surely relevant. When America snatched independence from the first Philippine Republic at the turn of the century, William Jennings Bryan replied to the imperialists' justification of "educating the Filipinos": "The educated Filipinos are now in revolt against us, and the most ignorant ones have made the least resistance to our domination. If we are to govern them without their consent and give them no voice in determining the taxes which they must pay, we dare not educate them, lest they learn to read the Declaration of Independence and Constitution of the United States and mock us for our inconsistency."

But the reasoning of John Locke and the precepts of Isaac Newton, which were the wellsprings of the principles of the American Constitution and Declaration of Independence, seem to have little bearing on questions like the pressures of population, the closing of the breach between rich and poor, the rapid demolition of the barriers of race and creed.

Equality is good, but in the newly emerging nations there is now too much equality in destitution. Dignity would be better. But where in the "rockets' red glare" of the American Revolution can we see how this dignity may be won by the multiplying millions of this age? In a world searching for an ideology that will bestow this dignity, where even the youth of America seeks a "national purpose," America's only answer seems to be pragmatic improvisation, meeting crises on a "case-to-case" basis.

And all the while, Americans are unpragmatically espousing or rejecting ideas because of associations that are either imprecise or no longer applicable. The idea of capitalism is a primary example. America is a monument to the genius of free enterprise, and American propagandists abroad would like to credit her unabated economic growth to completely free initiative, almost to classic laissez-faire.

This is what the young Filipino entrepreneur, inspired by the American example, schooled in the American tradition and seeking to build his enterprise in the American image, is told when he seeks assistance from the Philippine government in order to compete with the giant American firms operating freely within

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the uncontrolled Philippine economy. No mention is made of American government controls and subsidies that enable the "free-enterprise" economy to accommodate the concern for the national welfare.

Americans are proud to be known as alert opponents of socialism, yet poll-takers report that millions of Western Europeans, Asians, Africans and Latin Americans think of themselves as "socialists," and that this "socialism" is much akin to what the Americans themselves believe in.[1] Americans are proud of their crusading anti-Communism. Yet to many in the uncertain world, Communism is opposed to capitalism, not to democracy.

Even America's allies and non-Communist friends are beginning to tire of negative anti-Communism. As early as 1963, Don Van Sung, the Vietnamese patriot, warned: "By emphasizing anti-Communism rather than positive revolutionary goals and from lack of a better adaptation to the local situation, the United States has reduced its anti-Communist efforts in Viet Nam to the maintenance of an administrative machine and of an army."[2] To Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic President of Chile, "the anti-Communisms of fear, of preservation of 'order,' and of forces manifested in military coups are doomed to failure and are constantly in rout. They have nothing to say to youth or the people."[3]

But, it will be asked, what need is there of ideology? Did not pragmatism cure the ills of America? We may largely agree. The histories of other nations are always divided into periods, of rise and decay, of benevolent kings and lecherous kings, of the ascendancy of reason and the rise of faith, of progress and reaction. American history is singularly lacking in these periods and in this respect it is monotonous. But it is the unique, consistent and gloriously monotonous American condition which accounts for the fact that every minute an American is born free, free in every sense, to develop himself and his country according to his own will and initiative.

There will never be one single man known as the builder of America. And this just might be America's guarantee for great-

[1] *Cf.* Ralph K. White, "'Socialism' and 'Capitalism': An International Misunderstanding," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1966.

[2] Quoted by Maj.-Gen. Edward G. Lansdale in "Viet Nam: Do We Understand Revolution?" *Foreign Affairs,* October 1964, p. 82.

[3] "Religion, Revolution and Reform," ed. D'Antonio and Pike. New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 36.

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ness without end, for escaping the cycle of rise and fall which some historians predict for great civilizations. What shall we call this guarantee? Capitalism? Free enterprise? We might more aptly use the word which a hard-headed monk of the thirteenth century once associated with freedom. Thomas Aquinas said that "freedom is the spontaneous obedience to law." Spontaneity may be the key. And as America built itself spontaneously, so also could we build Asia.

III

But Asia is not ready for spontaneity. There is at present little enthusiasm in Asia for the American example; for it is apparent that patchwork democracy requires conditions which do not exist in the developing world. One such condition is the challenge of the open frontier—the response to which was the beginning of the American miracle. There are no such frontiers to challenge Asians. The Asian peasant must respond not to the heartening call of the rich wild but to the demoralizing prospect of having to make productive two hectares of unowned land, his tenancy having emanated from some unwritten ancestral contract or royal decree which his ancestor could not read.

This absence of Asian frontiers has moved practical theologians like Ceylonese Oblate Father Tissa Balasuriya to urge that the developed white countries abounding in virgin land, such as Canada, Australia and the United States, voluntarily give way to the demands of "macro-justice" and open their frontiers to the land-hungry millions of Asia. "If I were born of white parents," he laments, "almost the entire under-inhabited world would be open to me to settle down and reproduce my kind—Australia, Canada, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, etc. . . . Yet these same countries generously give non-whites arms to fight the Communists to make the world safe for political democracy and 'Christian civilization.' And they blame us when we are not enthusiastic. The present policy of 'increase and multiply and stay where you are, for we have filled the earth' cannot, humanly speaking, last."[4] This may sound extreme to some, but it helps explain why most Asians will not find inspiration in the squirrel-capped figure of Daniel Boone.

A second condition nowhere prevalent in Asia is the American tradition of dissent. The very act of crossing the Atlantic by the

[4] "World Apartheid," *Commonweal*, December 24, 1965, p. 364.

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original American settlers was one of dissent—dissent from oppression, from tyranny, simple dissent from opposing opinion. No such tradition motivates the Asian. The waves of Malays and Proto-Malays that landed on the shores of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, the early Filipinos (who drove the Negritos and the Igorots away from the lowlands and into the mountain fastnesses just as the early Americans were later to drive the indigenous population eventually onto reservations)—these men were no fugitives from tyranny. They came in groups of families, in *barangays*, and their tradition was conformism—conformism to the will of the chief, the *datu* and further up the Sultan. Soon it would be conformism to the will of the white colonial governor. But whether the supreme will was native or foreign, nonconformism would never be a right, and the penalty for it would invariably be heavy.

There is yet a third condition—the richness of the land. The pioneers found in the American continent a prodigious wealth of resources. Indeed there are pockets of great natural wealth in parts of Asia, not excluding the Philippines. But most Asians work barren land and must overcome supersition before putting to use the fertilizer that will fatten the soil.

No wonder, then, that Asia is not yet ready to understand spontaneity. No wonder that Asians, having almost always been servants, have developed the habits of the servant, a resistance to change, a willingness to obey only the gods of superstition that survive even in Christian societies like the Philippines, deified in the same way they were in Latin America in the syncretizing process of Latin evangelism. No wonder that when the Asian is told, "Go and be free, develop yourself, face and overcome each problem as it comes with your own genius," he does not understand.

IV

It is quite possible that something akin to American spontaneity can come from other antecedents. The Filipino writer, Nick Joaquin, reported after a recent visit to Red China that "responsiveness to challenges is the spirit that is Americanizing the Chinese." He says that the party line this year in New China sounds like Babbitt at a salesmens' pep talk: "Go all out, aim high, get results! Think big! Act big!" What could be more Damn Yankee?" he asks. "If you bumped into it in the dark, could you

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guess this was Chinese, not Rotarian; that this was Slave State, not Rugged Individualism?"[5]

Responsiveness without freedom. Is this paradox really possible? If it is, it is the result of an upheaval the premises of which have been easier for Asians to understand: the simple dichotomy of the rich and the poor, the oppressor and the oppressed, the few and the many. The rich are the few, the poor are the many. Let the many rise in revolution and redistribute the fruits of the earth—this is something Asians may understand, a revolution an Asian may indeed find easy to join, because he knows the poverty, the inequality, the oppression and all the rest. It is certainly easier to join than that complicated revolt against stultifying tradition, that rebellion against self through which he would have to go before he could enjoy the privilege of "pragmatic" spontaneity.

This is not to say that Americans are incapable of magnificent responses to challenges that excite other men and other nations. The whole history of America is a sequence of such performances —much like the improvisations of a jazz band, with each instrumentalist going his own individual way and still contributing to a totality that is a smashing success. But for Asians, what chance has such a performance, however brilliant, against the sustained, persistent, unequivocal panorama of revolution projected from other capitals? America is perfectly capable of lighting torches, and men will at times follow, but as Jacques Maritain has put it, "for lack of adequate ideology, her lights cannot be seen. I think," he adds, "it is too much modesty."[6]

Call it modesty, call it indifference, call it overconfidence; whatever it may be, I do not suggest that America stop lighting torches, for even though they may not last, they will always be useful in the dark. But America could also light a beacon, project a permanent beam steadily proclaiming what she stands for and informing the peoples of the world what it is they might gain from her leadership in the elevation of each human life.

Americans are almost organically averse to traditional ideology. This aversion may have been fitting to the early American, but how proper is it to the modern American—the American with a global commitment to leadership? Unless it is his desire to withdraw into isolation, he must collect his bundle of brilliant im-

[5] *Philippines Free Press,* April 11, 1966, p. 3.
[6] "Reflections on America." New York: Scribner, 1958, p. 118.

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provisations and distill from them an ideology relevant to the problems of this age and the lives of those millions who are touched by his commitment.

It is up to the Americans to draw the ideological possibilities out of their pragmatic experience, but an Asian is perhaps entitled to a few expressions of hope. He hopes that the beacon will show the way to a sustained social revolution that will lift men to a level where they may begin to enjoy the freedom and the privilege to be spontaneous. He also hopes this ideology will enable Americans to give better reasons than they have so far given for needed changes. Land must be redistributed because "it is the absolute right of the proletariat," says *Das Kapital;* "because of the social character of property," says *Quadragesimo Anno.* "Because without land reform American aid is wasted," says the American. Will Americans always limit themselves so?

Should we wonder that a man like President Senghor of Senegal, rejecting the scientific socialism of Marx, now turns not to Thomas Jefferson and "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," but to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and his humanistic, optimistic, Christ-centered synthesis of all races evolving irresistibly toward a transcendent God as the hope for *négritude,* for Africa and for mankind? If Africans now turn to Teilhard instead of Jefferson, it is not because the Jeffersonian declaration was not valid. Perhaps because it was so valid and so successful in America, the young and vibrant civilization that it engendered never bothered to review its relevance to the world.

An Englishman has said: "The trouble with Americans is that they want to be on top of the world and still expect to be loved. It simply can't be done, you know."

Is this true, or not? When America has shown the world how she can leap over her barriers of race, of creed, of poverty—not "case-to-case" but by the propulsion of ideas so universal, so understandable that they reach the hearts of all men—who knows? Americans may yet manage to be on top of the world and be loved. But that is not the important thing. Even without reward for the work of world leadership, there is enough return in the urgency and value of flinging in the teeth of those who would create an anonymous and faceless society the idea of a world of men endowed with individual dignity.

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V

The first false god to be toppled in the Asian revolution is paternalism. The family of young nations wants no more of the father image. Max Lerner has pointed out that in the days when American nationalism was taking shape, the Americans first had to slay the European father so that they could then without inhibition use the European heritage in their own drive to greatness. The Indians had to slay the British father to work out their own destiny through British constitutional traditions. The young Filipino entrepreneur must either slay the American father image or at least cut it down to brotherly size so that he can collaborate or compete on equal terms—using the techniques of the Harvard Business School. The Filipino leader must also slay the image so that he can lead his country without self-consciousness to its own version of American constitutional democracy, and negotiate treaties with America on the basis of mutual respect.

We are told we need not worry that the Americans will resist the slaying of an image which so ill befits them. A leader among equals, yes, but not a paternalist—not the American with his passion for brotherhood, his sporting blood that will preclude his taking advantage.

So let there be social revolution. Let it fight injustice, give hope. Let it produce wealth, but also close the gap between those who enjoy the wealth and those who do not. Let it not surrender to the simplistic idea that the only problem in Asia is productivity, "the enlarging of the pie," and that the exploitation of man by man will resolve itself with this enlargement. Let it persevere until the millions of Asia are released from the bonds of tradition, feudal tenancy and centralized power. Let America help to fire it, but do not make it an American revolution. Let it be so universal in meaning, so pregnant with hope for all races, that each nation will take it for its own.

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# NON-CRISIS IN ITALY

*By E. A. Bayne*

THE awesome floods of November aside, Italy in late 1966 was in a state of non-crisis. There has been enough political and economic instability in the past, however, to make us view this period of often frenetic progress toward industrialization and social unity as temporary. Fundamental social changes are in process. The business recession of 1964 seems a thing of the past. A government budget of $14.3 billion for 1967 has been prepared, including $1.4 billion for much-needed agricultural development during the next five years and another $600 million for the still depressed southern regions. After hesitant beginnings in February, the third coalition center-left government of the taciturn Christian Democratic premier, Aldo Moro, appears to be settling in with a minimum of open controversy for the period between now and the general elections in 1968. The strains among the basically mismated members of his cabinet are temporarily eased while the two major elements (Christian Democrats and Socialists) re-form for the campaign to win the adherence of more than 32,000,000 voters. In foreign policy, reflecting as it does the gentler phase of the cold war, no initiatives are likely. None the less, there is much for Italy's politicians to do.

The long-sought reunification of the Italian Socialist party and its junior Social Democratic partner, together holding the loyalties of about 20 percent of the electorate, had its serious beginnings in 1957 when the shock of the Hungarian revolution broke the Socialist-Communist "unity of action" pact. Reunion was finally sanctioned this past October when separate, simultaneous congresses approved a transitional charter covering ideological and organizational principles. Following the 1968 elections, the two parties will formally unite under a new constitution, the twenty-year rift will be healed, and Western Europe's second largest social democratic party will be reborn. Meanwhile, they will operate through a combined secretariat and central committee, with equal representation by each party. The decision not to merge totally until after the 1968 elections makes for cumbersome electioneering, and a fuzzy image, but it protects the minority position of the Social Democrats. It was they who requested the delay in the hope of making the wedding one of more equal partners.

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Even this much reunification has not been altogether welcomed by the Christian Democrats. A resurgent and unified Socialist party represents, at least theoretically, an alternative government that could break the twenty-year dominance of the Christian Democratic party. In 1948, there had been a genuine fear that a combination of the Communists and Socialists would provide Italy with a Marxist régime, but the efforts of the Vatican and the moral endorsement of the United States were perhaps conclusive in insuring that the government remained in the hands of the Christian Democrats, who, that once, won a slim majority. Two decades after that critical moment in Italian politics, the Communist party appears in retrospect to have been stalemated, its strength among the electorate hovering around 26 percent,[1] and presenting no more than a distant shadow of a threat as a governmental alternative. Moreover, the lack of Communist progress in these years has caused some attrition in the party's leadership. Defections of important members are increasingly frequent, and the concept of "democratic centralism" is being weakened by a lack of unified party policy.

On the other hand, while the anti-Communist forces have not been unified, certainly, the Church has remained a constantly concerned and effective grass-roots influence, and the *présence* of the United States continues to be indirectly effective through countless family ties resulting from Italian emigration to America, by America's increasingly significant industrial investment, by trade ties and by nuclear-equipped NATO forces. Socialists have charged that the Christian Democrats have at least passively encouraged the persistence of the static Communist strength as a domestic defense against a competitive socialist alternative. In any event, for many Italian political strategists the dangerous years of threatened Communist takeover have passed, and the appeal of a rigid Communist-Christian Democratic contest no longer serves.

The Communist party itself seems to be in a state of ambivalence. It has openly suggested closer ties with the Church itself, softening its traditional anti-clerical position for the sake, apparently, of a new reformist and national legitimacy in the eyes of the voters. Its once monolithic structure under the late

[1] Voter strength in Italy measured by the present parliament, elected in 1963, reveals the following proportions: Christian Democrats, 41.2 percent, Social Democrats, 4.9 percent; Socialists, 13.8 percent; Communists, 26 percent; Liberals, 6.1 percent; neo-Fascists, 4.6 percent; others, 3.2 percent. More than 95 percent of the electorate voted in that election.

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veteran leader, Palmiro Togliatti, who died in 1964, has been badly strained by a lack of accepted leadership under his successor, Luigi Longo. For example, while the central committee remains committed in its long-term loyalty to Russia, many of the party's intellectuals complained that Moscow's rivalry with Peking led it to abandon Communist universalism. Perhaps, too, some of the radicalism of early postwar Communism has moderated as a result of the prosperity which many of the party functionaries have enjoyed, undergoing the process of *imborghesimento* themselves. In 1966, 67 (out of 306) middle-sized communes have ousted their Communist mayors.

However, the continued effectiveness of Communist organization in Italy should not be denied. The party's durability is based upon its vigilant efficiency as a political machine which still controls the largest of the country's three labor federations, and much of the prospering coöperative movement. To many voters it seems to offer the only potentially successful alternative to a Church-influenced Christian Democratic government that contains a not inconsiderable proportion of reactionary elements. Nevertheless, the relatively unchanged strength of the Communist party in recent elections, and its lack of a clear political profile in an era of coexistence, suggest that it may have become virtually *hors de combat*; thus its supporters offer a more promising target for conversion than ever before.

Since the Socialists' determination to reunite became more or less clear a year ago, neither the Communists nor the Christian Democrats have been helpful to the progress of reunion. Socialist spokesmen in parliament have found themselves embarrassed by decisions that strained their commitment to unity—such as the government's unenthusiastic support of the American role in Viet Nam. The Italian press is heavily dominated by rightist influences and has not encouraged the public to take the Socialist manœuvre seriously. Major newspapers have repeatedly pointed out the historic alliance of the Italian Socialist party with the Communist party until 1957, asking whether the Socialists are really anti-Communist even now. The question is an obvious one for the government party to use polemically.

In the years since World War II, the unifying banner of the governing Christian Democratic party has been anti-Communism. This standard was enough to enfold the party's divergent factions, ranging from a progressively oriented element

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on the left to a once-fascist minority of extreme rightists. Any attempt to point the party definitively to either extreme would be likely to cause a split which its broad confessional ties to the Church might not be able to heal. Only the most skillful politicking averted such a threat when a narrow majority of center and left factions decided in 1963 to form a coalition with the Socialists in the "opening to the left," as it was called—a move which the Johannine liberal approach of the Church seemed to sanction. Internal party debates do not reveal any greater unity of the party as a result, and at least one Christian Democratic leader has publicly recognized recently that delays in the enactment and furthering of the reform program worked out with the Socialists—delays caused by rightist Christian Democrats to embarrass their Socialist partners—might force the more liberal elements to quit in disgust, leaving the Christian Democrats an essentially rightist party. This is a risk greater than the fate of one party. Few have forgotten the disastrous years of Mussolini's dictatorship when the fascist strength was drawn from reactionary elements of the suppressed Christian Populists, as well as from other conservative parties.

As for the Socialist parties, while enduring their Janus-like partnership in government, they have been forced to face some tactical alternatives. However uncomfortable their position, their departure from the government would be worse. It would force the Christian Democrats, lacking a majority, to seek a coalition with the rightist parties represented by the Liberals, Monarchists and Fascists. Reformist programs would be jettisoned and, without crying havoc, the democratic development of Italy might be jeopardized. Political polarity would again become extreme. The Communist party would be greatly encouraged and would come back into play as a potential alternative government. Meanwhile, the Socialist regrouping hesitates publicly to offer any new ideology or program. Instead, it has been satisfied to endorse the measures necessary to achieve an agreed reform program. Any effort to give itself individual identity could create irreconcilable differences with the Christian Democrats and the coalition would fall. Said one Socialist leader: "For the moment, our ideological position is like defending the old home against fire and storm, even though you know you will move into a new house next month."

If the combined party is to compete effectively with the now

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aging dogma of the Christian Democrats, its platform must be reasonable and pragmatic. Certain basic aspects of its program are already clear. A preliminary draft charter defines Marxism as "the fundamental theoretical experience of modern socialism to be constantly reinterpreted and reëlaborated in relation to existing historical conditions, instead of being professed as a rigid dogma." The new party's immediate association with the Socialist International, with which only the Social Democrats have maintained contact since 1949, provides certain obligations as well as offering the benefits of international support. It would appear to commit the party to social democracy as it has mutated in Europe, becoming virtually a "New Dealism" that emphasizes the government role in public welfare but does not deny the function of democratically monitored capitalism or, indeed, the persistence of economic inequalities.

The Italian Socialists' long ambivalence toward European cooperation will be clarified by these new associations—even including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which they have long viewed as provocative rather than peacemaking. They are likely to come into closer contact with German Social Democrats, for example, whose leader, Willy Brandt, once remarked to the writer that "Marxism brought up to date is no longer Marxism." A warmer endorsement of most European institutions generally can be expected, but with the obvious intent that the future management of Europe will fall to the Socialists and not to the Catholic parties.

II

In the political events of the last year in Italy, the Church has been more a silent influence than a participant, but the memory of Pope John XXIII is a significant factor. The papacy's long tradition of intervention in Italian political life takes a more shadowy and subtle form today—for both good and ill. It worked negatively, for example, in the refusal of the Christian Democratic party leadership last September to entertain a Socialist-supported bill that would make divorce possible in Italy, where as many as five million Italians live conjugally out of wedlock. And it has worked positively in the area of foreign policy, a circumstance which has a more complex explanation.

Since the sixteenth century and the era of the Counter-Reformation, the papacy has been predominantly an Italian institu-

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tion. In matters of faith as in international relations, Italian prelates guided the Church, the guardian of a Christendom so exalted after the Gregorian reforms of the eleventh century that "all princes shall kiss the Pope's foot," as a contemporary protocol stated.

However, as nineteenth-century nationalism developed and bourgeois Italians sought to enjoy newly discovered freedoms and reforms, the papacy seemed willing to accept, if reluctantly, selected new social concepts. In the Papal States themselves, the constitution of 1848 providing for a bicameral legislature permitted a modest democratic approach to internal administration and taxation. Civil absolutism was moderated, but in foreign policy this limited liberality was restricted by a definitive article which stated that "all discussions concerning the diplomatico-ecclesiastical relations of the Holy See are forbidden to both Councils." The reservation of responsibility to the popes for foreign relations still operates, at least in setting the limits which an Italian government, led by a Catholic party, may follow.

By 1944, the Fascist era over, the Church was ready openly to endorse the reconstitution of the Christian Democratic party, but it was also confronted by the public rejection (if narrow) of a monarchy that had provided a national symbol of unity. The focus of a national mystique in the House of Savoy was obliterated, and a spiritual vacuum existed which the new institution of the presidency could not readily fill. This enhanced the role of the Church, whose continuity was untouched; even the Communists voted to include the Lateran Pact in the new republican constitution, which involved the Church inferentially and practically in Italian life. Moreover, in a world divided between the "atheism of Marxism" and the pluralistic Christianity of the West, the Church held a chalice of freedom and at the same time, by its presence and by its agent, the Christian Democratic party, it overshadowed Italian foreign policy. It would have been inconceivable for the government of Italy to deviate significantly from Vatican policy.

The accession of Pope John XXIII in 1958 created a marked change. This remarkable man attempted to reduce much of the Church's direct intervention in the Italian scene, but at the same time deeply affected Italian foreign policy and the structure of internal politics. His solicitude for the brotherhood of man (in contrast to the bitter anti-Communism of his predecessor) led

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him to give papal sanction to the necessity of peaceful coexistence in a world of ultimate weapons. The Church seemed to have successfully passed its own "missile crisis." Moreover, the second Vatican Council not only urged a more democratic modernization of the Church but also appeared to give approval to national solutions for social problems. It sounded a further note of political tolerance. "All men are equal in their natural dignity," Pope John wrote in *Pacem in Terris;* thus "All political communities are of equal national dignity . . ."

The effect in Italy was to make the gulf between the left and the center less distinct, and to make possible the "opening to the left." It also made acceptance of American leadership less obvious. Gaullism may also have had a marginal effect in encouraging greater independence of the United States, combined with an awareness that absolute adherence to one camp was no longer necessary or useful. A result has been a series of warmer diplomatic contacts with Eastern Europe and a conviction that Italian membership in Western institutions does not prohibit unilateral if cautious efforts to relax tensions with the East.

Still, though Italy achieved secular independence more than a hundred years ago, it has not been altogether liberated from the influence of the Vatican. The state tends rather to operate within the ideal theory of a Christian democracy, free to act so long as its choices fit a Catholic ethic as defined by the Church. No other polity in the Western World operates with both left and right political currents (and with the many gradations of each that a proportional representational system of voting encourages) *and* so intimately with the heart of the Church.

## III

This change in the Vatican's world outlook has come at a time when Italy's economic expansion has opened new prospects for the good life for a majority of citizens. Radical changes in ways of life have already been accomplished for many. Nine million students entered school this autumn, compared to 4.7 million in 1950. Old ways, old laws, traditional views of societal taboos on sex, marriage and the family are now openly debated. The result is a still inchoate but persistent political pressure for reform, often involving radical change, though not the revolution Communists sentimentally demand nor the utopia Socialists once dreamed possible. Italy is already busy with development.

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There is an abundance of growth statistics this year. Steel production has reached a record of 14,000,000 tons. Tourism is up nearly 15 percent over last year; some 25,000,000 visitors have spent about $1.5 billion, boosting Italy's total foreign exchange reserves to more than $5 billion, and bringing with it a $500 million surplus in the 1966 balance of payments. Traffic congestion in Italian cities attests to the 10 percent increase in new automobile registrations in 1965 and the 12 percent increment expected in 1966, making a total of more than 12,000,000 vehicles in a population of 51,000,000. The number of telephones has doubled in the last seven years, and nearly 900,000 television sets will be sold in 1966, reaching a total of 7,000,000, or one for every eight people. An increase in national income of 4.5 percent in real terms is reliably forecast for 1966, and will result in a per capita income of more than $1,000 although individual incomes in the south and the islands regrettably remain at about a third of the national average.

Italy's birth rate is down to 18.3 per thousand, lower than that of the United States, and emigration is high. The loss of exported skills is partially recompensed by remittances which totaled more than $675,000,000 in 1965. Compared to a decade ago, unemployment in the country is at a relatively modest level of about 5 percent, but the labor market has remained highly concentrated. Even though Italy now has a total of almost 1.1 million artisan workshops and small industries, 0.7 percent of all enterprises employ 51 percent of all workers. Inevitably with industrialization, urbanization continues. More than 8,000,000 Italians have moved from the rural south to the industrialized north in the past decade. Whereas in 1901 only 14 percent of the Italian population lived in cities of 50,000 population or more, in 1966 the proportion approached 35 percent and nearly 60 percent of the population live in centers of more than 10,000 people. One result, however, has been that, out of 1.6 million farm families, only 41.5 percent have any male member under 50 years of age.

Italy's raw materials are, of course, largely imported and the economy is heavily dependent upon exports; more than a seventh of the national income is derived from foreign trade. Exports have risen nearly 20 percent annually for the past two years, and are expected to reach nearly that rate of increase in 1966. More than a third of Italy's trade is with the Common Market, and another fifth with the rest of Europe. Italy has clearly benefited

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from its association with the new institutions of Western Europe. As the lagging member of the Community, it is, for example, the recipient of 63 percent of the loans made by the European Investment Bank, amounting to nearly $400 million.

IV

It is a commonplace to observe the theatrical quality of Italian public affairs. The *classe dirigente* sometimes seem like professional actors performing before the general population and viewed by it remotely, without a sense of participation. It suggests the persistence of an Italian feeling that democracy is still unproven, despite an astonishingly high vote by the electorate. The voter seems part of an audience momentarily involved on election day in passing judgment but never playing a central role.

In a study made public in 1963, only 28 percent of a nationwide sample of Italians felt that the individual citizen was effective in the making of national policy.[2] In another detailed study made in 1962 to measure European sentiment in countries of the E.E.C., Italians ranked lowest of the respondents in the six countries both in knowledge of national or European issues and in the citizens' involvement with them.[3] Only 23 percent volunteered any indication of an awareness of the Common Market. On questions of national concern, the largest number (20 percent) felt that individual well-being was the most critical issue confronting Italy and 42 percent gave no response at all on national issues. Indeed, 67 percent indicated that they had little or no interest in political matters.

This alienation from political participation has been called "amoral familism"—the tendency toward a civic attitude that sharply limits the interest of the citizen to what is of direct concern to his immediate family. In any event, the result is that Italian public policy becomes less the direct expression of the electorate than it is the independent creation of a political class. Few are the decision-makers, but these few are subject to the necessity for a working equilibrium within an intricate political system. The structure is multi-party, and the fragmentation of the parties themselves into still smaller cliques seems to inhibit individual political leadership. It necessitates a sharing of party

[2] Reported in "The Civic Culture, Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations: an Analytic Study," by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965.

[3] "L'Opinion Publique et l'Europe des Six," conducted by l'Institut Français d'Opinion Publique for Gallup International (Paris: 1962).

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power for the purpose of achieving an equilibrium. For the Christian Democrats, the range of political coloring is sufficiently wide to make a workable synthesis of ideology almost impossible to develop, with the result that only the negative dogma of anti-Communism and the naked fact of continuing political responsibility remain visible. In this may lie an answer to the frequently asked question why Italy has not produced another leader with the stature of Alcide De Gasperi, for example, who led the country with distinction during the difficult years immediately following World War II. Or another: why Italy, for all its economic success in these past two decades has not provided more notable political leadership in the formation of a Europe which both the Church and a majority vote of the parties have now endorsed.[4]

Italy is the archetype of the Catholic society, and the first of its kind to adventure into industrialization. The value system it inherits tends to encourage that Italian individualism so often prized in literature, but rarely by the public administrator or the organizer of a coöperative. Italy is one of the newest countries of Europe in the modern sense of nationhood. It has enjoyed popular democracy in full measure only since 1948. The development of national confidence in a participant democracy is not easily achieved following centuries of alien rule. Moreover, the nation suffers from the continuing acceptance of class rigidity and an over-cautious approach to the open society. Nevertheless, there are evidences of social change that accompany the industrialization process, and from these, perhaps, a new Italy will emerge.

[4] De Gasperi's personal strength seems to have been drawn not only from his great political ability and his impeccable anti-Fascist record, but also from the fact that he was the leader supported both by the Church and by the United States, at a time when America was a prominent activist in Italian politics.

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# RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*By Henry L. Roberts*

*with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Howard Linton, Asia; Richard H. Nolte, Middle East, North Africa; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.*

## *General: Political and Legal*

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By Robert Blum. Edited by A. Doak Barnett. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 287 p. $6.50.

This volume in a series sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations was in rough draft at the time of Mr. Blum's untimely death. Completed and edited by Mr. Barnett, it is a serious effort to analyze Sino-American relations and find new approaches and initiatives in U.S. policy toward China, a matter of vital importance in the world today.

THE ATLANTIC IDEA AND ITS EUROPEAN RIVALS. By Harold Van B. Cleveland. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 186 p. $5.95.

The director of the Council on Foreign Relations' Atlantic Policy Studies has written a concise but comprehensive analysis of the salient problems of American relations with Europe. He shows what has changed since the alliance was founded in the years just after the war—in nuclear strategy, European integration and transatlantic economic relations. Drawing the implications of these developments for American policy, the book focuses sharply on today's problems and those ahead.

THE DYNAMICS OF MODERNIZATION: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE HISTORY. By C. E. Black. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 207 p. $5.95.

In this extended essay a Princeton historian develops his theme that the problem of modernization provides the best key to an understanding of the crises and turbulences of recent history. A publication of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

THREE WORLDS OF DEVELOPMENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL STRATIFICATION. By Irving Louis Horowitz. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, 475 p. $8.50.

A sociologist examines the characteristics and interaction of "three worlds of development"—the U.S. and its Western allies, the U.S.S.R. and its Eastern bloc allies and the Third World of Latin America, Asia and Africa.

SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD. By Barrington Moore, Jr. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, 559 p. $10.00.

In this important work a Harvard sociologist examines the roles played by land-

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owners and peasants in the transformation from agrarian to industrial societies, and the role of these groups in the processes making for democracy or dictatorship.

HISTOIRE DE LA GUERRE FROIDE. I: DE LA RÉVOLUTION D'OCTOBRE À LA GUERRE DE CORÉE 1917–1950. By André Fontaine. Paris: Fayard, 1966, 501 p. Fr. 24.

In this first volume the foreign editor and diplomatic correspondent of *Le Monde* reviews the history of the cold war (the origins of which he pushes back to the Russian October revolution) up to the Korean invasion.

BLUEPRINT FOR PEACE. Edited by Richard N. Gardner. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966, 404 p. $7.95.

A volume drawn from the reports and proposals presented at the White House Conference on International Coöperation, November 29–December 1, 1965. The topics range over a vast number of subjects from the arms race to the population explosion and questions of international finance.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE OBSERVATION: A HISTORY AND FORECAST. By David W. Wainhouse and Associates. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (in coöperation with the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research), 1966, 663 p. $10.00.

A solid study of the past experience and the possible future role of "peace observation," including ascertaining the facts, calling for a cease-fire and the like. A large part of the book comprises case studies since the 1920s.

A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM. By David Mitrany. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966, 221 p. $5.95.

Essays by a long-standing advocate of the "functional" approach to international organization and peace.

ANNIHILATION AND UTOPIA: THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By Errol E. Harris. New York: Humanities Press, 1966, 331 p. $7.50.

An effort, as the title suggests, to put forward some new principles of international politics under the threat of nuclear holocaust. The author points to world government as the only way out.

NORTH ATLANTIC ARENA. By Charles C. Colby. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1966, 253 p. $7.50.

A wide-ranging historical and geographical study of water transport, including the development of inland waterways, from the Mediterranean to North America.

FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. By Peter Hay. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966, 335 p. $7.50.

Essays on the role of supranational organizations, especially the European communities, in international law and in the legal structure of their constituents.

MODERN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE. By Arthur Lall. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 404 p. $8.95.

A substantial inquiry into the increasingly complex patterns and modes of international negotiation in recent years. For a number of years the author was India's Ambassador to the U.N.

HAMMARSKJÖLD. By Emery Kelen. New York: Putnam, 1966, 316 p. $5.95.

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A not very satisfactory and rather journalistic account by a former director and producer of television at the U.N.

AGENTS OF DECEIT: FRAUDS, FORGERIES AND POLITICAL INTRIGUE AMONG NATIONS. By Paul W. Blackstock. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966, 315 p. $6.50.

A discussion, by example, of frauds and fake documents in the underworld of international affairs; many of the items relate to Russia and Communism.

## *General: Military, Technical and Scientific*

ESCALATION AND THE NUCLEAR OPTION. By Bernard Brodie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 151 p. $4.50.

A knowledgeable writer on contemporary strategic issues presents his views on the problem of escalation and the use of tactical nuclear weapons, which he feels should be retained as one of the American options.

ON THE USES OF MILITARY POWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By Klaus Knorr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 185 p. $5.00.

An essay examining "trends discernible in the nature of military conflict, in political attitudes toward war as a method for settling disputes, and hence trends affecting the place of military power in international relations."

THE UNITED STATES IN A DISARMED WORLD. By Arnold Wolfers and Others. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, 236 p. $8.50 (Paper, $2.25).

Essays by a number of hands dealing with some of the problems and implications of a situation of general and complete disarmament. Prepared at the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

CONTAINING THE ARMS RACE. By Jeremy J. Stone. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966, 252 p. $6.95.

The author concentrates here on two relatively specific but much debated issues: the freeze of strategic delivery systems, and a U.S.-Soviet agreement not to deploy missile defense systems.

HITLERS STRATEGIE: POLITIK UND KRIEGFÜHRUNG 1940–1941. By Andreas Hillgruber. Frankfurt/Main: Bernard und Graefe, 1965, 715 p. DM. 78.

A massive, heavily documented volume on Hitler's strategy and policies in the critical year between the fall of France and the attack on the U.S.S.R. A major contribution, but not bedside reading.

THE SECRET SURRENDER. By Allen Dulles. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 268 p. $5.95.

An absorbing account, by the guiding participant, of the secret negotiations, via the O.S.S., for the surrender of the German forces in Italy. Of interest, too, in casting light on one of the early occasions for Soviet-Western friction as the war approached its end.

THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE END OF WORLD WAR II. By Herbert Feis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 213 p. $5.00.

Using new information, the author rewrites much of his "Japan Subdued," published in 1961 in a series of works on diplomacy in World War II. His authoritative discussion gains new value in light of today's discussions on the use of atomic weapons.

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1940. By Laurence Thompson. New York: Morrow, 1966, 256 p. $5.95.

Although the story has been told often, this is an absorbing account by a British journalist of the critical year 1940 in Great Britain.

BATTLES LOST AND WON. By Hanson W. Baldwin. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 532 p. $10.00.

An appraisal and evaluation, by the military editor of *The New York Times*, of eleven crucial battles—land, sea and air—of the Second World War.

THE ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON *AFFAIRE* OF 1941. By Douglas G. Anglin. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966, 219 p. $6.00.

A monograph on the diplomatic repercussions of the Free French seizure of St. Pierre and Miquelon in December 1941.

WORLD WAR 1939–45. By Brigadier Peter Young. New York: Crowell, 1966, 447 p. $6.95.

A concise but exceedingly well done history of the war in all its theaters. Probably the best short history now available.

LUDENDORFF: GENIUS OF WORLD WAR I. By D. J. Goodspeed. Boston: Houghton, 1966, 335 p. $6.00.

A Canadian officer and military historian appraises the outstanding German general of the First World War. While regarding him as a brilliant tactician and "one of the very greatest military organizers of all time," the author feels he was "completely unequipped . . . to cope with political problems"—a disaster for Germany and the world.

THE SKY ON FIRE: THE FIRST BATTLE OF BRITAIN 1917–1918 AND THE BIRTH OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE. By Major Raymond H. Fredette. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966, 289 p. $6.50.

A most interesting account of the little-known story of the German air raids—mostly by Gothas or Giants—during the last two years of the First World War.

## *General: Economic and Social*

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AID. By Wolfgang G. Friedmann, George Kalmanoff and Robert F. Meagher. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 498 p. $13.75.

The authors, who conducted a Columbia University Law School study of the giving and receiving of aid, give the gist of reports on the experience of individual countries along with a discussion of programs and analysis of key policy issues.

MAINTAINING AND RESTORING BALANCE IN INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS. By William Fellner, Fritz Machlup, Robert Triffin and Eleven Others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 259 p. $6.50.

These comprehensive papers prepared for discussions with officials and central bankers working on international monetary adjustments are an example of a valuable interplay between academic and governmental work on a tough subject.

INTERNATIONAL AID: A DISCUSSION OF THE FLOW OF PUBLIC RESOURCES FROM RICH TO POOR COUNTRIES. By I. M. D. Little and J. M. Clifford. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966. 302 p. $7.50.

Comprehensive, balanced and commonsensical, this useful book supports the view that sound economics is apt to be good politics. (The English edition of 1965 has two additional chapters about British aid.)

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COMMON MARKET AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By S. G. Triantis. Athens: Center of Planning and Economic Research, 1965, 232 p.

A professor at the University of Toronto, working with a Greek research organization, stresses the disadvantages of an underdeveloped country in a single market area and concludes that association with the European Common Market will hurt the Greek economy.

FUNCTIONALISM AND WORLD POLITICS: A STUDY BASED ON UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMS FINANCING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By James Patrick Sewell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 359 p. $6.50.

The core of this book is a good history of development activities in the U.N., the World Bank and its affiliates. The author, however, is chiefly interested in appraising the view that international coöperation on limited tasks is likely to follow a certain course and produce particular kinds of results.

INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE. By Joe S. Bain. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, 209 p. $5.00 (Paper, $1.45).

Plants and companies in Canada, France, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States are compared as to size and degrees of concentration. Inadequacies and discrepancies in data limit the results and force the author to give a good bit of attention to method. A pioneering effort.

TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME BY UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES. By R. Palmer Baker, Jr. and Others. Princeton: Tax Institute of America, 1966, 340 p. $12.50.

Papers and discussion about what the United States and other countries do and what they are trying to do, mostly by officials and lawyers.

COMMUNIST TRADE WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 1955–65. By Carole A. Sawyer. New York: Praeger, 1966, 126 p. $10.00.

A useful study that gives all the statistics but goes beyond them to interpret what has and has not happened in a segment of trade where appraisals are more likely to be politically distorted than rationally balanced.

EAST-WEST TRADE. Edited by Philip E. Uren. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966, 181 p. $3.00 (Paper, $2.00).

A symposium in which Canadians (and a few Americans) discuss economic, strategic and legal aspects of trade with the Communist countries and examine the prospects for its expansion.

DIE STRATEGISCHE BEDEUTUNG DES OST-WEST-HANDELS IM RAHMEN DER WELTPOLITISCHEN AUSEINANDERSETZUNG. By Michael von Berg. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1966, 205 p. Gldrs. 17.

A summary of Communist ideas about foreign trade and some useful statistics are the strong points of a book that is otherwise spotty and fails to live up to the promise of the title.

## *The United States*

AMERICA IN THE MARKET PLACE: TRADE, TARIFFS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. By Paul H. Douglas. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966, 381 p. $7.95.

To be an economist and a Senator is rare; to write well in addition is a real distinction. The professor is more apparent than the politician in this book's clear

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exposition of the history and economics of American involvement in international trade, aid and finance.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF POWER: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. By Harlan Cleveland. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 168 p. $4.50.

The U.S. Ambassador to NATO offers an informal and perhaps overly sanguine essay on the goals and requirements of American foreign policy. The central theme is suggested by the title.

POLITICS, STRATEGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: STUDIES IN FOREIGN POLICY, 1873–1917. By John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, 352 p. $7.50.

An examination of eleven episodes in U.S. diplomacy, from the foundation of a modern American Navy to 1917.

NEITHER LIBERTY NOR SAFETY: A HARD LOOK AT U.S. MILITARY POLICY AND STRATEGY. By General Nathan F. Twining. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. 320 p. $5.95.

The tone and direction of this book by the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is indicated by the title and subtitle—a great deal of criticism and some highly debatable positive proposals.

POSTWAR DEFENSE POLICY AND THE U.S. NAVY, 1943–1946. By Vincent Davis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966, 371 p. $7.50.

A study of the Navy's efforts, from midway in the Second World War, to plan and prepare for its postwar role.

STRATEGIC DEFENSES. By Stanley L. Englebardt. New York: Crowell, 1966, 168 p. $4.95.

A brief survey of the U.S. strategic defense systems, emphasizing the communications networks.

THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM. By Robert L. Heilbroner. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 148 p. $4.95.

A provocative essay suggesting that in spite of business's adaptability and general acceptance in American society, it may not be able to broaden its ideology enough to assert control over the application of science to society's problems.

UNITED STATES MERCHANT SHIPPING POLICIES AND POLITICS. By Samuel A. Lawrence. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1966, 405 p. $8.75.

This study of what the foreword calls "a small industry that has played a disproportionately large role in national and international affairs" is the fullest discussion for some years of a generally neglected subject. A good bit of history is provided as background for a thoroughgoing analysis of the unsatisfactory situation in which both industry and national policy find themselves.

EXPANDING LIBERTIES: FREEDOM'S GAINS IN POSTWAR AMERICA. By Milton R. Konvitz. New York: Viking, 1966, 429 p. $8.95.

A study emphasizing the new freedoms that have emerged in the last 20 years, though the author is by no means unaware of the remaining deprivations. The discussion centers on First Amendment rights, civil rights and the international protection of human rights.

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AMERICA'S POLITICAL DYNASTIES: FROM ADAMS TO KENNEDY. By Stephen Hess. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966. 736 p. $7.95.

In the author's words, this is an effort "to bring together for the first time the panorama of American political dynasties from colonial days to the present; to investigate their roles in shaping the nation; and to recount the lives of some two hundred often engaging, usually ambitious, sometimes brilliant, occasionally unscrupulous individuals."

WITH KENNEDY. By Pierre Salinger. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966, 391 p. $5.95.

These memoirs of the Kennedy Administration, by the late President's press secretary, while lacking the weight and breadth of some of the other recent works by Kennedy's associates, do provide useful insights together with a good deal of dispensable minutiae.

THE THINGS THAT ARE CAESAR'S. By Milton Katz. New York: Knopf, 1966. 227 p. $4.95.

This study takes off from the author's topic sentences: "It takes qualities of one kind to face an electorate and win elective office in the United States today. It takes qualities of another kind to govern." In discussing this disparity Mr. Katz ranges widely from Sulla and Caesar to the American Founding Fathers.

THE NATIONAL ELECTION OF 1964. Edited by Milton C. Cummings, Jr. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1966, 295 p. $5.00.

A collection of studies on various aspects of the 1964 election—the conventions, the campaigns, the role of mass media, finances, etc.

KENNEDY CAMPAIGNING. By Murray B. Levin. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, 313 p. $5.95.

A study of the Kennedy system of campaigning and more particularly its use by Edward Kennedy in the 1962 Senatorial campaign.

THE PARTY THAT LOST ITS HEAD. By George F. Gilder and Bruce K. Chapman. New York: Knopf, 1966, 331 p. $6.95.

As the reader might suspect, reference is to the Republican Party. Two young members discuss ills and schisms of the G.O.P. and make a number of proposals for reform. Among other things, "Needed: An Ideology."

THE JOHNSON ECLIPSE: A PRESIDENT'S VICE PRESIDENCY. By Leonard Baker. New York: Macmillan, 1966. 280 p. $5.95.

An account of Lyndon Johnson's rather shadowy and overshadowed role as Vice President in the Kennedy Administration.

THE JOURNALS OF DAVID E. LILIENTHAL. VOLUME III: VENTURESOME YEARS, 1950–1955. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 647 p. $11.95.

In this third volume of his journals Mr. Lilienthal moves from the stage of public affairs to the world of business. While somewhat less in the center of things, Mr. Lilienthal has much of interest to record on public matters and on his own readjustments during the early 1950s.

THE COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY IN WASHINGTON. By Earl Latham. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, 446 p. $7.95.

This book, one of the studies on Communism in America originally sponsored by the Fund for the Republic, deals with the bitter and in many respects traumatic

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controversy over Communism in and out of government that raged from the latter years of the New Deal to the flowering of McCarthy.

THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON. VOLUME I: 1856–1880. EDITED BY ARTHUR S. LINK. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 715 p. $15.00.

The first volume of a comprehensive edition of the letters and papers of Woodrow Wilson.

LETTERS ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: FROM THE FILES OF RAYMOND B. FOSDICK. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, 171 p. $4.50.

A valuable supplementary volume to "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson," containing letters from and to Raymond B. Fosdick, chiefly in 1919 and 1920, relating to the establishment of the League of Nations and the question of American participation.

NEWTON D. BAKER AND THE AMERICAN WAR EFFORT, 1917–1919. BY DANIEL R. BEAVER. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966, 273 p. $6.50.

While this excellent and interesting book centers on the person and activities of Wilson's Secretary of War, it also has much to say about other leading actors in 1917–1918, such as Generals Pershing and Bliss. A well-balanced and valuable contribution.

THE TECHNICAL ELITE. BY JAY M. GOULD. New York: Kelley, 1966, 178 p. $5.00.

A study of the élite status being achieved by American scientists and engineers and some of the implications for our society.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES. EDITED BY FRANK H. GOLAY. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall (for the American Assembly), 1966, 179 p. $3.95 (Paper, $1.95).

Papers, originally designed as background reading for the American Assembly, on various facets of U.S.-Philippine relations, past and present.

## *The Western Hemisphere*

A CHOICE FOR CANADA: INDEPENDENCE OR COLONIAL STATUS. BY WALTER L. GORDON. Toronto: McClelland, 1966, 125 p. $1.95.

As he showed when he was Finance Minister, Mr. Gordon is much concerned about Canada's economic dependence on the United States and the extent to which American firms own substantial slices of Canadian mining and industry.

THE CANADIAN DOLLAR, 1948–1962. BY PAUL WONNACOTT. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, 339 p. $7.50.

An earlier book on Canada's experience with flexible exchange rates ("The Canadian Dollar, 1948–1958") is reproduced here with an additional hundred pages on what happened after the country returned to a fixed rate in 1958, plus a discussion of the key issues of the present and future.

THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM. BY GORDON CONNELL-SMITH. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1966, 376 p. $8.75.

A cogent and valuable study of the hemispheric system—its origins, development and present crisis—supported by a selected bibliography. The author contends that the United States fostered Pan Americanism primarily to gain Latin American

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support for its own policy of limiting extra-continental influence in the Western Hemisphere.

AUJOURD'HUI, L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE. By Marc Blancpain. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1966, 309 p. Fr. 22.

Superficial reflections on contemporary Latin America. The author sees the hemisphere's future in terms of de Gaulle, the Mexican Revolution, Paulista industrialization and Chile's Christian Democracy—although not necessarily in that order.

CASTRISME, COMMUNISME, DÉMOCRATIE CHRÉTIENNE EN AMÉRIQUE LATINE. By Albert Samuel. Lyons: Chronique Sociale de France, 1965, 209 p. Fr. 13.50.

In this evaluation of Latin America's contemporary problems, the author focuses upon the impact of Castroism and the developing Christian Democratic movement.

MEXICAN MARXIST: VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO. By Robert Paul Millon. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966, 222 p. $6.00.

Based on his numerous writings and personal interviews, this is a clearly stated and valuable exposition of Vicente Lombardo Toledano's thought. The author's frankly sympathetic bias prevents a critical analysis of the Socialist leader's important role in Mexico's contemporary development but leads to interesting if contradictory conclusions.

THE MEXICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. By L. Vincent Padgett. Boston: Houghton, 1966, 244 p. $2.75 (Paper).

Part of a series dealing with government, this primer adequately examines the nature and the power structure of the Mexican system.

INTERÊSSE NACIONAL E POLÍTICA EXTERNA. By José Honório Rodrigues. Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1966, 232 p.

A respected Brazilian historian examines the economic and political forces which have shaped contemporary Brazil. He condemns the Castelo-Branco military coup of April 1964, asserts that Brazil has returned to an unrealistic foreign policy dominated by the United States and calls for the restoration of an independent foreign policy, along the lines established by Jânio Quadros.

CHILE: YESTERDAY AND TODAY. By K. H. Silvert. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, 218 p. $1.96 (Paper).

An informative introduction to problems of Chile's national development.

TROUBLE IN GUYANA. By Peter Simms. London: Allen and Unwin, 1966, 198 p. (New York: International Publications Service, $7.50.)

A thoughtful though abbreviated examination of political developments leading to British Guiana's independence. The author ascribes the declining fortunes of the People's Progressive Party to Dr. Cheddi Jagan's inability to frame a formerly viable political movement in national rather than sectarian terms.

## *Western Europe*

EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN THE SIXTIES: FROM THE VETO TO THE CRISIS. By Miriam Camps. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 273 p. $7.50.

A leading authority on Britain's relation to the Common Market discusses the implications for European integration of de Gaulle's veto on British entry and of the Community's 1965 crisis. She is gloomy about the short-run prospects for

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British membership or for significant steps toward closer integration but finds reason for more optimism in the long run. The book is in the Council on Foreign Relations' Atlantic Policy Studies.

DIE PROBLEMATIK DER VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHEN BEHANDLUNG EXTREMISTISCHER PARTEIEN IN DEN WESTEUROPÄISCHEN VERFASSUNGSSTAATEN. By Erich Edwin Brunner. Zurich: Schulthess, 1965, 324 p. Swiss Fr. 26.

A comparative study of the handling of extremist parties in selected Western European constitutional states—the Federal Republic, Austria, France and Switzerland.

WINDS OF CHANGE, 1914–1939. By Harold Macmillan. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 584 p. $10.00.

This first volume of the former Prime Minister's chiefly political memoirs covering the years 1914–1939 is lucidly written, informative on British history of the period, but leaves the personality of the author somewhat enigmatic.

SPEAKING EUROPEAN: THE ANGLO-CONTINENTAL CLEAVAGE. By W. Horsfall Carter. New York: Humanities Press, 1966, 223 p. $5.50.

As the author says, this is "an analysis and assessment of the Channel Gap . . . the gulf between English and Continental thought-processes." He advises the English to speak European and pay more heed to de Gaulle.

AN ARMY FOR THE SIXTIES: A STUDY IN NATIONAL POLICY, CONTRACT AND OBLIGATION. By Anthony Verrier. London: Secker and Warburg, 1966. 288 p. 42/.

A contribution to the ongoing debate about the role to be played by the British Army in the contemporary world, with some proposed reforms and an appraisal of the commitments it should attempt to undertake.

THE GROWTH OF THE BRITISH PARTY SYSTEM. By Ivor Bulmer-Thomas. New York: Humanities Press, 1966, 2 v. $16.50.

An industrious but only fairly satisfactory attempt to trace the long history of the British party system from 1640 to the present. The second volume deals with the years since 1924.

BACK STREET NEW WORLDS. By Elspeth Huxley. New York: Morrow, 1965, 190 p. $4.00.

A review of the status and welfare of the various minorities from all over the world who have settled in Great Britain.

A DECADE OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 1955–1964. Edited by W. B. Hamilton and Others. Durham: Duke University Press (for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1966, 567 p. $12.50.

A symposium on the challenges and changes confronting the Commonwealth since 1955, in the creation of new states, in intra-Commonwealth relations and in the international field.

THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND: PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC SERVICES 1921–1964. By R. J. Lawrence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, 198 p. $5.60.

An inquiry into the system known as "parliamentary devolution," a process that has given Northern Ireland a unique status in the Commonwealth.

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ISLAND, VON DER WIKINGERZEIT BIS ZUR GEGENWART. By Haye W. Hansen. Frankfurt/Main: Cate, 1965, 244 p. DM. 10.80.

A brief but informative history and survey of Iceland.

QUISLING: PROPHET WITHOUT HONOUR. By Ralph Hewins. New York: Day, 1966, 384 p. $6.95.

A British journalist's effort to rehabilitate in some measure a man whose name became an international epithet.

LÉON BLUM: HUMANIST IN POLITICS. By Joel Colton. New York: Knopf, 1966. 512 p. $10.00.

A substantial, sympathetic though not uncritical political biography, by a professor of history at Duke University.

D'UNE RÉSISTANCE À L'AUTRE. By Georges Bidault. Paris: Presses du Siècle, 1965, 382 p. Fr. 19.80.

In these memoirs from 1940 to 1965 M. Bidault attempts the role of historian but the book winds up, in the phrase of one observer, as "un laborieux plaidoyer."

THE FRENCH ARMY IN POLITICS, 1945–1962. By John Steward Ambler. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966, 427 p. $6.50.

An able study of the problem of civilian control over the French military establishment during those critical and hectic years when the army ceased to be "a docile servant of the state."

GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN NEUTRALITÄT: VIER JAHRHUNDERTE EIDGENÖSSISCHER AUSSENPOLITIK. By Edgar Bonjour. Basel: Helbing, 1965, 2 v. Swiss Fr. 62.

A completely revised and expanded edition of a history of Swiss neutrality to the 1920s, first published in 1946.

HOFFNUNG UND SORGE. By Karl Jaspers. Munich: Piper, 1965, 370 p. DM. 22.

A collection of postwar writings by the eminent philosopher on German politics.

GESELLSCHAFT UND DEMOKRATIE IN DEUTSCHLAND. By Ralf Dahrendorf. Munich: Piper, 1965, 516 p. DM. 28.

A significant, if at times difficult and perplexing work by a leading German sociologist on the social structure and attitudes in Germany and their impact on the development of political democracy since 1871.

DIPLOMAT IN WIEN. By Sven Allard. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1965, 246 p. DM. 22.

A German edition of the memoirs and reflections of the Swedish Ambassador in Vienna from 1954 to 1964.

MUSSOLINI IL RIVOLUZIONARIO, 1883–1920. By Renzo de Felice. Turin: Einaudi, 1965, 773 p. L. 5000.

This first of four projected volumes by a young historian covers Mussolini's early career, when he was a revolutionary on the left, and his break to the right in the period of the First World War. This may turn out to be a definitive biography.

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF POSTWAR ITALY. By Norman Kogan. New York: Praeger, 1966, 252 p. $6.00.

A brief survey, cautiously optimistic, by a professor of political science at the University of Connecticut.

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ITALY: THE POLITICS OF PLANNING. By Joseph LaPalombara. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966, 184 p. $3.95 (Paper).

A political scientist at Yale looks into the political features and implications of economic planning in postwar Italy.

SPAIN 1808–1939. By Raymond Carr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966, 766 p. $12.50.

This second volume to appear of "The Oxford History of Modern Europe" is a splendid and much needed work of historical scholarship, covering the sadly neglected history of Spain from the turn of the nineteenth century up to the Civil War of the 1930s. A major contribution.

HISTORIA DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE ESPAÑA: ABRIL, 1920—FEBRERO, 1936. By Eduardo Comín Colomer. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1965, 2 v. Ptas. 700.

A massive history of the Spanish Communist Party from its origins to the Civil War. Considerable documentation but hardly impartial.

A NEW HISTORY OF PORTUGAL. By H. V. Livermore. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966, 365 p. $12.00.

A considerably revised version of Professor Livermore's well-known history, but without a great deal on the twentieth century.

## *Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*

WEIMAR GERMANY AND SOVIET RUSSIA: 1926–1933: A STUDY IN DIPLOMATIC INSTABILITY. By Harvey Leonard Dyck. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966, 279 p. $6.75.

A scholarly monograph on the vicissitudes of German-Soviet relations between the treaty of Berlin and the coming of Hitler. An appropriate sequel to Gerald Freund's "Unholy Alliance."

STRATEGIC POWER AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. By Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, 225 p. $5.95.

A knowledgeable analysis of the interrelation of Soviet strategic military power and foreign policy in the "years since the advent of nuclear weapons made strategic power seem too destructive to employ militarily and yet too dangerous to ignore in political calculations."

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ARMS RACE. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Others. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966, 338 p. $10.00.

This study from the Arms Control Project at M.I.T. comprises an analysis of the Soviet interests, motivations and outlook on questions of disarmament and arms control during the "Khrushchev decade."

ON TRIAL: THE SOVIET STATE VERSUS "ABRAM TERTZ" AND "NIKOLAI ARZHAK." Edited by Max Hayward. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 183 p. $4.95.

A translation, with extensive introduction, of the trial, conviction and sentencing in February 1966 of the Soviet writers Andrei Sinyavsky ("Abram Tertz") and Yuli Daniel ("Nikolai Arzhak").

L'U.R.S.S. SANS IDOLE: DE STALINE À BREJNEV ET KOSSYGUINE. By Bernard Féron. Paris: Casterman, 1966, 229 p. Fr. 18.

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A French journalist reviews the Khrushchev era.

SOWJETUNION: DAS WIRTSCHAFTSSYSTEM. Edited by Werner Markert. Cologne: Böhlau (for the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung), 1965. 587 p. DM. 52.

This volume in the valuable series "Osteuropa-Handbuch" deals with the various facets of the Soviet economic system, each chapter prepared by a specialist in his field.

MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIIA POSLE VTOROI MIROVOI VOINY. Moscow: Politizdat, 1962–65, 3 v. Rubles 5.40.

These three volumes on international relations after the Second World War, prepared by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, cover, from the Soviet perspective, the years 1945 to 1965. A substantial, even hefty work, with quite extensive documentation.

SOVIET IDEOLOGY TODAY. By Gustav A. Wetter. New York: Praeger, 1966. 334 p. $7.50.

The author of a classic study of dialectical materialism, Father Wetter here turns to an analysis and critique of the philosophical doctrines of Soviet ideology, including historical materialism and the political economy of capitalism. (A translation of the edition published in Frankfurt/Main in 1962.)

VINAS DIENAS. By Edgars Krievinš. Kew (Victoria, Australia): Austrālijas Latvietis, 1966. 332 p.

Memoirs by the Latvian Minister in Berlin in the '30s. A useful source for the diplomatic history of that period, especially concerning the Nazi-Soviet agreement of 1939 and its Baltic repercussions.

THE MUTED REVOLUTION: EAST GERMANY'S CHALLENGE TO RUSSIA AND THE WEST. By Welles Hangen. New York: Knopf, 1966, 231 p. $5.95.

Chiefly vignettes of life in East Germany by an able N.B.C. correspondent, additionally welcome because of the relative paucity of writings on the D.D.R.

YUGOSLAVIA—A MULTINATIONAL STATE. By Jack C. Fisher. San Francisco: Chandler, 1966. 244 p. $15.00.

A student of city and regional planning undertakes "to examine the effects of the uniform system of local administration which was superimposed over the country's heterogeneous cultural and economic matrix after World War II."

THE MARKET-PLANNED ECONOMY OF YUGOSLAVIA. By Svetozar Pejovich. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966, 160 p. $5.75.

A study of the uniqueness of the Jugoslav economic system with its particular mixture of central planning and a free-market economy.

## *The Middle East*

THE THIRD REICH AND THE ARAB EAST. By Łukasz Hirszowicz. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966, 403 p. $10.00.

This thoroughgoing examination of Nazi policy in the Middle East by a Polish scholar fills in a dimension hitherto missing in the Middle Eastern history of that period.

DEUTSCHLANDS ARABERPOLITIK IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. By

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HEINZ TILLMANN. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1965, 473 p. DM-Ost. 48.80.

An East German historian's heavily documented study of Germany's expansionist policy in the Near East in which he hopes to "contribute to the struggle against German imperialism and militarism and to further German-Arab friendship." Drawing mainly on German Foreign Office archives and I. G. Farben records, the author lists as sources 31 "Classics of Marxism-Leninism."

FAREWELL TO ARABIA. By DAVID HOLDEN. New York: Walker, 1966, 268 p. $5.95.

A vivid up-to-date portrait of the once-unknown peninsula by the able special correspondent of the London *Sunday Times*.

ISRAEL: THE VIEW FROM MASADA. By RONALD SANDERS. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 310 p. $6.95.

The story of Jewish national rebirth has often been told but rarely so perceptively as in this absorbing volume.

JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM. By GIDEON HAUSNER. New York: Harper and Row, 1966, 528 p. $12.50.

The Attorney General of Israel, with righteous anger and in great, overlong and overwhelming detail, re-prosecutes the case against Eichmann and the evil he represented.

THE SYRIAN SOCIAL NATIONALIST PARTY: AN IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS. By LABIB ZUWIYYA YAMAK. Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies (distributed by Harvard University Press), 1966, 177 p. $3.50 (Paper).

An interpretation and analysis of the first party in the Arab East to have a definite doctrine, but which for thirty years has failed to win popular support.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT: IRAN AS AN ASIAN CASE STUDY. By NORMAN JACOBS. New York: Praeger, 1966, 541 p. $17.50.

Professor Jacobs asks himself why European countries and Japan have been successful in economic development while others have not, despite significant economic and political assistance. In his case study of Iran he finds some useful answers.

## *South and Southeast Asia*

THE FUTURE OF THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By LEA E. WILLIAMS. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1966, 143 p. $5.50.

A Brown University professor surveys the present situation of Chinese overseas populations and finds that instead of a trend to return to their own homes they are fast assimilating into the countries of their adoption, particularly in Singapore and Malaysia. An important book on an important topic.

STAGES OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE COTTON INDUSTRY IN JAPAN, INDIA, CHINA, AND KOREA. By SUNG JAE KOH. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966, 461 p. $12.00.

A specialist in comparative economic studies in Asian countries selects the cotton industry to prove his point that indiscriminate adoption of Western methods in economic growth, to the neglect of lessons learned from indigenous experiences, is not always wise. 130 pages of tables.

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INDIA AND THE FUTURE OF ASIA. By Patwant Singh. New York: Knopf, 1966, 264 p. $5.95.

In the belief that the Asian nations will determine their own destiny, and that India and China will determine the future of Asia, Mr. Singh surveys India's history, culture, religious and language problems, criticizing the Indian government on some points, the United States on others, to point to India's pivotal role in Asia.

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN INDIA. By Michael Kidron. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 368 p. $8.00.

An extraordinary amount of information has been compressed into this book, which not only gives a picture of the amount and distribution of foreign investment in India but compares it with the situation just before independence. Some of the author's interesting conclusions raise questions about how much India has benefited from foreign investment.

THE MCMAHON LINE: A STUDY IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA, CHINA AND TIBET, 1904 TO 1914. By Alastair Lamb. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966, 2 v. $17.50.

A detailed, careful study of the origins, achievements and failures of the Simla Conference together with its delineation of the McMahon Line, with emphasis on the latter's application to Sino-Indian tensions. Treaties, conventions and maps appended.

INDIA. By Stanley Wolpert. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965, 178 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

An outline of India's major current dilemmas and how they arose.

PAKISTAN: EIN SCHLOSS MIT TAUSEND TOREN. By Annemarie Schimmel. Zurich: Orell Füssli, 1965, 278 p. Swiss Fr. 24.80.

A Hindi and Urdu-speaking Bonn professor, specialist in oriental and religious studies, made five trips to the eastern and western sectors of Pakistan to collect materials for her book on Pakistani life and thought.

TRADE, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN. By J. Russell Andrus and Azizali F. Mohammed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966, 289 p. $8.75.

A detailed study of the financial and commercial arrangements in both their external and internal aspects, and their relation to the country's programs of economic development. Based on the authors' earlier (1958) "The Economy of Pakistan," but consideration of the new and prospective five-year plans makes it a virtually new work.

DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS IN NEPAL. By Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966, 551 p. $10.75.

An analysis of a political system in transition in its most critical formative period, with innovation still a predominant characteristic. The authors suggest that the Nepal experiment might well be applicable to other Asian states and to those of Africa.

BURMA—FROM KINGDOM TO REPUBLIC. By Frank N. Trager. New York: Praeger, 1966, 455 p. $10.00.

Professor Trager, Director of Point Four Program, Burma, 1951–1953, and now with New York University, has visited Burma frequently. In this useful book his main theme is the independence of that country: how it was lost, then regained

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and retained. Secondarily, he treats Burma's relations with major powers (especially China, the U.S.S.R. and the United States) whose roles affect its international conduct.

BUDDHIST BACKGROUNDS OF THE BURMESE REVOLUTION. By E. Sarkisyanz. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965, 248 p. Gldrs. 28.50.

The cultural background of Burmese socialism, based on field research in 1959 and on many Burmese sources, especially Buddhist canonical texts.

THE THAI BUREAUCRACY. By William J. Siffin. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966, 291 p. $8.50.

The institutional characteristics of Thai bureaucracy and their evolution, by a former staff member of the Institute of Public Administration, Thammasat University in Bangkok.

TRIUMPH OR TRAGEDY: REFLECTIONS ON VIETNAM. By Richard N. Goodwin. New York: Random House, 1966, 142 p. $3.95 (Paper, $1.45).

An examination of U.S. interest in Viet Nam, the measurement of the extent of needed commitments, the reasons for misjudgments of success and suggestions for future policies.

CHINA, VIETNAM, AND THE UNITED STATES. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1966, 218 p. $4.50 (Paper, $2.95).

The statements of participants in the February–March 1966 Hearings, now brought together in book form to enlighten a wider audience on U.S. policies in Asia, especially Southeast Asia.

VIET-NAM: POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. By Nghiem Dang. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966, 437 p. $10.00.

Professor Dang, Vice Rector at the National Institute of Administration in Saigon, is concerned here with the development of a Vietnamese nation and how public administration relates to rapid social change. Well documented.

THE CHANGING FACE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966, 438 p. $7.50.

A rewriting of "Southeast Asia among the World Powers," published in 1957, but actually a new survey of the present state of the nations, emphasizing both internal and international politics.

## *East Asia and Pacific Ocean*

PEKING AND PEOPLE'S WARS. By Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, II. New York: Praeger, 1966, 142 p. $4.95.

Official translations of Lin's "Long Live the Victory of the People's War!" and of Lo's "Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism!"—both basic documents, released in 1965, important for understanding China's revolutionary strategy but even more for firm indications of its foreign policy. The scholarly Marine Corps General provides a lengthy historical setting for the documents.

CHINA: EMPIRE OF THE 700 MILLION. By Harry Hamm. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966, 310 p. $5.95.

A member of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* editorial staff tells of a 6,000-mile journey through the interior of China, with shrewd observations on political and social situations.

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I SAW RED CHINA. By Lisa Hobbs. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966, 217 p. $4.95.

An Australian journalist, now with the *San Francisco Examiner*, who entered Communist China in 1965, gives her keen observations.

DIE CHINESISCHE VOLKSKOMMUNE IM "GROSSEN SPRUNG" UND DANACH. By Max Biehl. Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv, 1965, 245 p. DM. 29.80.

A well-documented study of the successes and failures of the commune system in Communist China.

POLITIK UND HERRSCHAFT IN ROTCHINA. By Jürgen Domes. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965, 183 p. DM. 10.80.

Basic information on the internal politics, structure of leadership and methods of ruling in Communist China. Mr. Domes, of Berlin's Free University, also provides a useful chronology of the Communist Party of China to 1965.

STUDENT NATIONALISM IN CHINA, 1927-1937. By John Israel. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1966, 253 p. $7.50.

Chinese and Western-language sources are used to show the vital role of the university and middle-school élite in Chinese history and politics, and how student nationalism contributed in a major way to the eventual victory of Mao Tse-tung.

JAPAN'S TRADE IN ASIA. By Kyung-Mo Huh. New York: Praeger, 1966, 283 p. $15.00.

Using almost entirely Western-language sources, this Korean economist of the International Monetary Fund investigates the development of Japan's trade with the ECAFE countries since the mid-1920s and projects the prospects for trade expansion by 1970. Numerous charts and tables.

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN PREWAR JAPAN. By George Oakley Totten, III. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, 455 p. $12.50.

Professor Totten uses many Japanese-language sources to outline the basic domestic problems leading to the establishment of this movement, its leadership, its relationship to non-Communist proletarian parties in Japan and its electoral and organized support. Period covered: 1925 to 1940.

STUDY OF NORTH KOREA. By Ryu Hun. Seoul: Research Institute of Internal and External Affairs, 1966, 317 p.

A biased 20-year history, based on materials available from Communist sources, by a director of Seoul's Research Institute of Internal and External Affairs.

THE AUSTRALIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: A STUDY OF POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS. By G. D. McColl. Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965, 180 p. $9.00.

A University of New South Wales professor spells out problems in Australia's international economic transactions incurred by increased postwar import demands.

## *Africa*

AFRICAN DIPLOMACY: STUDIES IN THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Vernon McKay. New York: Praeger (for the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University), 1966, 210 p. $6.00 (Paper, $1.95).

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This interesting book, by seven social scientists well-known in the African field, contains general essays on the little-understood process of how foreign policy is formed in Africa.

CREATING POLITICAL ORDER: THE PARTY-STATES OF WEST AFRICA. By Aristide R. Zolberg. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966, 168 p. $2.50 (Paper).

In an important contribution to the literature of comparative politics, Professor Zolberg surveys the development of parties and government since independence in Mali, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Ghana, calling attention to the basic similarity in their patterns of evolution.

HISTOIRE GÉNÉRALE DU MAGHREB: ALGÉRIE, MAROC, TUNISIE, DES ORIGINES À NOS JOURS. By Marcel Peyrouton. Paris: Michel, 1966, 284 p. Fr. 18.

A lively historical synthesis from the earliest times up to independence, enriched by the author's quarter-century of experience in North Africa as administrator at the highest level until 1949 and since then as a private businessman and journalist.

MOROCCO: OLD LAND, NEW NATION. By Mark I. Cohen and Lorna Hahn. New York: Praeger, 1966, 309 p. $6.50.

A useful and up-to-date introductory survey of "one of the more perplexing" of the new countries.

NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: PRELUDE TO THE REVOLUTION. By John P. Mackintosh. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, 651 p. $12.95.

Professor Mackintosh's authoritative treatment of the complicated ethnic-political struggles in Nigeria gives an excellent picture of politics before the January 1966 coup. Painstaking attention to details of election results, local government structures and party histories sometimes obscures the description of the underlying situation.

GHANA: END OF AN ILLUSION. By Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966, 130 p. $3.50.

This assessment of Nkrumah's Ghana by two Berkeley graduate students challenges many preconceptions. Written from a neo-Marxist viewpoint, it argues that Nkrumah's downfall was the result of his failure to liquidate the essential features of a foreign-dominated capitalist economy.

A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY GHANA. VOLUME ONE: THE ECONOMY OF GHANA. Directed and Edited by Walter Birmingham and Others. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, 472 p. $12.50.

This first of a two-volume study is a major contribution to scholarship on Ghana. There is little, however, on international influences upon the economy, and developments after 1962–63 are not covered. The second volume will deal with the Ghanaian social structure.

LE DÉVELOPPEMENT À LA BASE AU DAHOMEY ET AU SÉNÉGAL. By Jean Serreau. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1966, 358 p. Fr. 45.

A detailed study of the problems and policies in rural development of two West African states, devoting considerable attention to their respective economic plans since 1959–60.

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ITALIAN COLONIALISM IN SOMALIA. By Robert L. Hess. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. 234 p. $7.95.

A careful, factual account of Italian activities in "Africa Orientale Italiana" from 1885 to Somali independence in 1960.

L'AFRIQUE PEUT-ELLE PARTIR? CHANGEMENT SOCIAL ET DÉVELOPPEMENT EN AFRIQUE ORIENTALE. By Albert Meister. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966. 449 p. Fr. 25.

This book by a perceptive French sociologist presents a sobering discussion of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, and their plans and prospects for economic and social development.

CRISIS IN RHODESIA. By Nathan M. Shamuyarira. New York: Transatlantic Arts, 1966, 240 p. $7.95.

The nationalist movement in Rhodesia up to early 1965 receives a sympathetic and moving treatment by a scholarly journalist who is a member of the Zimbabwe African National Union.

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# SOURCE MATERIAL

*By Donald Wasson*

## I. DOCUMENTS

**Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York, 10022. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, N.Y.; *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York, 10027. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington, D.C. 20036. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 89th Congress, 2nd Sess. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.**

### Africa

ECA-Wirtschaftsausschuss für Afrika der Vereinten Nationen: Regionalplanungen für West- und Nordafrika, by Markus Timmler. Cologne, Bundesstelle für Aussenhandelsinformation, 1965. 150 p. (Wirtschaftlicher Aufbau in Afrika, 2.)

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